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Turkey’s relations with the United States have always been a diagnostic element not 
only for its foreign policy but also its economic and sociological structure. As a 
global power, the US has always interested in the region from Eurasia to the Middle 
East, which inevitably highlight Turco-American relations. This thesis is a product 
of the idea, which gives importance to analyze the key issues in Turco-American 
relations in order to ferret out costs and benefits of Turkish side from its relations 
with the US. It probably gives us to chance to see alterations in relations and 
evaluate Turkish foreign policy vision in the long run. “Indefiniteness” can be 
accepted as the nature of the global environment of the post Cold War which has 
appeared specifically in the aftermath of September 11 terrorist attacks. So, 
following developments in Turkey’s region indicates that there is  need to evaluate 
Turkish position in its relations with the US. This reevaluation period should not 
only comprise strategic, economic and political relations in Turco-American 
relations but also some cliché concepts like “strategic partnership”, “dependency”, 
“global power” and so on. This is why this thesis is analyzing Turco-American 
relations into two sections; the Cold War and the post Cold War Eras, because it 
aims to extract and underline in which ways this bilateral relation has changed with 
changing conjectures, which probably enlighten us about the near future of the 
relations. Therefore, it is possible to think that this thesis is an attempt to highlight 
the important linkage between an “established” or “weak” foreign policy and its 
possible reflections on the state’s international statisko in more general meaning. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
SOĞUK SAVAŞ VE SONRASINDA TÜRKİYE’NİN ABD İLE 
İLİŞKİLERİNDEN  KAYIPLARI VE KAZANÇLARI 
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Türkiye’nin Amerika Birleşik Devletleriyle olan ilişkileri sadece dış politikası 
için değil aynı zamanda ekonomik ve sosyolojik yapısında her zaman belirleyici bir  
öğe olmuştur. Küresel bir güç olarak ABD, Avrasya’dan Ortadoğu’ya kadar uzanan 
bölgeyle her zaman ilgilenmiştir ki bu da kaçınılmaz olarak Türk-Amerikan 
ilişkilerinin dikkat çekmesini sağlamıştır. Bu tez Türk tarafının ABD ile 
ilişkilerinden doğan kazançları ve zararlarını ortaya çıkarmak için bazı anahtar 
nitelikteki konuların analiz edilmesinin önemine inanan bir fikrin ürünüdür. Çünkü, 
bu muhtemelen bizlere bu ilişkideki değişimleri görme ve uzun vadede Türk dış 
politikasının vizyonunu değerlendirme şansı verecektir. Özellikle 11 Eylül terör 
saldırıları ve sonrasında Türkiye’nin bölgesindeki gelişmelerle beliren  Soğuk Savaş 
sonrası küresel ortamın ‘belirsizlik’ doğası göstermektedir ki Türkiye’nin ABD ile 
olan ilişkilerindeki pozisyonunu acil olarak bir değerlendirmeye ihtiyaç vardır. Bu 
yeniden değerlendirme süreci sadece Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerindeki stratejik, 
ekonomik ve politik ilişkileri kapsamamalı bunu yanı sıra “stratejik 
ortaklık”,”bağımlılık” ve “küresel güç” gibi bazı klişe kavramların tekrar gözden 
geçirilmesini içermelidir. İşte bu nedenlerle bu tez Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerini Soğuk 
Savaş ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası diye iki bölüm halinde inceliyor. Çünkü, bu tez 
muhtemelen bizleri yakın gelecekle ilgili aydınlatacak olan bu ikili ilişkinin hangi 
konjektürde nasıl değişeceğini ortaya çıkarmayı amaçlamaktadır. O yüzden daha 
geniş manada, bu tezin “oturmuş” veya “zayıf” bir dış politika ile buların değişik 
yansımalarının arasındaki önemli bağın bir ülkenin uluslararası statiskosu üzerindeki 
etkilerini değerlendiren bir deneme olduğunu varsaymak muhtemeldir.        
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 CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Most studies acknowledge that the world entered a new era in the aftermath 
of the September 11 attacks. In this new era bilateral relations between specific 
countries have become a matter of primary concern, perhaps more so than during the 
bloc-oriented Cold War Era. As an important global power of twentieth century- the 
US led several different types of changes in the world order, whether in the Cold 
War Era or the Post Cold War Era.  In this sense, Turkey has appeared as a good 
example to observe changing concerns in international politics. In essence, the 
direction of Turco-American relations during the Cold War and in the Post Cold War 
Eras can be accepted as an important indicator in determining Turkey’s present and 
future positions in its relations with the US. Moving from this point of view, this 
thesis is an attempt to write an overview of Turco-American relations, to compare 
them between the Cold War and post-Cold War Eras and produce a kind of cost-
benefit analysis focusing on key developments during these periods that have shaped 
relations between the two countries.  
First of all it is better to underline the framework of this work in order to 
clarify the aims, behind the writing of this thesis. Regarding the framework of this 
thesis, the main purpose of this thesis is developing a sort of outlook on specific 
issues in Turco-American relations in order to ferret out main tendencies and 
accordingly their impacts on Turkish position. In other words, the general motive of 
this framework is specifying the key issues- which have created both positive and 
negative impacts on Turkey- to observe possible shifts in Turkish foreign policy 
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mechanism in related to US, rather than trying to rewrite Turco-American relations’ 
nature. In this connection, it can be also possible to talk about two sub-motives of the 
analysis on key issues in Turco-American relations in the following chapters. First 
sub-motive is observing kind of opportunities and also constraints that Turkey had 
witnessed in its relations with the US. The second one is questioning the accuracy 
and impacts of some concepts such as ‘dependency’, ‘real-politic’, and ‘strategic 
partnership’ on Turco-American relations parallel to the shifts in Turkish foreign 
policy. Therefore, in short, I believe in the importance of analyzing key issues and 
their impacts on Turco-American relations in order to envisage how different 
interests and attitudes have changed the process, which probably enlightens us to 
look forward beyond some conceptual limitations. These are the main motives and 
accordingly limits of my framework for this thesis that have canalized me to research 
on Turco-American relations. So it is possible to point out that this thesis is going to 
try to demonstrate specific issues and analyze these issues according to Turkish costs 
and benefits. 
When we refer ‘cost-benefit’ concept, we should clarify the limitations of 
these concepts to specify in which point of view these concepts are going to be use. 
First of all, it should be noted that the terminology of the cost and benefits is in fact 
open to subjective mean of analysis and accordingly biases. That is to say that it is 
very hard to signify both the costs and benefits for a country. In other words, for 
example, an obvious cost in Turco-American relations for one perspective could be 
easily perceived by another perspective as an opportunity or benefit. On the other 
hand, in my opinion, cost and benefits is an extrinsic mean of analyzing the real 
impacts of specific issues and the accuracy of some concepts (like the accurate 
impact of dependency concept) in related to Turco-American relations. On this point, 
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it is better to set some limitations on the cost and benefit concepts in order to avoid 
biases as much as possible. In this connection, the costs and benefits in this thesis is 
going to seek two main criterions. First, in general, costs and benefits will be 
evaluated according to their impacts on Turkey. For example, if one situation 
explicitly results with economic or political constraints for Turkey, this thesis will 
evaluate these constraints as “costs”. Secondly, specifically, this thesis is going to 
look the correlation between the results of the situations in Turco-American relations 
and the concepts which is explaining in the introduction chapter (like dependency). 
For example, this thesis is going to question whether a situation created dependency 
or another concept occurrence in Turco-American relations. By following these 
criterions, it will be easier to underline the costs and benefits according to more 
objective means. On the other hand, it is possible to claim that my individual 
background and the resources which will be used in analyzing will be somehow 
effectual on defining costs and benefits in Turco-American relations. But, instead of 
summing of these costs and benefits, the essential point is their specific impacts on 
the direction of Turco-American relations.                 
When we focus on Turkey in some detail we can see that most of the costs 
and benefits arising from its relationship with the US have been governed by 
domestic factors and foreign policy miscalculations, rather than the predominance of 
the US in the relationship.  This may well be true of other countries that have a close 
relationship with the US.  In other words, a combination of all possible elements is 
the best guide to understanding the relationship between countries, even when one 
(the US) is a global power.  Although the US is now the only global super power, it 
still finds it impossible to impose unilateral domination or control over all the 
countries, which with it has relations. It is not just the weaker country that is affected 
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by the US.  The US itself can be also affected by another country’s smallest political 
maneuvers, a reality that highlights the validity of the notion of interdependency.   
This reality leads us to the conclusion that the unique power of the US is only one of 
several components in relations between the US and other countries. The interests of 
the US may well dominate its relationship with another country, but this might not be 
true of all countries. For this reason, an underlying theme of this thesis is that the 
other country’s interests and foreign policies may have also a powerful effect on a 
country’s relations with the US.   
As noted before, clearly the costs and benefits will change according to the 
differing perspectives and evaluations of each historical period. Thus the costs and 
benefits in the Cold War Era were totally different from the post Cold War Era. More 
interestingly, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington 
broadened the debate on different opened values in the cost-benefit balance between 
countries. There is consensus that the world has witnessed an increase of tension 
between the state and ethnic/national particularism as well as with ‘international 
terrorism’. The world seems to be reaching a point where, given alternative means, 
policies and accordingly complexities, it will be almost impossible for a single power 
or one or two powers to exercise total global control. There can be some difficulty in 
keeping up with the transformations now taking place; for example, according to 
Brat Roberts (1995: vol 18- 1): 
 
Analysts labor with an intellectual inheritance often ill-suited to the problems 
of the present: common wisdom about the way states behave, problems of 
war and peace, and strategic weapons, arms control, and stability all derive 
from the highly distinctive cold war era. Government official’s tinker with 
policy instruments designed for the problems of a different time. It is not 
surprising that the rapid and dramatic changes in international affairs of the 
last decade should have outpaced the understanding of an academic, policy, 
and intellectual community whose stance has been largely reactive. 
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This point of view also led me to work on Turco-American relations in order 
to explore differences between the Cold War and the post-Cold War Eras. I have 
sought to pay particular attention to the way in which political, strategic, and 
economic issues have affected the relationship between the US and Turkey. As I 
have indicated, in the post-Cold War era, bilateral relations would seem to be of 
more value following the collapse of the ‘bloc’ mentality that characterized foreign 
policy relations at the height of the Cold War.  
I regard political science as a complementary component to international 
relations in analysis of foreign policy because -- as already indicated -domestic or 
political miscalculations along with such factors as religion can be very influential 
elements in the relationship between two countries.  In this thesis the initial aim is to 
work from a perspective that takes into account a range of domestic factors as well as 
external issues that have affected the relationship between the US and Turkey.  
Preferring analysis to a chronological account of events, I will avoid deep historical 
and statistical data except where it is necessary to substantiate my analysis.   
The relationship between the US and a cosmopolitan and geopolitically key 
country would be best illustrates the sine qua non need to get a broader perspective 
and accordingly to get rid of static and conceptualized analysis like “the US and 
others”.  Turkey is an extensive example related with all these arguments which this 
thesis going to try to explain, because Turco-American relations is extrinsically 
allows us to see the transformation of the interrelations between a super power and a 
regionally important country. It also gives us to analysis the chance to explore the 
regional and global effects of miscalculations and successes, confidences and 
distrustfulness, and their reflections on the future of multilateral relations. In this 
sense, it can be possible to see many actors at work in Turco-American relations, 
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whether negative or positive ones, such as embargos, military partnerships and 
alliances, manipulation and domination, ideological bombardment, speculation, 
dependency, interdependency and so on.  
As a matter of fact, these elements are the ones that I shall focus on. 
Importantly, it seems to be important to shortly clarify some of these concepts, which 
is believed to be most influential on Turco-American relations. These are: global 
power, dependency (and also interdependency), realpolitik, democratization and 
strategic partnership. Therefore, it is better to look at some concepts that may or may 
not influenced on shifting costs and benefits in Turco-American relations   
First of all, It therefore important to look in brief at the specifics of Turkish 
foreign policy and also the ‘global power’ of the US in this introduction part, before 
moving on to an examination of specific cases and a cost-benefit analysis in 
following chapters.   First, I wish to clarify the concept of global power. There are 
the terms or expressions “global”, “globalization” and “global conflict” with which 
the US is often associated but only the term “global power” sums up its diplomatic, 
economic and military reach.  While the global power of the US was (and is) only 
one component of Turco-American relations, we need to identify the global power 
identity and its possible influence on Turco-American relations to highlight the other 
important components and the real impact of the US’s global power identity on 
Turco-American cost benefit analysis. Max Weber underlines “power” as a source 
for expressing one’s will in social relations.  According to Weber power is the basic 
source for influencing others. (Goehler, 2000: 42-43)  On this point Gerhard Goehler 
(2000: 43) asserts that the concept of power should be considered as the sum of 
different variables which emerge  from  all kinds of social, political, economic and 
cultural relations. Power is not simply one-sided domination.  As Erkki Berndtson 
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has argued (Goehler, 2000: 155) globalization is creating a different mean of 
socialization, development and accordingly different ways of using of power.  
Political and ideological manipulation is closely associated with global power and 
accordingly the globalization process. (Spybey, 1996:151-152) 
In general, the expansion of global power arose with the emergence of the 
Cold War.  The conditions of the Cold War Era created polarization in all senses 
between the two main world powers, the US and the USSR. (Kissinger, 2000:393) 
For more than 40 years, global power was polarized in the ideological and economic 
sense between the ‘west’ and the communist world. [In addition to this, the Cold War 
also witnessed the huge differences within the so-called communist camp, between 
the USSR and China.] Such was the enmity between the two main world powers that 
each deployed its global power towards the sole end of beating down the other 
(possibly more true of the US than the USSR) This polarization directly affected 
other actors, generally in the form of limitations on their policies.(Kissinger, 
2000:396) Indeed, the ideological element of global power during the Cold War era 
made other countries less capable of developing their own positions in world politics. 
(Kissinger, 2000:396-97). The limitations of the Cold War Era also affected their 
economic and social status. Turkey was one of these countries, and was perhaps 
affected even more strongly because of its geo-strategic position. Tobin Siebers 
(1993, 84-86) has also argued that the Cold War era also imposed conflicting ethical 
values on the world, which may be focused as an another important dimension in 
turco0American relations in connection with other effects.  
The character of global power changed just after the collapse of the USSR: as 
the ‘victorious’ global power the US was able by various means to project its own 
values on to the world. Thus global power in the post-Cold War era has meant 
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reconstruction of the world according to American ideological, political and 
economic perspectives:  the capitalist mode of production under the domination of 
American firms has become one cornerstone of the unique hegemonic power of the 
US as Bargchi has pointed out (Bargchi, 1987:4). Hegemony implies and demands 
total control. This is especially true of these regions of the world characterized by 
their strategic importance (because of geographic position, possession of vital world 
natural resources etc.). On the other hand, balancing all political and economical 
variables is an extremely difficult task even for the US. (Simai, 1990:165-166) Thus 
even for a global power “world order” must become “the sum total of the 
relationship among its [the world’s] components (elements) or the total effects of the 
regulating forces determining development, international movements and relations.” 
(Simai, 1990:166) 
The post Cold War Era of the 1990s gave rise to a new kind of conflict 
between the US and various state and non-state actors challenging its hegemony.  
The violence of the September 11 attacks a new period. In this sense, even for the 
source and reasons attacking to the US is not extrinsically envisaging, whether it 
caused by opposition to the US as a hegemonic power or opposition to its policies in 
Muslim countries. This in fact symbolizes how flue the new period and open to 
complexities and surprises in the global politics and also in the foreign policy 
concept. But it let one exact consequence, that is, the expression of US global power 
has certainly had strong consequences – both negative and positive -- in various parts 
of the world. The Turkish case is a particularly interesting example of the 
relationship between a super power and a lesser player in the world arena because of 
Turkey’s strategic and geographical position (and importance to the global power) 
but also because of its type of government and demographic structure. 
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  It is obvious that the “global power” of the US has been influential on Turco-
American relations, but it is also necessary to look at the Turkish side to include all 
the background variables of Turco-American relations. Since the 18th century, the 
Ottoman Empire and then the Republic of Turkey has been an important actor in 
European and international politics because of its geo-strategic position. In this 
period the relationship with the west has been the most dominant factor in the 
direction of Turkish politics both in domestic and foreign senses, both positively and 
negatively.  It might be normal to see Turkish politics as constituting some sort of 
dependency on Western values or pro-European style politics. One of the main 
objectives of Turkish foreign policy and accordingly Turkish politics has been to 
become European in the sense of modernization, democratization.(Kongar, 
1999:460) This objective arises from Ottoman history but is also influenced by close 
proximity to Europe and the desire to modernize.  The shifts and changes as Turkey 
seeks to achieve its goals vis-à-vis Europe or the US (or with respect to 
‘westernization’ in general) affect Turkish domestic politics and at the same time are 
influenced by them, as Müftüler (1996: 256) has pointed out.1 Political instability 
within Turkey indeed has to include as a critical component of Turco-American 
relations along with the particular role of the military in Turkey and the intervention 
of the army following waves of political instability.   As E. Özbudun (2000: 29) has 
observed “the three military interventions in recent Turkish politics [1960, 1971 and 
1980] resulted from profound crises in democratic rule.” It means that, military 
interventions and disruptions of the democratic regime created obstacles in the 
implementation of Turkish foreign policy. In this sense, even the military 
interventions somehow affected Turco-American relations.  
                                                 
1  See chapter 2, section 2.1.and also 2.1 in order to proper analysis of Turkish domestic political 
manipulations and instability, especially on Democrat Party period during the Cold War.  
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In the early period of the Turkish republic the aim of the governing 
Republican People’s Party was to create a high bureaucratic state structure. 
(Özbudun,2000:23) in which both foreign and domestic policy centered on the 
general ideal of ‘westernization’.   In consequence Turkey adapted western styles and 
values in its domestic politics and social life   but on the other hand ‘westernization’ 
as an ideology inevitably led to more dependency on Europe and the US, especially 
in foreign policy decisions.  During the Democrat Party government period (1950-
1960) Turkish foreign policy was mostly dependent on the US in economical and 
also political senses. (See chapter 2 for detailed examples during this period).   
Ironically, this dependency developed out of the domestic politics dynamics of the 
Democrat Party period rather than the ‘global power’ identity of the US.   
While influenced by domestic policy needs, Turkey’s foreign policy is also 
affected by changing global and regional environments. The post Cold War 
environment has brought with it new issues and problems. Today Turkish foreign 
policy has several problems both internationally and domestically. For example, 
internationally, Turkish foreign policy has had to deal with involvement in the Gulf 
War and accordingly the ramifications of the Kurdish question in northern Iraq 
between 1991 and 1995. (See chapter 3-3.3) The Gulf War developed out of Turkish 
foreign policy control and brought with it substantial costs to Turkey.  Today Turkish 
foreign policy faces fresh problems on its eastern borders as a result of the Anglo-
American invasion of Iraq in 2003. (See chapter 3-3.3)  How Turkey responded to 
the invasion was important politically, economically and militarily. As can be seen 
the Turkish position (especially the refusal of the recently elected Turkish 
government to allow the US to use Turkey as the launching pad for the opening of a 
second front against Iraq) opened up a new chapter in Turco-American relations.  
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(See chapter 3 and also chapter 6). Turkey’s so-called partnership with the US 
entered an extremely difficult period in the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq. (See 
chapter 4-4.3. for detailed analysis). The dilemma centering on the occupation of Iraq 
and the ramifications for Turkey has to be regarded as being separate from the more 
general question of how Turkey is to relate to the US as the world’s only super 
power and how it is to fit other needs (i.e. to join the EU- See chapter 4-4.3) into this 
relationship.  As has already been indicated such concepts as “democratization”, 
“political instability”, “dependency” and  “ regional dynamics” have added new 
dimensions to any cost-benefit analysis of Turco-American relationship: it is not 
simply decided by the   “global power” of the US. 
In this connection, secondly, it would be important to define the concept of 
dependency to the reason that dependency as a concept which is believed to have 
influence on Turco-American relations. In fact, dependency as a concept appears as 
another important topic that should be somehow clarified in order to draw limitations 
of the meaning of dependency in Turco-American relations. On this point, however 
dependency generally brings school of dependency theory to minds, this thesis is 
going to take up dependency as a concept in order to ferret out actual effects of 
specific situations on Turco-American. In other words, regarding the concept of 
dependency, political and economic constraints or opportunities, which is directly 
related to specific situations, will be considered for criterion of dependency 
evaluation, rather than evaluating Turco-American relations whether its linkage with 
dependency theories or not. Implementations and outcomes of the specific situations 
(both in the Cold War and after) in Turco-American relations, the concept of 
dependency have gain different type of complexities so that  it is possible to think 
that dependency as a concept have played important role both in the  specific issues 
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in Turco –American relations during the Cold War and its aftermath. It may be better 
to define the sources of dependency concept in Turco-American relations in order to 
clarify the actual impact of dependency on the specific issues in Turco-American 
relations. For example, Leyla Sen (2003:315) is evaluating the dependency concept 
in related to the Turco-American relations more than economic meaning of 
dependency. As she has pointed out, (2003:315) 
 
In addition to economic issues, diplomatic issues became matters of 
confrontation. (For example) The milestone in this confrontation (During the 
Cold War) was the Cyprus issue that led to the breaking of the glass and 
compelled Turkey to see the realities. 
  
This example in fact let to see the reality of dependency concept in Turco-American 
relations that demands of the super power, the US, has been mostly diplomatic and 
strategic, in return of Turkey’s economic  expectations (Foreign aids) from the US. 
The highlighted point here is the increasing complexities in Turco-American 
relations with the occurrence of dependency concept in separate issues such as 
economic, politic, and military.  Inevitably, the level of dependency concept has 
arisen in economic, diplomatic and military issues that directly has affected the cost 
and benefit analysis in Turco-American relations. Moving from this argument, for 
example, Turkish economic dilemma has played an important role in its political 
relations with the US so that complexities and interrelations between economic, 
politic, and military issues can be regarding as the first source of the dependency 
concept in Turco-American relations that is underlined and somehow analyzed in the 
following chapters. 
In addition to this main source of dependency in Turco-American relations, 
the US’s increasing role in Turkish social and economic development in the Cold 
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War Era indicates another dimension of dependency concept in Turco-American 
relations. For example, as Sen has pointed out (Sen, 2003: 328) 
 
Regarding the demands of the USA for an increased role and empowerment 
of private sector (during the first years of the Cold War), and without raising 
explicit objections Turkish policymakers preferred to refer to the previous 
experiences of the country. They defined the failure of the private sector to 
act as a locomotive of the Turkish economy during the first decade of 
Republic as the main reason that led them to adopt etatism. 
 
Besides what this example tries to underline, the essential point of this 
example is to show increasing US’s role on Turkish domestic economic and political 
mechanism during the Cold War and after. Therefore, it is again possible to highlight 
the involvement of dependency concept into the Turkish economic and political 
progress and the role of the US.   
Some aspects of dependency can certainly be identified in the Turco-
American relationship, especially during the Cold War when the level of political 
dependency could be described as almost full.  (See Chapter 2).  Another example 
arose in consequence of the US arms embargo in the mid-1970s:  Turkish 
dependency on US arms created further costs in the sense of its political dependency.  
Subsequently (in the 1990s) Turkey turned to other countries (Russia and Israel) to 
buy arms.  But surely they were never as important as US arms. (see chapter 4 
section 4.1) The crucial role of the US securing loans from the IMF and the World 
Bank also (and obviously) arises in the context of dependency. Of course, examples 
can easily be augmented in Turco-American Relations history.  The essential point 
here is the role of dependency both on appearing a specific situation in Turco-
American relations and on subsequent situations. 
Thirdly, realpolitik is a concept which may be partially important in Turco- 
American relations therefore we need to clarify in which perspective; realpolitik 
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became a topic in Turco-American relations. Here the important point is the basic 
definition of realpolitik rather than the details of political realism theory. In this 
sense I want to put my arguments based on Turco-American relations so that it is 
possible to think that this thesis will try to seek out whether realpolitik plays an 
important role in specific situations in Turco American relations. Therefore, it is 
better to start with the basic definition of the realpolitik in order to clarify in what 
sense I am going to focus realpolitik in Turco-American relations: “A usually 
expansionist national policy having as its sole principle advancement of the national 
interests”2.  In addition, another definition in fact is well summarizing the realpolitik. 
That is: “ruthlessly realistic and opportunist approach to statesmanship, rather than a 
moralistic one, esp. as exemplified by Bismarck”3 As it will be openly seen in the 
following chapters, we should underline the fact that Turkey and the US have 
continued relations mostly because of the conjectural strategic and national interests, 
rather than any other dynamics like neighborhood or ideological alliances or 
historical ties.  It would be appropriate to evaluate Turco-American relations from 
the light of realpolitik to the reason that mutually national interests have been the 
main dynamic in Turco-American relations. In other words, Turkey has sheltered 
strategic and geographic specialties for the US global interests (like American use of 
Turkish territory for the military basses during the Cold War Era and Turkish support 
for American intervention in several different places in the Post Cold War Era). On 
the other hand, the US, as a global power, has sheltered sine qua non specialties for 
Turkey’s regional interests (like American support to Turkey against Soviet 
threatened in the Cold War Era and support for Turkey’s EU membership in the post 
Cold War Era).As a result, both strategic and geographic security have been fit into 
                                                 
2 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition 
Copyright © 2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company. 
3 The Collins English Dictionary © 2000 HarperCollins Publishers: 
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general characteristics of Turco-American relations. On this point, reciprocally 
national interests have played primary role in developing relations. Therefore, 
inescapably, national interests have become the key concept in Turco-American 
relations which opened hilly nature of Turco-American relations in general. So, it is 
appropriate to use the concept of realpolitik in order to clarify the basic motive of the 
parties in Turco-American relations.           
Fourthly, the concept of democratization should be focused. In fact 
democratization in Turkey has been closely related to Turco-Western and 
specifically Turco- American relations.  As Przeworski has pointed out, democracy 
and modernization are somehow embedded in each other (Przeworski, 
Limongi.1997: 158-9). As a matter of fact Turkish democratization has just come to 
Turco-American relations agenda as an primary component, because strategic 
interests has always played a essential role in its political and economic relations 
between Turkey and the US. For example, American oriented foreign aid to Turkey 
was not based on democratic advancement or human rights in Turkey in the past. But 
with the changing geographic and strategic interests the US has started to regard 
Turkish democracy as being a crucially important model in its struggle with radical 
Islamism in the aftermath of September 11 attacks. (See Chapter 3 section Sec. 3.4.). 
Therefore, it is hard to talk about primary place of democratization in Turco-
American relations’ history, especially during the Cold War, but, on the other hand, 
it needs to be focused in related to Turco-American relations      
Strategic partnership is a concept which has been generally underlined by 
both American and Turkish administrators. So, fifthly, we should include the real 
meaning and the effects on the development of Turco-American relations. One of the 
aims of this thesis is questioning and enlightening the validity of the strategic 
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partnership in Turco-American relations. Beyond this, whether the relations fit into 
the strategic partnership explanation or not, both countries administrations have used 
this concept in order to explain their mutual relations, which catalyze us to 
investigate the strategic partnership. On this point, win order to get clear picture on 
the strategic partnership in Turco-American relations, we need to see some specific 
issues in contemporary history of relations. After this, I will turn to analysis of 
strategic partnership in the conclusion part.  
As a result, this thesis defends three main assertions on Turco-American 
relations in the light of these concepts.  After all these conceptual explanations, a 
core and the first assertion in this thesis is that Turco-American relations have 
developed in an interesting and somehow unique way. Unique part of the relations 
contains two main bases: 
First, in an interesting way, reciprocal Turco-American relations have 
developed with a huge variety of international reflections on the global politics. 
Indeed, as exciting examples will be easily seen in the following chapters, Turco-
American relations have gained international dimension because of both US’s 
‘global power’ identity and Turkey’s geographic and strategic importance for the US. 
On this point, Turkey’s geographically importance for the US benefits and foreign 
policy has played primary role in extraordinarily intensifying of Turco-American 
relations. Secondly, as indicated in the previous paragraph, both countries have 
needed to explain this relation with specific definition (such as ‘Strategic 
Partnership’) rather than explaining with some routine definitions (such as economic 
partnership or friendship or ally). Therefore, however strategic partnership definition 
is debatable concept, it constituted on of the basis for unique nature of Turco-
American relations. In fact, all these explanations are not very clear explanations in 
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order to clarify the unique side of relations, but increasing intensity of Turco-
American relations during the American intervention of Iraq and in the post invasion 
of Iraq, is the latest example to separate Turco-American relations from other 
diplomatic relations of the US in the post Cold War Era.(see chp.4) As a result, the 
relationship is an example of the variables that can be at work in the relationship 
between the US and potentially many other countries.  At the same time the 
relationship between Turkey and the US is characterized by complexities of an 
international nature (as demonstrated by Cyprus and the question of Turkey’s 
terrorism problems).  
  As second assertion, I prefer to underline the importance of political 
realism4 (in the limits which has defined above) in defining the historical 
development of Turco-American relations with referencing to conjectural differences 
in Turco-American relations.  For most of the time the place of Turkey in US foreign 
policy has been dictated by global and national benefits to the US.  For example, the 
Cuban Missile crisis, the opium crises and the arm embargo5 in the aftermath of the 
Cyprus operation all demonstrate political realism at work in Turco-American 
relations during the Cold War period.  In addition to this, Iraq issues from the Gulf 
War to the recent US invasion of Iraq can count as significant examples of political 
realism in the relationship. As it can be seen in near past debates, Turkey’s rejection 
to allow the US military activities in Turkey during the invasion of Iraq is the another 
pinpoint in Turkish American relations, because whether the Turkish government 
                                                 
4  Political realism assumes that “the general character of international relations is also true of the 
nation state as the ultimate point of reference of contemporary foreign policy. While the realist indeed 
believes that interest is the perennial standard by which political action must be judged and directed, 
the contemporary connection between interest and the nation state is a product of history, and is 
therefore bound to disappear in the course of history. Nothing in the realist position militates against 
the assumption that the present division of the political world into nation states will be replaced by 
larger units of a quite different character, more in keeping with the technical potentialities and the 
moral requirements of the contemporary world. (Hans J. Morgenthau, 1978:11-12) 
5 Respectively, see Chapter 2-2.4, 2.1 and Chapter 4- 4.1) 
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wanted to allow the US, public pressure on the government and the Parliament, 
Turkey has rejected the Americans request to use Turkish ground in order to pass 
into northern Iraq. So, in addition to realism, the Iraq issue is a good example of how 
other (complementary) factors, like public pressure may play an important role in 
Turco-American relations.   
 As an third assertion, in the light of the first and second assertions and the 
latest developments in Iraq, Turco-American relations seem likely to have a primary 
impact on the international system arising largely from perceptions of Turkey as a 
‘moderate’ Muslim country which can perhaps be used in various ways 
(diplomatically as well as militarily – the use of Turkish troops as ‘peacekeepers’) to 
protect and further US interests.  Clearly 2003 will turn out to be a pivotal year for 
Turco-American relations:  more importantly, costs and benefits in a broad array of 
global and regional partnerships between the two countries will determine their 
future relationship.  
As a result, this thesis can be no more than an overview of key issues in 
Turco-American relations. Within this limitation it seeks to set out the benefits and 
the costs to Turkey of its close relationship with the US.  To what degree does 
Turkey fit the pattern of a dependent state? Does the concept like dependency (or 
other concepts like political realism), real politics, strategic partnership describe the 
Turkish position in the specific situations?  To what degree can the relationship 
between the countries be described as patron-client?  The answer to these questions, 
after the evidence has been presented, will be given in the concluding remarks of 
each chapter and mainly in the conclusion chapter.  
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CHAPTER 2 
COST AND BENEFITS IN THE COLD WAR ERA 
 
        2.1 Ideological Affinities and Strategic Perspectives 
The concept of ideology has been interpreted in many different ways since 
the French Revolution. During the Enlightenment “the study of ideas becomes 
focused on the ideas which animate human conduct, especially in the domain of the 
moral, the political, and the religious.” (Collins, 1993:9) However, the use of 
ideology and accordingly its definition almost totally changed or shifted in the 
conditions of the Cold War that began in the middle of the 20th century. In this period 
ideology was applied globally as part of an intricate weapons system deployed by 
rival powers.  Ideology was embedded with lots of different meanings, which found a 
place itself both in the sociological and strategic dimensions in term of politics. For 
example, Ideological affinities became a dominant aspect of the Cold War period.   
Public groups put their interests on the line and individuals put their lives in jeopardy 
in the defense of specific ideologies, in the U.S., the Soviet Union and indeed around 
the world. Ideology meant different things to different people, different societies and 
different countries.  For example, communists regarded their ideology as a source of 
freedom and equality between the people. In the U.S on the other hand, communism 
was demonized and given an entirely negative meaning. In short, every state and 
every faction in the Cold War – and this was especially true of the two main global 
powers; the U.S. and the USSR -- used ideology to support the extension of their 
power around the world.  What effect did these ideological affinities have on the 
relationship between the U.S and Turkey, and what strategic choices did they 
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effectively force Turkish governments to make? These questions lie at the heart of 
this thesis.   
 If the Soviet Union was mostly concerned with promoting communist ideals 
around the world (albeit in its own national interest) the United States had no over-
arching ideology and preferred to talk more of such values as freedom and 
democracy.   For this reason, the ideological affinities of the U.S seem to some 
observers to be more pragmatic than those of the Soviet Union. (Carlton, Levine, 
1988:158). Both powers, however, did not hesitate to use force or subversion to 
implement their strategic goals.  Differences between an ideological thesis (or an 
ideal abstract value) and reality had to be destroyed when necessary.  The Soviet 
involvement in Afghanistan in 1979 can be given as just one example. In Latin 
America and elsewhere the U.S used similar means in pursuit of the strategic 
necessities that were cloaked by the rhetoric of freedom.  In various parts of the 
world both the USSR and the US were also capable of adapting their rhetoric to 
evolving circumstances to maximize their influence.  
In such an environment many countries – including Turkey -- became caught 
up in the Cold War rivalry, economically, politically and also strategically.   Turkey, 
according to all these three variables, was in a key position both for the Soviet Union 
and the United States and accordingly came under ideological bombardment from 
both sides.   
From the foundation of the Republic Turkey was close to the   West and 
western-oriented ideologies.  This tendency was strengthened after the Second World 
War by perceptions (and the reality) of Soviet expansionism and communism as a 
threatening structure of ideas.   Thus it was that the desire for close relations with the 
West and fear of communism (the first increasingly shaped by the second) strongly 
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influenced the attitudes of post-war Turkish governments. As a close relationship 
with Turkey was also perceived as being in the interests of the US government the 
two countries quickly began to draw closer together.  For the US Turkey served as a 
barrier against the expansion of communism and against a direct threat to Europe 
emanating from the USSR.  The Middle East connection was also important because 
of perceptions of Soviet expansion there through the channel of sympathetic 
governments and political movements.  Thus Turkey would also serve as a barrier or 
a bulwark against penetration from the south. US concerns were mostly shaped by 
perceptions of global Soviet expansionism whereas Turkey (once the 1945-46 crisis 
with the USSR had ended) was concerned more with regional issues such as border 
security as well as the drive towards  ‘westernization’ and ‘modernization’.   
 In the US consensus, between Democrats and Republicans at the onset of the 
Cold War (1946) served as the foundation stone for the policy of ‘containment’ of 
communism declared in the early 1950s.  (Kunz, 1994: 1) It was at this time that the 
struggle with the Soviet Union took on a strikingly ideological nature as a 
metaphysical struggle (from the US perspective certainly) between good and evil 
rather than a temporal conflict with a rival super power.  Already on April 1, 1946, a 
State Department officer, H. F. Matthews, had prepared a memorandum centered on 
the ideas of George Kennan6, who was then an influential U.S. diplomat. Thus it can 
                                                 
6 In July 1947, the quarterly Foreign Affairs published an anonymous article entitled "The Sources of 
Soviet Conduct," which offered what would soon become the basis for U.S. policy toward the Soviet 
Union. The policy offered was that of containment, which would remain fundamental for the duration 
of the Cold War. (http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/04/documents/x.html) this 
article which named “X” article was one of the main guide of the Cold War and US containment 
policy against the USSR. As H Jack Matlock pointed out, his long telegram, which was sent and on 
which the "X" article was based, was really the key document, which set U.S. policy. He convinced 
the policy makers on this policy, which, broadly speaking was our policy until the end of the Cold 
War. (http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/Matlock/matlockcon02.html) 
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be seen that the ‘containment’ policy of the 1950s had a lineage stretching back to 
the beginning of the Cold War.  
Central to ‘containment’ was American military and economic aid for 
countries, which shared borders with the USSR.   (Kissinger, 2000:416). Thus it was 
that ‘containment’ served as the catalyst for the definition and shaping of new 
strategic alliances between the global powers and other actors (this was true of the 
USSR just as much as it was of the US).   Many countries (including Turkey) were 
drawn into the containment strategy implemented by the US.   Not that ‘containment’ 
was ever a fixed notion -- it hardened in some periods of the Cold War (the 
Eisenhower presidency from 1953-61) and softened during others (For example, 
Nixon’s presidency and his “Triangle”7 foreign policy in the aftermath of Vietnam).  
Geographically, its application ranged from Latin America and the Middle East to 
Southeast and East Asia to the borders of China.  
During the entire period, however, the US constantly used the concept of 
‘democracy’ to strengthen its strategic posture against the USSR even while failing 
to do much in practice to strengthen democracy around the world (indeed by its 
support of authoritarian regimes in south-east Asia and Latin America it did much to 
undermine it). On this point, as Henry Kissinger has pointed out (Kissinger, 
2000:419) the promotion of democracy was especially valuable as a propaganda tool 
in Europe at a time when countries in eastern Europe were rapidly being turned into 
Soviet satellite states. Outside Europe, in Vietnam, Korea, Lebanon, Iran and various 
countries in Latin America talk of democracy quickly gave way to more forceful 
                                                 
7 Nixon’s Triangle Policy can be labeled as “Nixon s Doctrine” in the US Foreign policy. In this 
sense, in the aftermath of Korea and especially Vietnam Wars, the US needs to revise its containment 
policy in 1970s. In short, these three basics of the Nixon’s triangle policy depend on:  
First, the US is going to be committed to obligations that the signed agreements in the previous 
periods, Secondly, if a nuclear power will be threatened a country which is important for the US 
national interests, the US will provide security shield to this third country. Thirdly, if there will be no 
nuclear threat for a country, the US wait to see this third country’s self-defending. (Kissinger, 2000: 
672)    
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means of attaining strategic goals and protecting what were regarded as vital 
interests.  Another tool was economic power. Of all the variables at work during the 
Cold War this served as one of the most effective means of winning the support of 
weak and dependent countries and ensuring their compliance with US ideological 
and strategic imperatives.   
Turkey stood at a middle point between the promotion of ‘democracy’ in 
Europe and the search for ‘alternative’ policies. It means that the US was supporting 
democracy in Western Europe as an institutional tool in the aftermath of the Second 
World War. On the other side, according to pragmatic US interests, the US directed 
its policy in the Middle East towards controlling petroleum resources8 and strategic 
points in the Middle East. (Bal, 2001:700)  Thus the US used a combination of 
different policies in the Middle East, rather than promotion of concepts like 
democratization and liberal and human rights. For example, even Madeleine 
Albright, former US Secretary of State, underlined the fact that US intervention was 
not aimed at building democracy in the Middle East.9 
In 1953 the United States played a significant role in orchestrating the 
overthrow of Iran's popular Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadegh. 
Moreover, during the next quarter-century, the United States and the West 
gave sustained backing to the Shah's regime. Although it did much to develop 
the country economically, the Shah's government also brutally repressed 
political dissent. As President Clinton has said, the United States must bear 
its fair share of responsibility for the problems that have arisen in U.S.-
Iranian relations. 
 
 
However, while the US has strong strategic interests in Turkey it also 
promoted democracy there.  This was an ideal, which suited a country that was 
already into a process of political transformation. In order to focus on the costs and 
                                                 
8  Petroleum resources were one of the primary interests either for the US and the USSR during the 
Cold War, because half of the world’s petroleum reserves were found in the Middle East and 
operating cost of Middle Eastern petroleum were nearly half of the other places. (Bal, 2001:700) 
9 http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/jan-june00/iran_3-17.html 
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benefits of the relationship to both sides, it is important to find out what was unique 
to the US-Turkish relationship. What singled out the American relationship with 
Turkey from the relations between the US and other countries? Two important 
factors were at work apart from ideological or philosophical affinity: economics and 
strategic imperatives.  
In order to work out Turkey’s position in the Cold War it is first important to 
concentrate on the US policies for the Middle Eastern region and beyond. As I have 
pointed out the US developed different tools in order to advance its   interests in 
different places of the world.  Bertil Duner, a Swedish political scientist writing 
about the Cold War, put U.S. policy options into six main categories.10 (Duner, 1987: 
124) There was the category of threats in response to threats from the USSR.  
Second, there were ‘negative sanctions’ aimed at weakening the Soviet Union in 
some way. Third, there was ‘positive sanction’ which sought to convert a bad 
situation into one that would serve US interests.   Fourth were the ‘promises’ aimed 
at rewarding allies in the struggle with the Soviet Union.  Fifthly, there were 
‘obstacles’ that could be put in the way of Soviet involvement or intervention in the 
affairs of other countries. Finally, there was ‘cooperation’, this referring to   
agreements that could be reached with the Soviet Union (such as that the 
understanding between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Khrushchev that 
ended the Cuban missile crisis. (Duner, 1987: 125)  
As has been already observed the US adjusted its policies in different regions 
of the world, directly or indirectly, according to these main six headings.  Turkey 
was no exception to the application of these policy choices during the Cold War.  
                                                 
10  US policy was shaping with the goals against the USSR during the Cold War. USSR and the US 
struggle opened the way of different type of categorizations in foreign policy during the Cold War 
Era. Duner’s categorization was only one of them but it also develops an extrinsic example in order to 
see in which perspective the US foreign policy saw the other actors like Turkey.  
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The economic aspect of the Turkish-American relationship, in particular, was closely 
connected to the strategic goals being pursued by the US and indeed was virtually 
dominated by the American ideo-strategic vision, preventing the development of a 
more stable and balanced economic relationship between the two sides.   In its 
relationship with Turkey the US resorted to many of  Duner’s policy options  
including  negative and positive sanctions, but the dominant tool  remained the 
‘promise’ especially in the early years of the Cold War.  In this sense, the Truman 
Doctrine can be regarded as a ‘promise’ doctrine that delivered economic aid and 
promised more as long as Turkey adapted to the pursuit of US regional and global 
aims. The Truman Doctrine combined offers of economic and (as the Cold War 
started to intensify) military aid to several countries in the Middle Eastern region.   
Turkey signed an agreement with the US for Truman doctrine aid on 12 July, 1947. 
(Kongar, 1998: 458) In the economic sense the Truman Doctrine – leaving aside for 
a moment its ideological content -- appeared as an extension of the Marshall Plan 
which delivered financial aid to a variety of countries in the immediate aftermath of 
the Second World War.  Interestingly,   the U.S. had not initially planned to give 
economic support to Turkey because (according to the US perspective) Turkey had 
not suffered from the war in anything like the same way as European 
countries.11(Ismael, 1986:142) However, in line with the Truman Doctrine, the US 
congress subsequently authorized (20 June 1947) an aid program of nearly $400 
million12 to be distributed between Greece and Turkey in order – according to the US 
                                                 
11 Turkey did not involve into the Second World War under Ismet Inönü’s administration. Most of the 
time, Inönü did not argue on politics and decision that he had made, but at the end Turkey managed to 
put itself from out side the World War. (Heper, 1999:6) but it does not mean Turkey did not affected 
from heavy conditions of the Second World War.   
12 In March 1947, US president Truman accordingly told Congress and He asked for $400,000,000 in 
aid specifically for Greece and Turkey, but the Truman Doctrine thus propounded universalized the 
American commitment to contain the spread of Communism. A Greek-Turkish Aid act was signed in 
May. (http://home.wanadoo.nl/tcc/nato/marshall.html) 
 26 
government -- to protect them from the Soviet Union. (Ismael, 1986:142) In time 
economic aid developed into Turkish dependency.  There were two reasons for this.  
First, the Turkish economy was in an extremely weak position in the aftermath of the 
Second World War.  Secondly, the pronouncedly pro-American Democrat Party 
came to power in 1950. Both need and inclination were the determining factors in 
Turkey’s developing economic dependence on the US, and this of course came at a 
political cost. The deepening of the Cold War provided the context for the 
strengthening of this dependency.   
It can quickly be seen that economic aid was critical in the expansion of 
American political and ideological influence over Turkey.  It was a cornerstone of 
the ‘strategic partnership’ that developed between the two countries. An ally is an 
ally not just militarily or strategically but economically.   In other words, the US used 
economics as a tool in its relationship with developing countries (including Turkey) 
in the continuing effort to assert its supremacy over the USSR.  In other words, the 
US, during the Cold War, wanted to use different form of tools, which mainly 
depend on building economic institutions. For example, Fred Bloc (Ikeberry, 
1995:240) wrote for G. Kennan’s “For Kennan, the Marshall Plan succeeded because 
it simultaneously concentrated the Soviet Union and strengthened liberal institutions 
in the West.” As it can be extrinsically seen from the idea of G. Kennan’s ideas the 
US focused on building economic institutions in Europe against the Soviet danger. In 
contrast, the economic aspect of Turco-American relations was built on the provision 
of aid oriented than the building of institutions. The American approach brought 
undoubted costs to the Turkish side because the Turkish economy became caught up 
in the American attempt to implement a global strategy.   
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In addition, Turkey’s economic direction, along with the economic direction 
of many other developing countries, became subjected to the ideological 
predilections of the US or the USSR. Economic models were adopted according to 
the interests of the patron super power.13 The entrapment of economics in political-
strategic necessities continued into the 1960s and 1970s. There were negative 
consequences as well as evident benefits.  Economic difficulties in Turkey served to 
polarize and radicalize political groups in the 1970s. It can be said that as a result of 
the ideological bombardment of the Cold War economics and ideology were forcibly 
fused.  The consequences were to be felt at both the political and social levels. The 
same was true of countries which came under the influence of the USSR.  
Strategically, there were negative and positive consequences for the Turkish 
side but there were (and are) so many complexities in the Turco-American 
relationship it is it difficult to strike a balance between them.  All variables have to 
be included to bring out the costs to the Turkish side.  However, there is no doubt 
that in the conditions prevailing at the time Turkey had no option but to choose one 
side or the other. According to the ‘with us or against us’ doctrine that prevailed in 
Washington in the 1950s there was little room for maneuver for developing countries 
(joining the non-aligned bloc – the middle position – was never acceptable to the US 
government). The strategic costs and benefits to Turkey will be weighed up in 
separate sections of this study, dealing, inter alia, with the Cuban missile crisis, the 
Cyprus crises of the 1964 and 1974 and the Gulf War of 1990-1991. 
On the other side of the partnership, strategic interests were much more 
important to the US during the Cold War than economic concerns (at least explicitly 
because economic power ultimately lies at the core of any power relationship). To 
                                                 
13  This patron- super power dominancy during the Cold War Era let the question of   Clientalism 
perspective in Turco-American economic Relations, which will be analyzed in Chapter 5-5.2. 
 28 
the United States Turkey’s strategic value lay in its geo-strategic position as a barrier 
against Soviet penetration and a possible in the case of a Soviet military attack that 
could well be nuclear.  Turkey was effectively regarded as a front line state.  There is 
clearly great distance between this point and the 1990s view of Turkey serving as an 
example of a Muslim democracy!  This is not to say that the US was not interested in 
utilizing Islam in one way or another as an ideological tool against the Soviet 
Union’s ideological model of socialist Islam.14 By the early 1950s Islam was rapidly 
unfolding as another tool to be used in the Middle East -- especially in the key 
countries of Egypt and Syria – in the ideological struggle between the superpowers.  
Leaving side the question of Islam, American (and British) support for conservative a 
Arab regimes caused many headaches for Turkey in its relationships with Middle 
Eastern countries.  The prevailing emotions and political tides were running strongly 
in favor of nationalism and Pan Arabism, leaving the governments with which the 
US wanted Turkey to have a close strategic relationship dangerously exposed.  
Turkish susceptibility to American approaches and its willingness to take part in 
externally-organized Middle Eastern ‘defense’ pacts left Turkey open to Arab 
charges of taking sides with imperialism (despite the underlying tensions that 
sometimes divided the countries of the western bloc).  Not until the 1970s, in the 
wake of the oil boycott which followed the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the US 
embargo following Turkey’s intervention in northern Cyprus, did Turkey seriously 
set about realigning its posture regarding the Middle East. Complications in its 
relationships with the Arab world can be included in the costs of Turkey’s strategic 
                                                 
14 During mid1950s, the USSR managed to develop its relations with some of the Middle Eastern 
countries. It opens to way for the expansion of socialism in the Arab world. Egypt under Cemal Abdul 
Nasir and Syria under Hafez al Assad in the following period were the extrinsic examples. For 
example, Egypt and the USSR was dealing an the agreement which envisaged huge range of Soviet 
arm selling to Egypt in return Egyptian cotton in 1955. (Kissinger, 2000:489) this uprising ties 
between socialism and Islam was unacceptable for the US politics under the Cold War struggle 
conditions. 
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relationship with the US. At this point, we also should mention another perspective 
that highlighted the importance of rising American interests in the Middle East on 
Turco-American relations. In this sense, Abdülkadir Baharçiçek (Bal,2001:41) 
pointed out, the US needed to support Turkey with its rising interests in the Middle 
Eastern in the aftermath of rising economic (petroleum resources) and strategic 
(USSR’s rising interest in the region) importance of the Middle East. Therefore, 
Baharçiçek (Bal, 2001:41) underlined the fact that the aid program which envisaged 
by US administrations after the Second World War mostly depended on pragmatic 
US interests in the Middle East and aligning Turkey against the USSR during the 
Cold War years. 
In short, while the US developed a strategic partnership with Turkey during 
the Cold War that was important to both sides, its policies in the Middle East had 
numerous negative consequences for governments in Ankara. It has to be said also 
that in its dealings with Turkey the US was not consistent (not as consistent as the 
Turkish side). Whether as the result of lobbying in Washington or for other reasons 
the relationship between the two countries was frequently rocked by episodes that 
certainly left a feeling of bad faith (if not betrayal of a friendship) on the Turkish 
side. The most obvious example is Cyprus. There were to be other rough passages 
(right up to the Turkish decision not to allow itself to be used as a second front in the 
Anglo-American assault on Iraq in 2003), which had a cumulative negative effect on 
the relationship between the two countries. There were costs to the American side as 
well as those accruing to Turkey.  
In the Middle East context, again, Turkey appears as a possible source of 
keep when the US was planning to rescue the 52 Americans trying held hostage in 
Tehran in 1981. Hostage crises (so-called 444 Days crisis is in fact a complex 
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dilemma in the US politics as Gary Sick (Kreisberg, 1985:155) pointed out,15) The 
main point from the Turkish Perspective was that the US launched a dangerous 
military operation against one of Turkey’s neighbors without consulting or deeply 
informing Turkish government. To many Turks, this seemed like a replay of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. (See Chapter2-2.4), In short, while Turkey quickly became an 
important strategic ally for the US during the Cold War, American governments were 
not always satisfied with the attitudes and performance of their friends in Ankara. 
 Proper analysis demands a more detailed study of particular aspects of the 
Turco-American relationship. Accordingly, this work will in subsequent sections 
look at specific issues, beginning with Turkey’s involvement with and in the NATO 
alliance.  As will be seen there have been costs and benefits throughout: apparent 
benefits in the placing of missiles near Izmir turning to costs during the Cuban 
missile crisis (see chapter 2- 2.4).  In the chapters to come the approach will be issue-
focused in preference to a chronological account of the relationship as it has 
developed.   The hope is that this approach will bring out more strongly the costs and 
benefits to both sides.  
    
2.2      NATO 
 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established to prevent 
potential aggression by the USSR and to create an atmosphere of political 
sovereignty in the West. (Kaplan, 1994:2) This is the most common basic 
understanding of why NATO was created. However, a more complex analysis is 
required.  One approach is to see NATO as the natural end product of a sequence of 
                                                 
15 The US changed to the operation center to USS Nimitz ship, which was found in the Persian Gulf. 
Surely, 444 days hostage crises was only a step in the continuous conflict between the US and Iran. 
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historical western alliances, which took root after the French Revolution. According 
to liberal approach, as Rebecca R. Moore has pointed out16: 
 
Although NATO remains committed to the collective defense of its territory, 
its new mission reflects an   evolving conception of security that is less state-
centric, less deferential to the Westphalian principle of non-intervention, and 
dependent to a considerable degree on the triumph of liberal democratic 
values. Indeed, NATO is currently engaged in the active promotion of these 
values, having deemed them central to peace and stability in a globalizing 
world. This new mission and, indeed, the very notion that security can be 
constructed on the basis of a specific set of ideas or values is contingent upon 
essentially constructivist assumptions that states’ interests are not wholly 
material but can be shaped or even constituted by ideas. 
 
 
This is in fact a sort of institutionalist idea, which generally emphasizes the 
continuity of institutions like NATO and envisages the adaptation of institutions to 
the new period like the post Cold War. On contrary, a second approach sees NATO 
as a purely strategic institution of the Cold War years.  Moreover, this approach 
questions the compatibility of NATO between the Atlantic and European 
communities and calls into question, furthermore, its validity following the end of 
the Cold War. For example, as one of the representatives of this counter attack one 
the institutionalists, as Celeste Wallander has pointed out17:  
The puzzle of NATO's persistence is best addressed as part of a larger inquiry 
into institutional change. Institutions persist because they are costly to create 
and less costly to maintain, but this institutionalism argument is incomplete. 
Whether institutions adapt to change depends on whether their norms, rules, 
and procedures are specific or general assets and on whether the asset mix 
matches the kinds of security problems faced by their members. Assets 
specific to coping with external threats will not be useful for coping with 
problems of instability and mistrust, so alliances with only the former will 
disappear when threats disappear. Alliances that have specific institutional 
assets for dealing with instability and mistrust and general institutional assets 
will be adaptable to environments that lack threats 
 
                                                 
16http://www.bham.ac.uk/cssd/content/csp23.1.htm 
17 http://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/intorg/v54y2000i4p705-35.html 
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 Irrespective of which interpretation is correct it is undeniable that the Cold 
War environment played an essential role in the way NATO evolved. And American 
involvement meant that NATO would play an important role in the rivalry between 
the two global powers -- a role that would transcend   the defense of the integrity of 
Western Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed by the victorious wartime 
powers in Washington on 4 April 1949. NATO was not just a military ‘defense’ 
organization aligned against the Soviet Union but served as an important stepping-
stone for the application of US foreign policy in Europe.   In this sense, NATO was 
turned into a tool for the distribution of US military and economic aid to Europe, and 
a kind of umbrella over rising American influence both on European politics and 
economies. For example the Marshall Plan utilized NATO channels in the 
distribution of aid.     In short, behind the protective wall send up to defend Western 
Europe NATO played a critical role in the passage of American policies and plans 
into the European continent. (Kaplan, L.S. 1994; Çayhan, E. &Güney N. 1996; 
Bilinsky, Y.1999) 
The existence of the Warsaw Pact on the other side of the ‘iron curtain’ was a 
useful counterfoil. Each had to exist for the sake of the other. Each became the 
guarantor against the hostilities arising out of the Cold War. Each could use the 
existence of the other to justify increased spending on weaponry and the opening of 
new bases. European fears (and doubtless Soviet fears) rose with the steady 
accumulation of nuclear weapons and the entry of new members into the ‘nuclear 
club’. Both sides sought a military balance (Mellenthin, Stolfi, 1984:23). The 
dominant position of the US in NATO arose because the US was the only country 
that could give military support to Western Europe in the event of a nuclear 
confrontation with the USSR. However, the hegemony of one power created intrinsic 
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and extrinsic problems, in time changing NATO’s role as it was originally envisaged:  
from an organization whose original brief was the defense of Europe it turned into 
one that frequently seemed to serve American interests above all. (American 
dominancy in NATO’s decision-making process can be given as an example.) For 
example, the IRBMs in Europe would have been launched according to American 
decision in the guise of NATO (see Chp. 2.4)) under the changing conditions of the 
Cold War combined with US pressure its role never could be static.  For example, the 
US first wanted to use NATO to strengthen its military and political influence in 
Europe but later on it sought to utilize the organization in the context of the global 
struggle against the USSR. The Korean War appears, as going to be analyzed in the 
following section) is striking example of how the US sought to change NATO‘s 
structure and objectives during the Cold War.      
  For a country like Turkey, joining the western ‘side’ during the Cold War, 
NATO membership was a sine qua non necessity because of Turkey’s geographic 
and strategic environment.  Geographically Turkey stood at a critical point for US 
and Soviet policymakers alike but despite its strategic importance to the US and 
Western Europe it still had to wait for its NATO membership.  It was invited to join 
the European Council on 8 August, 1949. Turks celebrated membership of the 
council but the fact that Turkey had not yet been included in NATO was the source 
of disquiet (Kongar, 1998:459) that could easily be placed in the general context of 
Turkey’s difficult relations with the West. Surely in a similar ways, NATO as an 
organization benefited from accession of Turkey into organization: On the point, 
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Şerif Alp Atakcan has underlined the importance of Turkey for NATO and surely 
accordingly the US:18 
Since its accession, Turkey has contributed to the alliance in every way. The 
nation assigned almost all of its military forces to NATO and fully 
cooperated in the peacetime training, planning, and infrastructure 
development of the alliance, often at the expense of its economic 
development. Furthermore, 29 bases and facilities in Turkey played a key role 
in NATO's defense plans in such areas as intelligence and early warning, 
forward basing, airlift and refueling capabilities and training during the cold 
war. 
 
The Turkish side believed that NATO membership would greatly strengthen 
its security posture against the USSR, a position that was cemented when the 
Democrat Party came into government in the 1950 elections. Turkish attitudes to the 
USSR bore a sharp edge ideologically and politically. Under the anti-Soviet 
Democrat Party government, NATO membership was sought more urgently than two 
years previously.  The enthusiasm for NATO membership was not borne of political 
manipulation for domestic consumption. NATO exercised real power, political as 
well as military, and stood as a powerful deterrent to the nuclear-armed Soviet 
Union19. NATO brought into focus the nuclear capacity of the Europeans. 
In addition to the nuclear aspect of the confrontation between the two blocs 
western governments had decided, when meeting at Lisbon in 195220 to increase 
NATO’s conventional forces from 25 to 96 divisions, thus raising the military stakes 
                                                 
18 http://www.milliyet.com.tr/ozel/nato/serif.html 
19  The US acquired the nuclear weaponry with the Second World War and they practiced on Japan 
during the Second World War. Other global power of the Cold Term period, USSR acquired the 
ability to produce the nuclear bomb in 1949; the security of being the world’s sole nuclear power 
suddenly vanished. The threat posed by two nations having nuclear weapons would eventually lead to 
a policy of deterrence. (http://www.reagan.dk/newpolcha.htm) 
20 So, as Allin pointed out, (Allin, 1995:17) from the beginning of NATO establishment, NATO was 
established to deter the Soviet Union so that NATO introduced as an defensive organization in W. 
Europe and in 1952, member states explicitly institutionalized this aim of NATO in Lisbon Meeting, 
1952. 
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across Europe and the region on its borders.  (Allin, 1995:17) According to NATO 
sources, the context of Lisbon meeting content was21  
 
Accession of Greece and Turkey - Proposed European Defense Community - 
TCC recommendations adopted - Infrastructure- Military terms of reference 
revised - Adaptation of NATO's organization by appointment of a Secretary 
General heading a unified international secretariat and establishment of the 
North Atlantic Council in permanent session in Paris - Atlantic Community 
Committee's report adopted.   
 
Even more than ever, NATO membership was regarded by Turkey as being 
necessary to its security and not just as a channel through which it could pursue its 
goals of westernization, modernization and association with Europe.  
The Democrat Party regarded the Korean War as an opportunity to show 
itself as an ally of the western campaign and especially of the U.S.  In addition to 
this, the party wanted to use the war for domestic political reasons. (Kongar, 
1999:460) Consequently it decided to send a contingent of Turkish troops.  However, 
as will be seen in subsequent section (See Chapter2-2.3) the costs were high.  
(Kongar, 1998:460) The important point to make is that Turkey accepted the 
commitment to Korea as the necessary cost of NATO membership, a cost arising 
from domestic policy concerns and the needs of the Cold War environment. But 
Korea was not the only entry point into NATO:  by the beginning of the 1950s the 
US wanted to establish military and communications bases in Turkey to be used 
against the USSR. The Turkish government agreed to grant the US request but   only 
if they were placed under the authority of NATO. This maneuver also helped Turkey 
to enter NATO, which it finally did on 18 February 1952.22  
                                                 
21 http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c520225a.htm 
22 http://gopher.nato.int/docu/basictxt/bt-a1  ( Legal document on accession of Greece and Turkey, 18 
February 1952) 
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NATO membership dramatically changed Turkey’s foreign policy outlook:  
the Democrat Party governments and the governments that succeeded it began to 
wear NATO-tinted spectacles in the evolution of their foreign policy. Turkey had 
only limited tools in the development of foreign policy and so it was natural for it to 
shift the policy weight to states and an organization that represented their strategic 
interests in which Turkey’s position was regarded as increasingly important. Here, 
the cost was the abandonment of a more balanced multi-dimensional foreign policy 
approach.  Turkey might not have put all its eggs in one basket but it certainly put 
many of them in the US-NATO basket. Once it became a member of NATO (in 
which the old colonial powers, Britain and France, were still dominant) Turkey too 
often seemed to be acting as an agent of the West against Arab and third world 
interests. This was certainly the view from Arab capitals at a time when they were 
still struggling to eject the British and the French from the Middle East and North 
Africa, and when the US had taken the faulty view that indigenous nationalism in the 
Middle East (and elsewhere) was no more than a cover for Soviet penetration.  As a 
member of NATO it might be argued that Turkey had no other choice but it remains 
a fact that Turkey started to see all international situations from the NATO 
perspective.  Turkey’s foreign policy choices were limited in consequence, and in the 
long run NATO membership brought numerous direct and indirect costs. (It will be 
discussed in the following part of this section and also Chapter 2, 2.5 and 2.6). 
On what might be called the positive side NATO membership opened up 
access to the acquisition of military hardware by Turkey. The military equipment 
aspect of Turkish dependency on the main arms supplier – the US -- became more 
pronounced with NATO membership.  Thus it can be seen that NATO also played an 
important role in accelerating military cooperation between Turkey and the US, but 
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this also brought its complications despite the value of military exchanges (weapons 
supply and training programs) to the Turkish army. For example, during the Cyprus 
crisis (1974) the US sought to prevent intervention by applying an embargo on the 
sale of military equipment. So if it is true that the Turkish side benefited from NATO 
membership and an accelerated supply of US military hardware it is also true that in 
the long run weapons dependency was followed by costs to the Turkish army and the 
country’s foreign policy. As K.Kirişçi (Kirişçi,  July 1997:13) has pointed out: 
Turkish defense strategy assumes Middle East countries would be deterred 
from attacking since that would invoke a NATO response. Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty of April 1949 establishing NATO, committed member 
countries to defend any member facing aggression. In October 1951 it was 
extended to cover armed attacks "on the territory of Turkey." At the same 
time, Turkey has a credible ability to defend its territory should deterrence 
fail, with a large army, a large part of its budget dedicated to defense, and 
receiving Western, especially U.S., military aid.  
 
As a result, NATO membership opened the way to a secure and developing 
partnership with the west, but it ushered in constraints in Turkish foreign politics 
especially in its Middle Eastern politics with developing Turco-American military 
partnership. 
Turkish-American relation was also affected by fluctuations in US-European 
relations.  In the 1960s but especially from the early 1970s, some European countries 
had begun to express dissatisfaction with the dominant economic global role of the 
US. The dominance of the dollar was rising dramatically, forcing most European 
banks to build up their holdings of the currency. This kind of   ‘dollar dependency’ 
meant that US inflation and some other chronic problems of the US economy started 
eventually (in the 1970s) began to have an impact on European economies. (Allin, 
1995:41-42) Many European countries -- like France which enjoyed a strong if 
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idiosyncratic relationship with the United States -- grew increasingly unhappy with 
the level of European military and economic dependence on the US23. These 
difficulties were exacerbated by the deepening American involvement in Vietnam 
from the late 1960s attitudes  (Allin, 1995:43) American foreign policy became even 
more Machiavellian (certainly in European eyes) after Richard Nixon became 
President and Henry Kissinger Secretary of State. Today, the same Machiavellian 
attitudes can be easily seen in the US foreign policies. (Leeden, 1999:152-3)    
More importantly, American aspirations as far as NATO were concerned 
changed format with the passing of time and individuals.  In the late 1960s and for 
almost all of the 1970s disappointments (for the Americans) emerged as the result of 
problems between the U.S. and European allies like France and Britain.  The October 
1973 Arab-Israeli War became the occasion for a virtual shouting match between 
NATO members.24  
                                                 
23  For Example, De Gaulle was openly critical of the international monetary system, which made the 
dollar a reserve currency and gave the US considerable power, not least because it could ignore the 
usual rules on budget deficits. More over, France and the US disagreements explicitly increased with 
DeGallue‘s presidency period: His analysis and the policies it inspired resulted in profound 
disagreement with the US. This became immediately apparent, in July 1958, when De Gaulle met the 
then US secretary of state, John Foster Dulles. The Soviet threat to Europe, the Middle East, Africa 
and Asia was central to the US perception of the world. To counter it Dulles recommended bolstering 
Nato's political and military strength and setting up a regional defense system based on medium-range 
missiles and US tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe so that it is possible to thing that NATO 
also was effected from these kind of disagreements. (http://mondediplo.com/2003/03/07franceusa) 
  
24 With this war, the global dominancy of the US in the Middle East became more apparent. After the 
Suez crisis, there were no more influentials either Britain or France. Two global powers0 the US and 
the USSR explicitly dominated the scene. For example, The United States provided considerable re-
supply to Israel, as the Soviet Union did to the Arabs.  The Soviet airlift began on 9 October and was 
quickly supplemented by sealift.  The United States effort had to rely more on airlift initially, due to 
the distances at sea.  The United States airlift began on 14 October and the sealift effort did not reach 
Israel until after the ceasefires. This re-supply effort was the natural response of both powers to 
obligations that they had made in the region, both Israel and the Arabs had assumed that they would 
receive this and when it was asked for, and they had made certain of their logistical plans on that 
basis. Both the United States and the U.S.S.R. were deeply committed to ending the conflict as soon 
as possible. 
 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1989/PSJ.htm 
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By this time Turkey was drifting into a mood of pessimism because of 
European and American differences (especially but not only as they related to the 
Middle Eastern region). On one hand, Europe had been a beacon for Turkish 
modernization and democracy; on the other there was the valuable relationship with 
the US, a distant ally but one of the two global super powers. When the two sides of 
the Atlantic differed, which one should Turkey choose? Almost uniformly the 
answer was the United States. During the Cold War, Turkey invariably supported 
American policies in NATO.  It gave almost unconditional support to NATO- 
oriented policies (such as – almost all Turkish army segments were given to NATO 
command) and brought almost all its foreign policies in the Middle East into 
alignment with US preferences. 
One other reason for aligning Turkish foreign policy with US interests (apart 
from arms and economic support) was that NATO went through periods of structural 
instability.  For example, in 1966 France under DeGallue withdrew from NATO’s 
military command. (Huntley, 1969:78) This can be taken as an example of the 
divisive effect political differences could have on the organization. The absence of 
France from the NATO military command was the cause of further divergences 
between allies. In fact it was increasingly clear that most members did not formulate 
their policies simply on the basis of NATO perspectives.  According to the French 
point of view, NATO was no more than a military- strategic alliance. This was only 
partly true because the Cold War environment had added a political dimension to the 
organization, in which the US appeared as the power that put its politics into 
practice. In this sense, it is not surprising that the Turkish government became 
confused over the military and political missions of NATO and how they were to be 
reconciled. The dilemma became explicit with French opposition to US domination 
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of NATO.25 France’s withdrawal from the NATO military command was a sign of 
political instability within NATO.  Accordingly Turkey’s orientation within NATO 
was focused on the relationship with the US rather than relations with the European.  
Turkish membership of NATO should therefore be seen as having a sort of unifying 
effect on the Turkish-American relationship. 
While NATO was established and organized under the control of the US it 
would be hard to say that NATO has always worked to an American brief (a view 
that can be held even more solidly against the experiences of recent years, especially 
disagreements within the organization over the Anglo-American attack on Iraq in 
2003). For example, the US did not succeed in manipulating NATO to serve US 
needs in Vietnam or in southeastern Europe.  
The American public was completely dominated by anti-communist 
propaganda during the Cold War.  In this atmosphere any country under threat of 
communism ‘subversion’ and any country that evidently had joined the struggle 
against communism and the Soviet Union could easily be ‘sold’ to the American 
public.  But without the intervention or mediation of the government of the media, 
explaining why country A should be regarded with special favor, the American 
public had little understanding of the dynamics that guided American relations with a 
country of which they knew very little. (Cottrell, Eberhart, 1969:51)  A survey 
carried out by the Gallup polling organization in 1947 indicated that more than 63 
percent of the American people supported the idea that the program of aid to Greece 
and Turkey should be turned over the United Nations. (Cottrell, Eberhart, 1969:51)  
This shows that American public did not understand the nature of or the motives for 
their government’s direct relations with the key countries like Turkey during the 
                                                 
25 http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/02/16/1045330467658.html 
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Cold War. Moreover, the American public attitude towards Turkey was subject to 
fluctuations because of the manipulation of public opinion by special interest groups 
(Armenian and Greek lobby activities in the last decade  is an good example, see 
chapter 4, 4-2)  So it is hard to say whether Turkey’s  NATO membership  had a 
direct effect on American public opinion. The administration itself was often caught 
between polarized views and needs arising from domestic pressures.  It always had a 
difficult time during periods of Greek-Turkish tension or crisis, for example, because 
both Greece and Turkey were NATO members (and the influential Greek lobby did 
not make its life any easier).  Sometimes the US supported the Greeks and sometimes 
the Turkish side in those crises. Again, after the Cuban missile crisis, the government 
was criticized domestically for insensitivity in dealing with NATO member Turkey 
(this situation will be discussed in Chp.2-2.4). 
If Turkey occasionally suffered before American public opinion the 
responsibility at least partly lay on the Turkish side.  Turkey rarely if ever used its 
strategic and geographic value (including its value to the US as a member of NATO) 
to get more out of the American administrations.   In view of the pressure of the 
domestic lobbies in the US that directly targeted Turkey (human rights, Armenian, 
Kurdish and Greek pressure groups among them) it was surely essential for Turkey 
to lobby more vigorously itself and to make the best use of its strategic value to the 
US.  If there was a cost here in terms of the Turco-American relationship it partly 
arose from the failure of successive governments in Ankara.   
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2.3 Korea 
 It is hard to find any signs that Korea was central to American concerns in 
the immediate aftermath of the Second World War but it quickly came on to the 
agenda as the Cold War heated up. (Stueck, 1995:16). Primarily concerned with 
Soviet expansion, the US quickly added China to the list of enemies that had to be 
confronted following the victory of the communist forces over the nationalists in 
October 1949  (Levering, 1994: 41) The differences that existed between Moscow 
and Beijing were not to come to light for another decade. The view from Washington 
was of communism spreading across the Euro-Asian land mass and quickly turning 
in other directions as the opportunity arose. It was in this context that Korea assumed 
such critical importance. The struggle where taking place in Korea between rival 
ideological forces was interpreted as a surrogate conflict being waged by China (with 
the USSR in the background) for control of the Korean peninsula.  Once won it 
would serve as the launching pad for forays further a field.  Accordingly the 
communists could not be allowed to come to power   even at the cost of intervention 
and confrontation with the communist ‘world’ (as it was seen). 
Thus the Korean War26 had its roots in broader ideological concerns and not 
the struggle between rival forces within the country.   (Lowe, 1984: 150)   In time the 
war turned into one of the dangerous phases of the Cold War (along with the Cuban 
missile crisis) because of the battlefield confrontation between Chinese and 
American troops and the global tensions that were fed as a result.   What the war also 
revealed was that while Chinese communist influence was growing across southern 
Asia neither the US nor the Soviet Union had a clearly developed strategy for the 
region. (Levering, 1994: 41)  As a result events could quickly develop that were 
                                                 
26 The Korean War (opening 25 June 1950 -- 15 September, US troops landed) 
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beyond their capacity to control. (Levering, 1994: 42) it is possible to talk about 
errors by the US in responding to Chinese foreign policy were a main precipitate 
cause of the Korean War: as many argued that the US had developed a foreign policy 
against the Soviet Union which mostly focused on European issues (Germany and 
south- eastern Europe) to the detriment of   critical questions arising further field.  
Like Iran many years later, it was caught short by the rapid developments in China in 
the late 1940s.  
The US tended to deal with issues arising in other parts of the world in a 
similar fashion, indicating that it had not yet developed an overall strategy even 
though it was one of the two global super powers.  However, it can be said that 
developments in Europe after 1945 were important in determining the western 
response to the Korean crisis in 1950. (Lowe, 1985:126).  Whatever the origins of the 
war, it was quickly inscribed on the Cold War agenda. Korea was yet another 
occasion for showing the Americans who their friends really were.  While there was 
no sense in which Turkey could be said to be threatened by what was happening on 
the Korean peninsula strategic interests and the need to demonstrate the sincerity of 
its relationship with the US dictated that it should take a strong position.   The United 
Nations (under whose aegis the US intervened) did not designate an active role for 
Turkey but Turkey surprisingly saw the war as an opportunity to be included in 
Western campaign. As C. Erhan has pointed out (Bal, 2001:120) there was clear 
linkage between the Turkish role in Korea and its NATO membership, with 
participation in the war playing its part in the cementing of initial Turkish-American 
relations. As H. Bagci pointed out27 Prime Minister Menderes explained their 
                                                 
27 Turkish Daily News, 26 May, 2000 
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decision to involve into the Korean War in an interview for the Vatan newspaper in 
1951: 
Because we saw that the country's security, in the long run, lay in taking a 
number of risks and maintaining our initiative in foreign politics. We could 
not leave the United States alone as that country was for the security of all 
free mankind, challenging the aggressor in Korea with large forces. We also 
saw great advantages for us from the standpoint of our own future defense in 
playing an active role. Our decision and the way it was carried out have given 
a vivid example of how we shall fight when exposed to aggression. Our 
admission to NATO is the result of our efforts along these lines. In 
international relations, Turkey is now being referred to as a great power. 
 
As might be expected there were costs and benefits arising from Turkey’s 
involvement in the Korean conflict. There were military benefits in the sense of 
accelerated US military aid to Turkey, that there is also a point of view that Korea 
was the true beginning of a long period of military dependency on the US (Kongar, 
1999: 460).  It is a fact that the Turkish army was not yet familiar with the new US 
military equipment it received. (Danışman, 2002:1-3) On the costs side, the Turkish 
army28 lost 144   soldiers during the war29. The number of Turkish deaths was one of 
the highest after Australians and British losses on the coalition side. (Kılıç, A.1956: 
150)  On this point, most authorities argue that many Turkish lives were lost because 
the Turkish force was a semi-independent unit that operated mostly under the 
direction of the US command. 
The general political consequences of the Korean War could not but have 
effects on the structure of NATO. At the beginning of the 1950s, President Truman 
and the US administration assumed that the Soviet Union and Stalin had total control 
                                                 
28  Turkey sent total 15.000 military personal to Korea between 1950-1953. 
(http://www.tsk.mil.tr/genelkumay/uluslararasi/barisdesharekatkatki/barisdestekkatki.htm) 
 
29 Total causalities in the Korean War  
United Nations (UN): 94.000 (the US causalities: 33.651) 
Communist Bloc: 150.000 
South Korea (Public): 1.500.000 
Turkey: 144 
(http://www.cryan.com/war/death.html)  and (http://www.iktibas.net/metin.php)  
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over North Korea.  The evidence, however, suggests that the USSR did not have as 
much control or influence as they thought 30 But whatever the real level of Soviet 
influence,  these American perceptions  ‘governed NATO’s reaction and widespread 
change in that organization resulted.’ (Kaplan, 1994: 42)    
   Turkey (and Greece) came into an organization that was quite different 
politically speaking from what it was before the beginning of the Korean War31. 
There are two different approaches to assessing the political results of Turkey’s 
involvement in Korea. According to the first, Korea was too high a price for 
Turkey’s acceptance into NATO and closer association generally with the West. 
(Kongar, 1999:460) The second is based on the view that Korea was critically 
important and that Turkey had to be involved.  What Turkey got out of Korea was 
greater security against perceived Soviet antagonism and the opportunity to take a 
leading role in the Middle Eastern region. In this sense, this perspective also 
evaluates the Democrat party foreign policy and general policies between 1950 and 
1960 as a sort of continuation of Atatürk’s foreign policy, as H. Bağcı has pointed 
out.32 In fact, it is hard to find a direct correlation between Turkish enthusiasm for 
becoming a leader in the region and the political results of the Korean War.  Whether 
the first interpretation is more correct than the second, the Korean War was an 
important step towards future close relations between Turkey and the US, because it 
was one the first associated military operations of the Turkish-American partnership. 
                                                 
30  However Northern Korea had used the Soviet tanks and arms at the beginning of invasion. As 
Kaplan pointed out there was a huge difference in communism perspectives between the USSSR and 
Northern Korea. 
 (Kaplan, 1994: 42)    and  (http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_relations_of_North_Korea) 
31 Inevitably, the Korean War had an important role to shift NATO into political oriented of the Cold 
War period. In other words, NATO was explicitly appearing ad an organization that stand against 
communism so that NATO gains a kind of military extension of a one political approach in the world 
wide in addition to its European security mission.   
32 Turkish Daily News, 26 May, 2000 
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NATO appears as the only political result of the Korean War for the Turkish 
side. NATO membership deflected domestic criticism of the Turkish government 
while participation in the Korean War played an essential role in raising the 
popularity of the new Democrat Party government in Turkey at the beginning of the 
1950s. The government did not hesitate to use Korea for domestic propaganda 
purposes. The Democrat Party used Korean War for the government’s political 
propaganda in domestic politics.  Ultimately, though, it does not seem possible to 
develop an exact analysis of the economic cost and benefits to Turkey from the 
Korean War.  The economic costs of Turkish military involvement were mostly 
borne by the US.  Beyond military spending, the Korean smoothed the way to 
increased foreign aid for Turkey. 
The long-term effects of the Korean War on the Turkish economy can be best 
understood by focusing on the economic structure of 1950s Turkey.  The outbreak of 
war coincided with the election into government of the Democrat Party. The negative 
effects of the war on the global economy compounded the economic problems facing 
the new government.  The prices of raw materials and agricultural products quickly 
increased.  In the short run Turkey, which was still trying to shake off the economic 
consequences of the Second World War, was worse affected by the negative 
consequences of the war than were European countries, especially in the agriculture 
sector. In this sense, the newly emerging close relations between the US and the 
Democrat Party government were affecting Turkey’s economic choices. As 
Waterbury (Waterbury, 1993: 42) has written a quotation from Adnan Menderes:  
 
It is claimed that the Democrat Party's program of 1950 stated that "the basis 
of our economic and financial views, it can be said, is to shrink as much as 
possible the state sector and to broaden as much as possible the private 
enterprise sector and to provide it security"  
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On the other side, the US wanted Turkey to increase agricultural output rather 
than industrial products because its benefits depended on the development of 
agricultural products in an allied country. (Tokgöz, 1997:115) Consequently the 
recently elected Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, started to pursue 
economic policies that were different from those followed in previous periods.  .  It is 
obvious; as Tokgöz (Tokgöz, 1997:115) has pointed out that the fact American 
economic specialists played an important role during the implementation period of 
the Democrat government’s new economic plan. According to the economic policies 
of the new government, Turkey would give priority to the development of 
agricultural products. (Tokgöz, 1997:115-116)  Secondly, the state would partially 
place industry in private hands. Lastly, Turkey started to quickly liberalize its’ 
foreign trade which meant that Turco-American economic relations accelerated in 
the aftermath of the Korean War.  
 
[As a consequence of changes in economic direction Turkey’s production of 
wheat jumped from 2500 tons in 1949 to 5600 tons in 1951. (Tokgöz, 1997:115)] 
 
It can easily be seen that the Korean War accelerated the close relationship 
between the US and Turkey.  On the other hand, it is also possible to see that close 
relations were changing format through American intervention in Turkish politics 
and economics with supporting conditions of domestic political changes in Turkey 
between 1950 and 1960. The War also played an important role in developing the 
linkage between Democrat party government and the US relations. The Democrat 
Party’s economic policies are still disputatious topic even today. Whether its policies 
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were right for that period’s conditions or not, the important point here is to show how 
Turkish-American relations strengthened the Democrat Party rule in Turkey 
domestically and the Korean War internationally.  
                      
           
 
2.4 The Cuban missile crisis and IRBMs in Turkey 
 
The nature of the Cold War changed dramatically with the launch of the 
Soviet space satellite, Sputnik, on 4 October 1957. The struggle for mastery of space 
had begun. The implications were military, strategic, political and global in nature.   
Earlier in the 1950s the US had already planned to deploy intermediate range 
ballistic missiles (IRBMs) against the Soviet Union threat. However, the launch of 
Sputnik raised the stakes in the confrontation between the US and the USSR, 
affecting the crises that were to develop between them in the following years.  
(P.Nash, 1997: 12-13)  It is essential to note that the Cold War period’s policies were 
dominated by high level of sensitivity, which meant that the launching of Sputnik 
was certain to have a powerful impact on the US and its policies.   It must be 
remembered that the US (and the West generally) still did not have a lot of 
information about Soviet technological and military progress.  Therefore, the US was 
not so much cognizant of the complexities of the Soviet side. The same was almost 
certainly true of the USSR’s understanding of the US, giving rise to the fears and the 
suspicion that were so characteristic of the Cold War years. It has been argued 
(D.B.Kunz, 1994: 159) that the search for strategic equivalence between the global 
powers now took precedence in the policies adopted by both sides.  NATO, under the 
leadership of the US and alarmed by the technological prowess demonstrated by the 
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launching of Sputnik, now started to search for potential hosts for the deployment of 
IRBMs in Europe against the so-called Soviet threat.   
France, Italy, Greece, and Turkey appeared as willing candidates.  There is no 
evidence that the U.S. forced IRBMs on its NATO allies. In some cases these allies 
wanted them because they were lesser partners during the Cold War years and 
because they were located close to the USSR (like Greece) or shared a common 
border with the Soviet Union (like Turkey). On the downside the deployment of 
these missiles would turn these countries into potential targets in any conflict 
between the US and the Soviet Union. 
Ultimately Greece refused to accept the deployment of missiles because of 
strong public opposition.  The Turkish government, however, was enthusiastic.  
There were two main reasons for this: 
First, the strongly pro-American Democrat Party was in government between 
1950 and 1960.   The party’s foreign policies were strongly anti-communist and anti-
Soviet.  In this sense, the Turkish government thought the deployment of IRBM 
deployments would yield political support both domestically and internationally.    
Second, there was a long history of antagonism between Turkey/the Ottoman Empire 
and the USSR/Tsarist Russia. The two countries shared a long border and it was the 
combination of geographical proximity, an adversarial history and crises in the 
modern period that drove Turkey to seek protection under the NATO umbrella.  The 
psychology of the Cold War also had its effect on Turkish feeling at the government 
and popular level. (Kongar, 1999:460-1): The placement of missiles in Turkey has to 
be seen which the broader context of Turkey tightening of relations with the western 
bloc, with ramifications for its policies in the Middle East and elsewhere. As Nur 
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Bilge Criss, (Middle East Review of International Affairs, 1997 (1): no1)33 has 
pointed out 
the 1960 military coup did not bring about any significant change in Turkey's 
foreign policy. Its Middle East policy, which was still an extension of 
Turkey's Western-oriented foreign policy. The lack of cautiousness and the 
urge to act with the West, attitudes identified with DP governments, remained 
visible in Turkish actions. For example, on September 29, 1961, when Syria 
decided to break away from the United Arab Republic (UAR -founded by 
Syria and Egypt in 1958), Turkey became the second state after Jordan to 
recognize the new regime. That early declaration was probably prompted by 
Turkey's happiness to see a rift between the region's two most anti-Western 
states. This step drew the wrath of the Egyptian leadership, which cut all 
diplomatic relations with Turkey.34  
  
Finally Italy, Turkey, and Great Britain agreed to host the deployment of 
IRBMs in Europe. The Democrat Party government and the Eisenhower government 
signed an agreement for deployment of IRBMs on 25 October 1959 in Paris. 
(T.Yavuz, 1999: 67)   (Interestingly, the   Menderes government did not need to send 
this agreement to Turkish Grand National Assembly for ratification, which was a 
further sign of the strength of prevailing pro-American feeling). Subsequently the 
deployment of 30 Jupiter IRBMs in Italy was completed in July 1961. (P.Nash, 1997: 
102-103).  The US also supplied 60 Thor missiles to the UK and 15 Jupiter missiles 
to Turkey. The Jupiter missile was fitted to carry a nuclear warhead and had a range 
of nearly 1500 miles (2413 km) range.    This meant that the Jupiters (deployed in the 
                                                 
33 http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue1/jvol1no1in.html 
34 So, as Professor Bilge underlined the fact that Turkish politics the general tendency of Turkish 
foreign policy, which indicates pro- western attitudes, is going on. It was important point, because 
Turkey accepted to deployment of IRBMs before the 1960 Military intervention under Menderes 
(Democrat Party) government. So the military did not change Turkish attitudes to missiles under the 
cold war condition. 
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Çiğli region of Izmir) threatened a large part of the USSR ranging from Moscow to 
Leningrad. 
 The deployment of the missiles had positive and negative effects vis- a-vis 
Turkish security.  On the one hand they provided a measure of psychological comfort 
to a country, which was geographically located at the centre of Cold War tensions 
between the US and the USSR.   On the other the deployment of the missiles also 
turned Turkey into a potential primary target in the event of war: this was not simply 
the fear of the Turkish government but was made clear by the Soviet government in 
an announcement on Moscow Radio.  (T.Yavuz, 1999: 69).   In order to arrive at 
balanced conclusions   about costs and benefits, the Cuban missile crisis will now be 
discussed in the context of Turkey’s involvement through the deployment of the 
Jupiter missiles.  
In November 1960, the Democrats won the US presidential elections and 
John Kennedy came into the White House. Kennedy wanted to remove the Jupiter 
missiles from Italy and Turkey because he believed their presence increased the 
possibility of conflict with the USSR.35  Against arguments that this would weaken 
the overall military posture of the US Kennedy had the trump card of the new Polaris 
submarine, which could launch IRBMs without even needing to surface. Thus the US 
no longer needed Italy or Turkey as European defense lines against the USSR in the 
Cold War.  There was also a case to be made on the grounds of efficiency.  Most 
experts argued that the immobile structure of the missile emplacements in Turkey 
                                                 
35  For example as pointed out 24 The American restraints, despite their overwhelming advantage, is 
counter-intuitive and difficult to explain, except as the consequence of the fear of nuclear war itself. 
The American restraint becomes even more remarkable when considered in the light of new evidence 
that suggests that President Kennedy was willing to even make a public bargain of the Jupiter missiles 
in Turkey, if that was what it would take to resolve the crisis short of war. (http://www.idsa-
india.org/an-jun-100.html) 
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and Italy rendered them vulnerable to air attack or bad weather conditions. (May, 
Zelikow, 1998: 28). 
On the other side the USSR was also preparing its own missile defense far 
from its borders by placing medium range SS-4 ballistic missiles in Cuba.  The 
deployment of missiles close to the American mainland brought the world to the 
closest point of nuclear conflict since the end of the Second World War. (Allison, 
Zelikow, 1999:1).  Given the involvement of numerous lesser actors in the Cold War 
the Cuban missile crisis could not but affect them.  Following the dramatic revelation 
that the USSR had deployed missiles in Cuba (October 1962) US warships were sent 
to the island.  The result was an eventual standoff between the two superpowers (and 
at a personal level between President Kennedy and the Soviet leader Nikita 
Khrushchev).  
The development of the Cuban crisis from beginning to end was a fascinating 
example not only of power politics and ‘brinkmanship’ but also of how decisions are 
made in crisis conditions.   Faced with the grim reality of nuclear conflict both Soviet 
and American decision makers had to give up some of their principles and primary 
objectives.  Turkey -- like Cuba -- unavoidably became a tool in the negotiations 
between the two super powers. If the Americans wanted the SS-4s out of Cuba the 
USSR wanted the removal of the Jupiters from a country on its borders and these 
mutual demands became the basis of the tacit agreement between them.   According 
to some writers (like Zubok) (D.B.Kunz, 1994: 171) the negotiations between 
Kennedy and Khrushchev were actually steps in the search for arms control. The 
Cold War gains international importance rather than bilateral problem between the 
US and the USSR for two reasons. First, it is possible to say that the nuclear balance 
appears to have played a part in the crisis,  
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Because the missile crisis suggests even greater American restraint than was 
realized earlier, strengthening the proposition that the US was as deterred by 
the threat of war as the Soviet Union was, and was willing to go to 
extraordinary lengths to prevent the outbreak of such a war36. 
 
Today it is easy to see that the Cuban missile crisis and subsequent developments 
brought costs to the US at the global level in the form of deterrence and constraints 
in the US foreign policy alternatives. 
Secondly, the other point about the Cuban Missile Crisis was its impact on 
third parties Turkey was a good example of how other actors were influenced by the   
missile crisis. Certainly Cuba increased the Cold War costs to Turkey. During the 
missile crisis the negotiations between the US and the USSR developed without the 
participation or even the knowledge of the Turkish government. The Turkish public 
certainly had little idea of what was going on even though the missile emplacement 
in their country was at key issue in the negotiations.  This had a political effect on the 
Turkish ‘public mind’ 37with consequences in the domestic arena and in Turkey’s 
foreign policy orientation.  The Democrat Party government had declared that the 
partnership with the US was a cornerstone of Turkey’s security position in the face 
of the ‘Soviet threat’.  Whatever the real nature of this ‘threat’ the Democrats had 
used it as a foreign policy tool to serve their domestic political needs. (Kongar, 
1999:460). Generally, the public accepted this view and came to regard the 
emplacement of the missiles near Izmir as being a necessary part of the country’s 
security structure: However, it has to be explained that neither the public nor most of 
Turkish policy makers knew much about the conditions attached to possible use of 
the missiles.38  
                                                 
36 http://www.idsa-india.org/an-jun-100.html 
37 http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/01/10/yazar/kohen.html 
38 http://www.haberanaliz.com/detay.php 
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The Cuban missile crisis showed that the presence of the missiles did not 
necessarily enhance Turkey’s security position but might even threaten it.  
Furthermore, while Turkey had been put at risk through the emplacement of missiles 
it had been kept at arm’s length during the negotiations to end the Cuban crisis.   
These developments tended to confuse and divide public opinion in Turkey but were 
certainly consequences for Turkey in terms of domestic politics and foreign policy.   
The Cuban issue raised question marks in the Turkish public mind about the 
relationship with the US.  The fact that this relationship was continued as before was 
an indication that the Turkish side – far from blaming the US -- regarded the Cuban 
crisis as a ‘natural’ outcome of the Cold War.    In addition, in the years to come 
Turkey remained enthusiastic about the ‘strategic’ partnership with the US which it 
regarded as a sine qua non because on balance the benefits seemed greater than the 
costs: Among these benefits was easier access to IMF credits than many Latin 
American countries and American support for Turkish membership of the EEC/EU. 
Surely, from the other side of the mirror, all these correlations developed as a result 
of different US interest in different time periods. Therefore, it is obvious that Cuba 
missile crises opened a more intimate stage in the relationship, but it does not seem 
to be possible to speculate on very deep impacts of the Cuban Missile Crises on 
Turco-American relations. In conclusion, while the relationship with the US 
remained strong, Cuba was an example of how the weaker partner in a power 
relationship can be forced to adopt a submissive attitude in a situation in which it is 
affected when the stakes are global in nature.  
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2.5 Military Bases 
            
Military bases have always been an important aspect of relations between the 
US and other countries.   It is generally assumed that the presence of US military 
bases around the world was most critical in the Cold War period. However they have 
remained important (in various countries and especially now in the Middle East and 
Central Asia) since the end of the Cold War because of their value in the projection 
of US global power. 
  In the aftermath of the Second World War, the US administrations started to 
give priority to establishing military bases for two reasons. First, as a super-power 
engaged in what was seen as a life or death struggle with the USSR, the US wanted to 
take control of strategically critical areas that it thought would give it the upper hand, 
two global powers started to challenge each other almost in everywhere. The two 
powers began to challenge each other around the world almost as soon as the Second 
World War ended. The US used military bases from Italy to Japan in order to 
‘contain’ communism.  In this way, the US strengthened its capacity to take military 
action in many parts of the world. In short   military bases were the cornerstones of 
global effectiveness of the US military. The second reason for opening bases was the 
US desire to turn military powers into political power vis-à-vis both its friends as well 
as its enemies. As J. Odell has observed the fact that (Ikeburry, 1995:42-43) the 
military bases were a tangible demonstration of US power. In this sense, From 1950 
until 1989, during the Cold War, the US spent an average of $325 billion (current 
year dollars) on the military 39(and most of them on military bases and arms 
                                                 
39 http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/usdefense/06161998Isaacs.html 
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development) In short it can be said that the presence of military bases added much to 
the ‘global reach’ of the US.  
The idea of political power accruing from military power -- hardly a new one 
and in the modern period one that was embraced by radical nationalists and 
communists as well as the ‘reactionary’ governments they were seeking to overturn 
across Latin America, the Middle East and South-East Asia -- was in fact one of the 
main building blocks in the establishment of NATO.  It would be difficult to argue 
that NATO was established merely to provide a cover for US military bases around 
but NATO does appear to have arisen as a tool for legitimizing the American 
presence and the presence of military bases in friendly states. For example, Zoltan 
Grossman has argued that 40 
 
As each intervention was being planned, planners focused on building new 
U.S. military installations, or securing basing rights at foreign facilities, in 
order to support the coming war. But after the war ended, the U.S. forces did 
not withdraw, but stayed behind, often creating suspicion and resentment 
among local populations, much as the Soviet forces faced after liberating 
Eastern Europe in World War II. The new U.S. military bases ( in addition to 
previous ones) were not merely built to aid the interventions, but the 
interventions also conveniently afforded an opportunity to station the bases. 
 
On the other hand, it is possible to talk about NATO military bases causing 
political problems with allied governments (as pointed out before, for example,  the 
French dilemma with the US) that reduced their effectiveness. 
To minimize problems US administrations pursued two different strategies on 
the base question.  Two categories of bases were opened. Those in the first category 
were placed under the command of NATO although the US remained influential in 
their operation through supplies of arms and other means of exercising influences.  
Bases in the second category were under the full direct control of the US government 
                                                 
40 http://www.counterpunch.org/zoltanbases.html 
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and military.  US bases in the Middle East (the US military Bases in Saudi Arabia for 
example41) were a good example of this type of base.  The difference in type of base 
could be taken as a signpost to the nature of the relationship between the US and the 
host government. 
The presence of US military bases (and the presence of the US in the form of 
a NATO base) had paradoxical results for host countries during the Cold War.  The 
military presence of the US military was seen as providing a guarantee against Soviet 
aggression (this was especially important to countries that shared a common border 
with the USSR or were close to it).  However, bases would inevitably arouse the 
hostility of the USSR especially when those bases were close to its borders.  In short 
the presence of bases created contradictions for the host countries which continued 
even after the Cold War ended because a military base controlled by an outside 
power could always be used in a way that did not suit the interests of the host 
government (by attacking a neighboring country for example). Thus the presence of 
bases was likely to cause regional diplomatic complications.42 In the decades 
following the US decision to open bases all over the world their presence became an 
important issue in domestic and foreign policy debates in many countries.43  
In this context the base issue became a critical aspect in Turkish-American 
relations. The issue first came on to the Turkish-American agenda when Turkey 
applied to join NATO at the beginning of 1950s. The possible presence of US 
military bases in Turkey was an important subject for debate during negotiations 
between Turkey and NATO members.   Indeed Turkey used its strategic position as a 
                                                 
41 U.S. military training mission established at Dhahran in 1953 provides training and support in the 
use of weapons and other security-related services to the Saudi armed forces. After the gulf war, a 
new base was constructed at Al Kharj, about 60 miles south of Riyadh. Al Kharj, one of the sites 
selected to receive Phase II aircraft, was a classic bare base location. It had been programmed as a 
massive Saudi military installation,(http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/saudi-arabia.htm) 
42 http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/usdefense/06161998Isaacs.html 
43 Today, the US has got more than 400 military basis (including NATO oriented ones. Interestingly 
most of them were build during the Cold War Era. (http://www.globemaster.de/cgi-bin/bases/) 
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kind of trump card in order to secure acceptance into NATO.  Turkey would not give 
the US permission to open bases without being given to NATO membership. (It was 
expected that Turkey was going to give permission to the US) (Kongar, 1999: 460) 
Another example which illustrates Turkish rejection to allow for using basses is, as 
Nur Bilge Criss (Middle East Review of International Affairs, 1997 (1):no1)44 has 
also observed that 
 
regarding the use of NATO bases for non-NATO purposes, Turkish policy 
makers preferred to preserve a degree of ambiguity, which they believed to 
have a deterrent value of its own. Although Turkey maintained that it would 
not allow the use of its bases during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, it is 
premature to argue that this was an indication of a complete reversal in 
Turkish foreign policy simply because Turkey refused to cooperate with the 
United States while adopting a policy of benevolent neutrality that tilted 
toward the Arabs.  
 
 
It was Turkey’s strategic importance that dictated the US desire for bases in Turkey.  
The most important aspect of this geographical proximity was Turkey’s 360 mile 
long (579 km.) common border with the Soviet Union   (See Chapter 2-2.2).  On the 
Turkish side – once Turkey became a NATO member -- there was the need for 
American assistance to ensure the supply of military equipment and support facilities 
in order to met NATO standards.45 It can quickly be seen that Turkey successfully 
used its geo-strategic position to secure political and military benefits once the base 
issue came on to the agenda. However, the general Turkish view was that military 
bases should operate within NATO limits and under NATO rather than under the 
direct control of the US.  At the same time, once military bases were opened in 
                                                 
44 http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue1/jvol1no1in.html 
45 http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue1/jvol1no1in.html 
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Turkey it could be difficult to limit American influence especially given the 
pressures of the Cold War.  
Several different bases were built in different parts of Turkey, from Izmir to 
Adana. The Incirlik air base was one of the most important American-oriented basses 
in Turkey, was opened as the result of negotiations over Turkish membership of 
NATO. Both sides (Turkish and American) “spent months negotiating an agreement 
with the USAF (United States Air Force) concerning joint use of the base, which 
both parties eventually signed on 6 December 1954.  Several weeks later, on 21 
February 1955, the base received its first official name, Adana Air Base (AB).”46  
The Incirlik base subsequently became one of the most important overseas bases for 
the US because of its close proximity both to the Soviet Union and the Middle East. 
The Adana air base (renamed Incirlik in 197947) has supported almost all US 
activities in the region, including tactical military operations.  Moreover, Incirlik has 
been used to reinforce US military activities in Europe (i.e. during the German Cold 
War crises and in most of the US oriented operation to the Middle East like US’s 
Lebanon operation) during the Cold War.  
Incirlik was also used by the US intelligence service (the CIA) to gather 
information about the Soviet Union during the Cold War.   U-2 aircraft   flew 
from Incirlik to gather photographic imagery and electronic signals from the 
USSR for intelligence purposes. The U-2 plane crisis of the 1960s showed how 
use of bases created cost for Turkey. One of the planes, piloted by Francis Gray 
Powers, took off from Incirlik for 48flight over the USSR without Turkey’s 
                                                 
46 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/incirlik-history.htm 
 
47 In 1979, the base’s name became Incirlik Installation in accordance with the Defense and Economic 
Cooperation Agreement between the US and Turkey. 
48 http://history.acusd.edu/gen/filmnotes/francisgarypowers.html 
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apparent knowledge and was shot down.49  This situation opens extrinsic danger 
for Turkey, to abuse and threats from the USSR. 
Incirlik gained in strategic and political importance during the Cold War 
as a point from which the offensive and defensive capabilities of the US against 
the Soviet Union (and vice versa) could be assessed.  Incirlik alone is a 
fascinating topic in any cost-benefit analysis of Turkish- American relations. 
Incirlik was a physical symbol of the practical benefits from this relationship. It 
was a necessary element in American strategy regarding both the USSR and the 
Middle East (according to American perspective, it was using for mostly 
humanitarian aims, but on the other hand, it).  The geographic location of Incirlik 
added a political dimension to the strategic importance of the base.  It was a 
further step in the consolidation of American military power across the Middle 
Eastern region.  After the precedent of Incirlik the Turkish government allowed 
the US to improve facilities at its air-to-ground range at Konya.  Although the Konya 
Base (or ‘training area’) remained mostly under the control of the Turkish military it was 
important to the US as a testing area for the missiles that were deployed at Incirlik. 
                                                 
49 Clarence “Kelly “Johnson at the Lockheed” Skunk Works (on Dec. 1, 1954) developed the U-2 
airplane. Project Staff was budgeted at $35 million to develop 30 planes and sophisticated cameras 
developed by Edwin Land. Johnson's old boss Jimmy Doolittle at the Shell Oil Co. provided a special 
fuel that would not boil off at high altitudes, called "Kelly's Lighter Fluid No. 1." Johnson built the 
first U-2 plane in 88 days and the first U-2 test flight took place Aug. 6, 1955. In May 1956 the U-2 
air the CIA with Turkey providing an air base at Adana established wing of 4 planes and 6 civilian 
pilots. The first U-2 flight over Russia from Adana to Bodo, Norway, a distance of 3788 miles at 
80,000 feet, took place in June 1956 and was detected by Russian radar. The Russian spy Selmer 
Nielsen at the Bodo air base gave the Russians the time and routes of the U-2 flights. In the "Spirit of 
Camp David" Eisenhower had halted the U-2 flights in September 1959 but they were resumed April 
9, 1960, to prepare for the Paris Summit Conference planned for May 1960. The U-2 flight of Gary 
Powers was shot down May 1 by a SAM-2 missile. Eisenhower leaned that Powers was alive May 7, 
and Khrushchev displayed the recovered parts of his U-2 plane Moscow on May 11. Eisenhower 
departed for Paris May 14 for the summit conference. On May 15 Khrushchev made a threat against 
U-2 bases and the U.S. went on DefCon 3 alert. On May 16, Khrushchev canceled Ike's Moscow visit 
and walked out of the Paris summit. On Aug. 19, Powers made his confession during his trial that he 
was "deeply repentant and profoundly sorry" for his actions. He was jailed in Russia until exchanged 
for Rudolf Abel in Feb. 1962. The U-2 production at Skunk Works was shut down in 
1969.(http://history.acusd.edu/gen/filmnotes/francisgarypowers.html) 
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Subsequently the number of US bases in Turkey gradually expanded (The most 
influential ones during the Cold War were Izmir Air Base and Adana Air Base)50. 
It can very easily be seen that NATO military involvement in Turkey 
frequently turned into US military involvement such as the deployment of the 
Jupiter missiles near Izmir.  The US used the cover of NATO to legitimize and 
accordingly increase its military involvement in Turkey during the Cold War. 
The US saw Turkey and according Incirlik Base critically important: as Jane 
Brooker has pointed out51 
As weapons of mass destruction proliferate in the Middle East, it will become 
increasingly vital to have Turkey on the side of moderation and stability. If it 
comes to conflict, the Turkish NATO airbase of Incirlik is within 1000 miles 
of much of the world's energy resources. This is a critical consideration as the 
Caspian Basin opens to export because Turkey is at the crossroads of transit 
to the West in competition with Russia and Iran. 
 
From the discussion above it ought to be clear that the presence of military 
bases largely governed US attitudes toward Turkey and was central to cooperation 
between the two countries.  The foundations of this cooperation were constructed 
out of the complexities of global political calculations, regional strategic goals, and 
economic benefits. 
The presence of US military bases affected Turkey politically, 
psychologically and physically. In the psychological sense, the presence of the 
bases strengthened the feeling of unity with a global power.  This was felt very 
strongly by Turkish governments and the general public in the 1950s (Kongar, 
                                                 
50 http://www.globemaster.de/cgi-bin/bases/ 
51 http://www.daily.umn.edu/daily/1998/04/24/editorial_opinions/oo0424/ 
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199:460-462) but within a decade Turkish attitudes to the US military presence 
were becoming more negative.  In retrospect it is difficult to decide what the main 
reason was for this shift in attitudes but as have I pointed out in previous sections 
the Cold War was characterized by ideological affinities and by the 1960s the 
political climate in Turkey was changing. Newly emerging leftist and anti-
imperialist sentiments affected Turkish society from the middle of the 1960s into 
the 1970s.  Although Turkish governments (in line with state ideology) remained 
hostile to communism and suspicious of the USSR leftist tendencies were beginning 
to have an impact on public opinion.  One outcome was increasing negativity on the 
base question. In other words, the 1960s witnessed the rise of anti Americanism in 
Turkish politics and society. After the Democrat Party reign, Turkey entered a 
period when Turkish public and politics started to be influenced by leftist 
tendencies. As Yetkin (Yetkin, 1970: 15-17) has written the leftist group were 
fragmented, anti-Americanism appeared to their only common point, especially 
during mid-1960s. More interestingly, pressures of American bases started to be 
more subject to the domestic politics. Turkish governments maintained their 
positive stand but even for them problems arose over the bases.  The main reason 
was the difference in priorities between the US and Turkey over how and when the 
bases should be used. According to the Turks the bases should remain within 
NATO limitations, which meant they should only be used in the common security 
interests of NATO members. However, the US regarded the bases as a means of 
strengthening its regional and global strategic posture, as pointed out in the 
quotation from Jane Brooker52. The bases (especially Incirlik) also became 
subjected to differences that arose over Turkey’s relations with its neighbors. For 
                                                 
52 http://www.daily.umn.edu/daily/1998/04/24/editorial_opinions/oo0424/ 
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example, after Turkey intervened in Cyprus (20 July, 1974) it was placed under an 
arms embargo ordered by the US Congress. (See Chapter 4-4.1)  In response to the 
Turkish government ordered in 1975 that all  US  bases be closed and placed under 
the control of the Turkish military and their transfer to would close and transfer 
control to the Turkish military. 53 Incirlik and Izmir air bases were allowed to remain 
open because of their NATO missions. All other US military bases that were non-
NATO were closed by order of the Turkish government. This was an a good 
example of how military bases quickly became central to diplomatic crises.  As 
noted before, response and counter response on the Cyprus question also showed 
that Turkey was prepared to use the military bases as a tool in its diplomatic 
relations with the US.  
 
 
2.6 The Middle East 
 
The relationship of the US with the Middle East totally changed with the end 
of the Second World War.  The US became a global power, and this brought new 
problems and new perspectives into US politics. As a global power, American 
interests in the Middle East were soon regarded as a critical aspect of its global 
position.  The region was important not just because of its resources but because of 
its strategic position during the Cold War. Involvement in the Middle East was 
especially complicated because the region lived in a state of continual crisis.  This 
was largely the result of the partition of the Arab world after the First World War. It 
was the colonial powers who decided on boundaries and who decided to establish a 
                                                 
53 the arm embargo totally lifted by the end of 1979    
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Jewish state in Palestine which, at the time the US moved into the picture, had set off 
waves of anti-western feeling from one Arab country to another. The most striking 
social characteristic of the region was the fragmentation between different political 
groups, religions, ideologies and ethnic groups which -- taken with the longstanding 
effects of the colonial past – combined to create dramatically unstable political 
structures. These internal problems were aggravated by the continuing interest of 
outside powers in the region’s resources and their meddling to increase their control 
over governments and access to these resources. The task ahead of the US was 
‘stabilization’ of an area, which appeared to be inherently unstable. (Kissinger, 1994; 
Ripley, Lindsay, 1997; Kanter, Brooks, 1994)  
The US used different tools and policies in pursuit of its strategic goals.  
From the beginning it supported Israel diplomatically and, increasingly, 
economically and militarily. On this point Alan Taylor, summarizing the linkage 
between Israel and the US, has defined US policy (in T. Y. Ismael’s book, 1986:139) 
as being  ‘premised on the conviction that the new state would serve both as a 
stabilizing force and a watchdog for American interests in the Middle East’. It is in 
fact possible to elaborate many reasons for American support for Israel. In the 
climate of the Cold War a strong motive clearly was to build a barrier (through the 
close relationship with Israel and other countries) against the USSR. (Ismael, 
1986:139)  The second was to use Israel to polarize and divide Arab governments 
and public opinion. From this perspective, Americans thought (like the British and 
the French before them) that a unified Arab world would endanger their national and 
global strategic interests.  Central to these interests were the petroleum resources of 
the region.  
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One US foreign policy priority was to the creation of an inter-connection 
between American foreign policy tenets and the foreign policies of Middle Eastern 
countries. However, American policy towards the Middle East did not run smoothly 
during the Cold War because of the divergence between US policy goals and the 
region’s unavoidable realities. There was no ‘parallelism’ for most of the time 
(Kissinger, 1994: 491).  As noted before, the US regarded Turkey as standing in the 
front line against Soviet expansion in the Middle Eastern region. Therefore, it is 
possible to say that the Middle Eastern politics of the US played an essential role in 
Turkish-American relations. So the US turned to countries like Iran, Turkey, and 
Pakistan in order to contain the Soviet Union’s influence in the Middle East.  
   The US's strategic and ideological anxiety about the Middle East played an 
important part in the development of the ‘containment’ policy.  According to this 
policy the US wanted to give Turkey a   complementary or supplementary mission.  
The US wanted to create a Middle Eastern version of NATO as an additional barrier 
against the Soviet Union. (Kissinger, 1994: 493).  One basic US goal was to establish 
a link between NATO and the countries of the Middle East.  Turkey was central to 
US plans and a sine qua non element because it was already a NATO member.  
Through the Baghdad Pact (1955) the US proposed to create a Middle Eastern front 
line against the Soviet Union. Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran signed the Pact.  
Britain also came into the agreement. However, while the US strongly promoted the 
pact it was almost impossible (as Kissinger has pointed out) to run it successfully 
because it did not reflecting common goals and benefits.  Neither was it based on a 
sense of common danger: to Arab states the problem of Israel was more menacing to 
their interests than any perceived ‘threat’ from the Soviet Union. Neither (unlike 
NATO) did the pact have the power to organize a military force against a common 
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danger (if one could be found). Lastly the governments, which signed the Baghdad 
Pact, did not enjoy a stable political environment (the Iraqi government was 
overthrown in 1958 and the monarchy destroyed).  To complicate matters even 
further behind the façade of cooperation and ‘western unity’ the US and Britain were 
rivals for .the leadership of countries, which had signed the pact. (Kissinger, 1994: 
494).  
 Not surprisingly the pact came with costs for Turkey, which regarded its 
involvement as the natural extension of its pro-western and pro-US alignment.  E. 
Kongar has summarized the costs to Turkey arising from involvement in the 
Baghdad Pact (Kongar, 1999:461). According to him Turkish-Soviet relations 
became more and more strained – inevitably – while Arab countries, which had 
refused to become involved (which meant most of them) started to see NATO and 
Baghdad Pact member Turkey as an agent of western imperialism in the region, 
representing US interests in particular.   It is hard to see any benefits accruing to 
Turkey in return for these costs because (as Kongar has pointed out) Turkey had 
placed almost all of its military power under the control and authorization of NATO 
command.   Moreover, its strategic partner across the seas -- the US -- did not want 
to become directly involved in the Baghdad Pact but only to give it support from the 
sidelines.   Inescapably Turkey seemed to be America’s representative in the pact. 
The pact brought new responsibilities into Turkish foreign policy, but it was almost 
entirely because of the relationship with the US that Turkey had become involved in 
the first place in the Pact.  Even today many scholars (such as E.Kongar) questioned 
whether the Baghdad Pact served Turkey’s interests or not.   Because of the unstable 
political structures characterizing the Middle East it was certainly impossible for 
Turkey to develop a stable partnership with other signatories of the pact.  Following 
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the revolution (1958) Iraq.  The pact then became CENTO (the Central Treaty 
Organization) but   the name change meant no real change: CENTO was a dead letter 
from the start. 
 The Middle Eastern politics of the US shifted under different 
administrations.  The differences between the Kennedy and Johnson administrations 
stand as an example.  Kennedy believed in the importance of the US image in the 
running of a productive foreign policy and wanted to win the support of the so-called 
‘Third World’ countries. His administration certainly wanted to develop good 
relations with Arab governments but this was difficult (and became more difficult 
under the Johnson administration) at a time the US was just beginning to give Israel 
substantial military support.  ‘Stabilizing’ the Middle East in US (and ‘western’) an 
interest in the Middle East was certainly a strong aspect of US policy during the Cold 
War.  There was talk of democracy but  (apart from Israel and Turkey where a 
democratic political system had only recently opened up) US interests tended to 
focus on states whose rulers showed little interest in introducing democracy any time 
soon (Iran and Saudi Arabia being two examples). The main concern was benefits to 
the US as measured in terms of resources or strategic gains. Towards these ends the 
US could show considerable flexibility. In the 1970s, for example, Henry Kissinger 
worked closely with the Soviets to bring the 1973 Arab-Israeli war to an end (Ismael, 
1986:150) while the Nixon administration continued to support anti-communist 
forces in Syria and Egypt against the Soviet Union.   
Turkey could not fail to be affected by twists and turns in American policy on 
the Middle East. Its involvement in the Baghdad Pact (arising from its desire to be 
seen as a good and reliable ally of the US and the ‘West’) was one example but there 
were many other examples of how American policy brought tensions – open and 
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hidden -- into Turkish foreign policy.   In assessing the costs and benefits to Turkey 
of its relationship, complications in the Middle East have to be taken into account. 
The alignment of Turkish interests with the US could not but affect its relations with 
its Arab neighbors.  Arab hostility to Turkey’s willingness to join western ‘defense’ 
arrangements in the 1950s was only one example. Turkey also had to formulate a 
policy on Palestine that could be accommodated by the US and Israel without 
alienating Arab governments. The need to strike a balance was brought home 
dramatically during the oil boycott which followed the Arab-Israeli war of 1973:  the 
desperate shortage of oil in Turkey was a powerful motivating force for a policy that 
took Arab concerns more into account.    
Partly because it did not want to get caught up in Middle Eastern problems 
and partly because its focus remained strongly on attachment to the West and in 
particular the relationship with the US Turkish foreign policymakers in the 1950s 
and 1960s tended to put the Middle East to one side.  Until the 1960s Turkey tended 
to follow the Middle East lead of the United States. Undoubtedly this ‘west-centric’ 
vision created costs for Turkey especially – given the size of the potential Arab 
market for Turkish products – economically. All Turkish governments have to share 
the blame for failing to develop stronger economic relations with the Arab world but 
their vision was primarily political and ideological and not economic: it was not until 
much later that the economic costs of isolation from the Middle East were brought 
home.  
 American Middle East policies were bound to have an effect on nationalist 
and subsequently Islamic feeling, with consequences that all governments in the 
region (including Turkey) were to feel to a greater or less degree.  In the Cold War 
the US was swayed by the possibility of developing Islamic feeling as a counter-foil 
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to the spread of ‘radical’ nationalism or pro-Soviet influence but as the Americans 
were to discover well before Afghanistan, Islamic sentiment was a double-edged 
weapon. Islamic movements that were hostile to ‘radical’ secularized nationalism 
were likely to be as just as hostile as the secular nationalists to western penetration of 
the Middle East and support of Israel.  The Iranian (and vehemently anti-American) 
revolution of 1979 came as a complete shock to the US administration. It has been 
argued that the revolution was even influential in the electoral victory of 
conservative parties in the US and Britain. It certainly brought home to the 
Americans the dangerous nature of Islamic radicalism in an area where the US has 
many interests.   According to President Reagan  ‘the U.S. will not permit it [Saudi 
Arabia] to be an [other] Iran’ (Zelikow, Zoellick, 1998:69) but it was too late in the 
Middle East:  Iran had been established and had started to spread its radical Islamist 
ideas across the Middle East. Very interestingly, Barry Rubin, who is known for his 
support for American foreign policy in the Middle Eat, has underlined the reality and 
natural tendency of the US in the region, as Rubin (Middle East Review of Internal 
Affairs, 2001: vol5-4)54 
 
The United States, like all other countries, seeks to make a foreign policy that 
is in accord with its interests. In dealing with this particular debate about the 
Middle East, however, that factor is quite irrelevant. Even if the reason that 
the United States saved Kuwait from permanent conquest by a radical 
secularist regime in Iraq in 1991, for example, was primarily because of oil 
interests, the American policy was still in practice pro-Kuwait, pro-Muslim, 
and pro-Arab. After all, there were many alternatives available. The United 
States might have tried to seize contro 
 
 
                                                 
54 http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2001/issue4/jv5n4a1.htm 
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So, again, this claim highlights the claim that the US has inadvertently stimulated the 
radicalism in the Middle East during the Cold War Era. On that point, as Stephen 
Zunes55 has claimed that; 
Often, extremist Islamic movements arise in direct response to U.S. policies. 
The 1953 overthrow by the CIA of the moderate constitutional government of 
Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran, followed by years of support for the brutal 
regime of the shah,led directly to the rise of the Islamic revolution in that 
country. U.S. support for the regime of Jafaar Nimeiry during most of his 
repressive 16-year rule of Sudan led to the destruction of much of that country's 
civil society, resulting in the 1989 coup by hard-line Islamist military officers 
who overthrew that country's brief democratic experiment. During the 1970s 
and 1980s, the destruction of moderate Muslim-led factions in Lebanon by 
U.S.-backed invasions and occupations from Syria and Israel—and later 
military intervention by the U.S. itself—led to a vacuum filled by more 
sectarian groups such as Hezbollah, even as most of the other militias that once 
carved up the rest of the country were disarmed by a revived central 
government and its Syrian backers. The roots of Islamic radicalism stem from 
economic inequality, military occupation, and authoritarianism. Given that U.S. 
policy in the Middle East and elsewhere has often perpetuated such injustices; 
responsibility for the rise of radical Islamic movements can often be traced to 
the U.S. itself.  
 
Turkey was one country that was affected from the US foreign policies in the 
Middle East. The important point here is that American support for the Shah’s 
repressive regime in Iran and its condemnation of the Islamic radicals who brought it 
down created costs for the Turkish side and later for the US itself.  As Noam 
Chomsky has pointed out, political scientists would probably dismiss most of the 
events underlining the relationship between radical Islamism and the US as 
‘speculative’. (Chomsky, 2002:162). Others take a more cynical view of the means, 
which the US has been prepared to employ to achieve its purposes. According to H. 
Amirahmadi – writing of the US -- (Amirahmadi, 1993:14): 
like any other super power, the U.S. has used a variety of malignant and benign 
means to achieve its interest in the Middle East. These have included both 
                                                 
55 Foreign Policy in Focus2001, September 12. (http://www.alternet.org/story.html?StoryID=11479) 
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peaceful and violent methods carried out by means of covert and overt 
operations.   
 
So the US mainly developed and applied different means in order to get an 
advantageous position in the Cold War struggle including trade embargos, sanctions 
sabotages, and support for different ideologies in the Middle East.  Sometimes these 
multi-basis policies had contradictory and ill-defined results, which inescapably 
played a role in defining today’s fragmented structures in the Middle East. Directly 
or indirectly the chaotic political environment prevailing in the Middle East has 
affected Turkey. 
There were also some exceptions to Turkey’s policy of standing aside from 
politics in the Middle East, For instance, Turkey was the first NATO member to 
accept the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as a representative of the 
Palestinian people (1975), and it recognized Palestine as an independent country in 
1988. These initiatives had their effect on Turkish-American relations. For example, 
Turkey did not allow the US to use military basis in Turkey during the 1973 Arab-
Israel War (for the reason of weakening relations in the aftermath opium poppy 
crises) while allowing Soviet planes to Turkish air space at the same time. 
(Sönmezoğlu, 1996:193)  This and similar instances indicates that while the Turkish-
American ‘strategic partnership’ has worked more or less well, there have been some 
periods of friction between two sides. Both sides have not hesitated to use the Middle 
Eastern card against each other: for example, when the US imposed as arm embargo 
on Turkey following its intervention in Cyprus in 1974, Turkey ‘retaliated’ by 
making contact with Arabian countries without consulting the US. Turkey was 
revising its complete Middle Eastern foreign policy in way that did not always suit 
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the US.56 57 As Sönmezoğlu has pointed out, Turkey supported the resolution put 
before the UN General Assembly by Muslim countries in 1975 (10 November) 
describing Zionism as a form of racism. (Sönmezoglu, 1996:193) this attitude of 
Turkey was strongly opposed by the US. The ‘opium crisis’ of 1971 was a further 
example of the weakening of Turco-American relations, in the early 1970s. 
According to the CIA, Turkey was a prime source of opium delivered to the US drug 
market. In response to the US threats, Turkey appeared to stop opium cultivation. 
However, in 1973, the new Prime Minister B. Ecevit, expressing nationalist and 
leftist position at that time, lifted the ban. The US angered hurt but did nothing (like 
another embargo) 
 
2.7. Concluding remarks 
The Cold War Era symbolizes extraordinary political and diplomatic period 
in the world history. Surely, the level of security danger was uprising both for the 
dominant actors-- the US and the USSR--  and other actors during the Cold War Era, 
which meant that political polarization in the world was almost the explicit result of 
the conditions of the period throughout nearly 50 years. ‘Indefiniteness’ (both in the 
sense of political and economical) stood as the main source of the problem for the 
countries like Turkey, which was characterized by irrational and ideological world 
wide political polarization. Therefore, the Cold War conditions were being effectual 
on Turco-American relations development. In other words Turkey, similar to any 
                                                 
56 The co-called ‘opium crises’ can be best described with example of global power – third actor. In 
this sense, in 1971, the US, depending CIA reports, which indicates Turkish opium as one of the main 
the source of drug market in the US, started to put pressure on Turkish government (leaded by Prime 
Minister Nihat Erim). Turkey directly abandons the opium cultivation in Turkey under the US threats 
(economic and political), although Turkish agriculture had been benefited much from opium. 
Ironically, in 1973, new Prime Minister Ecevit announced that the prohibition on opium cultivation 
was lifted by the new government 
57 http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/dosya/abd_dehseti/19mensur.asp 
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other countries in its region, was affected from the political polarization and the 
indefiniteness political environment of the Cold War conditions. For example, 
Turkey faced with ineluctable reflections of the Cold War environment, such as 
Turkey had been forced to choose one side-- western side or eastern bloc 
ideologically, politically and economically. It means that the Cold War affected to 
whole Turkish system from economy to its’ sociological structure. On the other 
hand, politically, it was almost impossible to remain neutral between two sides for 
the country like Turkey, because of its specific geographic position. On this point, it 
should be highlighted Turkey’s geographic position’s strategic importance for the 
two super power of the Cold War Era. This was the main reason why Turkey did not 
able to remain neutral like Switzerland from beginning to the end of the Cold War 
period. As has noted before in this chapter, this was the natural and unavoidable end 
result for the country like Turkey. But what was the US’s role on Turkey during the 
Cold War? 
On this point, as has indicated in the chapter, one question has become 
important: what single out American relations with Turkey than its relations with 
others?  This question, which has been trying to find answer in this chapter, is in fact 
in the key position in order to understand how and in which ways Turco-American 
relations were effected from the Cold War environment. Therefore, it is possible to 
talk about two main results which probably were effectual on costs and benefits to 
Turkey in its relations with the US during the Cold War Era. 
Firstly, it is essential to underline the fact that Turkey and the US have 
become closer with the Cold War conditions. As it can be seen in the specific issues, 
(like Turkey’s NATO membership or American military basses in Turkey) the Cold 
War conditions directed Turco-American cooperation towards more or less strategic, 
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militarily and economic nature rather than directly ideological or even philosophical 
cooperation for most of time. (with some exceptions like 1950s Democrat Party rule 
in Turkey-see chp.2 2.1) This kind of process in relations is probably the 
characteristic reason for developing sort of ‘strategic partnership’ concept that has 
been expressed by both the US and Turkey administrations nowadays. As a result, as 
it can be easily seen in the specific issues in this chapter, both Turkey and the US 
were being closer to each other with mostly security and strategic anxieties. In other 
words, strategic perspective dominancy of the Cold War Era in Turco-American 
relations has somehow effected perceptions on the costs and benefits concepts in the 
long run. For example, as it can be seen in the issues that have highlighted in this 
chapter, (like NATO, IRBMs and military basses in Turkey) Turkish administrations 
mostly saw its’ costs and benefits  from its relations with the US from the point that 
short term economic and militarily gains or looses during the Cold War. This kind of 
perceptions is still prevailing in Ankara nowadays in the post Cold War Era. It means 
that the Cold War period were not only limited the nature and conditions of Turco-
American relations, but also limited the perceptions on costs and benefits concepts 
that have inevitably effected nowadays perceptions of both sides to each other. 
Second important result of the Cold War Era on Turco-American relations is 
the US’s “with us or against us” doctrine. As I have pointed out in this chapter, 
according to ‘with us or against us’ doctrine that prevailed in Washington since 
1950s, developing countries like Turkey were somehow compelled to act in the 
limits that the US put. It means that there was very limited area for maneuver (both 
political and economic) for the countries like Turkey. More importantly, this doctrine 
brought up the priorities to US benefits and global interests while it certainly limited 
other actors. Whatever the reasons for the other actors like Turkey, it is certain that 
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global polarization and power balances of the Cold War conditions were open to run 
this kind of doctrine. More importantly, after September 11 attacks, US president 
George W. Bush have announced that the US will continue to follow “with us or 
against us” doctrine in their foreign politics. Latest developments in the aftermath of 
September 11 attacks exposed that the US foreign policy practices and policies have 
not so much different than the Cold War Era. Surely, this kind of foreign policy will 
be open to high level of controversial dilemmas between the US and its allies, 
because, the world has changed by the end of the Cold War and countries like 
Turkey want to give priority its own  benefits in the regional politics. Turkey’s 
different attitude in the Middle East is an explicit example in the post Cold War Era 
and specifically during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
As it can be seen in this chapter, during almost whole Cold War Era, Turkey 
somehow followed the American oriented politics and limited itself to practices its 
own politics. On the other hand, Turkey abstained to the US invasion of Iraq and did 
not allow opening territories to the US campaign against Iraq. Just six mounts later, 
same Turkish administration decided to send Turkish troops to help the US in order 
to stabilize Iraq.(However, the US has abandoned its request for Turkish troops to 
Iraq because of regional anxieties.) So, the Cold War‘s third actors like Turkey have 
started to seek primarily their privileges and need areas to maneuver according to 
their foreign policy benefits. So, it is impossible to expect that the US will lead the 
strict doctrines like during the Cold War. On the other, however these realities also 
underlined the fact that political conditions of the new era are different than the Cold 
War Era. The previous political exercises have somehow affected today’s politics. 
This reality is the biggest finding of this chapter which also means that Turco-
American relations in the Cold War Era is still demanding more detailed studies and 
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research in order to ferret out nowadays’ costs and benefits and accordingly the 
dynamics under Turco-American relations.                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 77 
CHAPTER 3 
COST BENEFITS IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA 
 
The post-Cold War Era has witnessed specific changes in the US interests 
and roles in the global realm  Linton, F. Brooks and Arnold Kanter have summarized 
the new American role in the post-Cold War Era. In this sense, as Brooks and Kanter 
(Kanter, Brooks, 1994:21) have pointed out,  
 
The US post Cold War role has changed. The US is now, at most, the 
leader of a community of increasingly independent actors, rather than 
the commander of a military alliance united by a common threat. The 
US has become the world’s sheriff, rather than the world’s police 
officer. 
  
As it can be easily seen from the tone which underlying these words, the US 
and its perspective of previous allies is totally changed by the post-Cold War 
conditions. In this sense, Turco-American relations have entered into a period of 
transformation. In the following chapter, I am going to try to illustrate changing 
attitudes between Turkey and the US with changing conjecture.  
 
3.1 The new global environment 
In foreign policy, sequences of events are the main stepping-stones in order to 
specify different periods in international relations. In other words, some specific 
events -- like the world wars -- designate periods of foreign policy.  In this sense, the 
collapse of communism and the Soviet Union certainly had their effect on foreign 
policy formation. The complexities of the Cold War ended with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union only to be followed by the growth of new complexities. These cannot 
be evaluated simply within the limits of conventional foreign policy thinking. The 
 78 
world entered a different period with the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union had a profound effect on strategic, geographic and military issues but 
also influenced the demographic and social structures across the world. J. Rosati   
(Rosati, 1999:36) argues that  
 
U.S. foreign policy may have entered a time span where the contradiction 
between the legacy of America’s expansive and cold war past, the implications 
of the tremendous changes that have enveloped the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe, and the uncertainty of domestic support need to be addressed and 
reconciled. 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union not only changed the context of foreign policy 
tools but also changed almost all patterns and policies in US foreign relations. This 
new reality left the US as the single global power. Many if not most people would 
perhaps think that the ideological and political collapse of the world’s other super 
power  would also have brought down  all  obstacles  to the spreading  of western- 
type democracy, human rights  and a high standard of life. But this has not happened. 
The globalization that has strengthened in the past decade has brought with it greater 
inequities and rising anger in developing countries against the economic institutions 
of the West.  In the meantime, new enemies appeared in the place of the old: foremost 
among them are the Islamic radical groups opposing the general values of  
‘westernization’ and the particular policies of the United States in the Middle East 
and other regions. The Cold War might have ended but US foreign policymakers now 
have to deal with issues no fewer complexes than their predecessors did in the 1950s 
and 1960s. 
After the Cold War ended in practice in the 1980s, the US turned its attention to 
maximizing its global economic and political power in accordance with the new 
strategies being formulated as far back as the Reagan presidency by the ‘neo 
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conservatives’ who finally came into government with the election of President 
George W. Bush Jnr. It is possible to think that US foreign policy goals were already 
planned before the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a global power the US was 
certainly going to experience problems and complexities in foreign policy with or 
without the Soviet Union. In the post-Cold War world the US embarked on a series of 
interventions that delineated a new and more muscular approach to foreign relations 
based on directly confronting regimes that threatened American interests. It was 
surely no coincidence that US intervention in the Iraq-Kuwait conflict (1990/91) 
came just a year after the collapse of the Soviet Union; that the Soviet Union’s global 
power had started to decline in the mid-1980s. So, US dominance in the global realm 
started before its formal end. This momentous event seemed to open the way to the 
enactment of a policy that had already been developed. 
It is an open question whether the collapse of the Soviet Union affected the 
foreign policy tools of the US rather than US foreign policy goals. 58 The US is now 
using its military power in order to maintain its strategic goals. This means that a 
world environment -- labeled as ‘Post-Cold War’ – has arisen with new dilemmas, 
complexities and surely uncertainties both for the US and others. The concept of the 
‘U.S. and others’ is indeed an inescapable consequence arising from the unique status 
of being the world’s only super power. This new situation (in Iraq and elsewhere) is 
already bringing its own costs.  
While the definition of the enemy has changed with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union it is hard to say it about for US strategies in foreign policy. The indicators 
since 1990 shows that while given a different emphasis they have largely been carried 
                                                 
58 http://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/news/special_packages/Soviet 
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from the Cold War period. As Coit D. Blacker has pointed out (Kanter, Brooks, 1994: 
55); 
 
Topping the list of the US preferences is that the international community be 
dominated by countries that are more, rather than less, democratic in their 
political orientation. The goal of policy, therefore, should be to support 
democratic regimes where they exist, and to proffer assistance of various kinds 
to those struggling to establish such systems of government. 
 
However this declaration of formal US foreign policy interest in fact has not 
been practiced by the post-Cold War US administrations in general.  
Constant threats and the use of force are now (under the Bush administration) 
even more pronounced than before.  In other words, power politics directed towards 
consolidating US hegemony (rather than democracy) has been a striking aspect of the 
new global environment since the Gulf War (which was to be followed – in President 
Bush’s words – by the construction of a ‘new world order’).    
At this point it is necessary to ferret out the specialties and actors of the post-
Cold War environment. First of all, globalization has replaced ideology59. 
Globalization (especially its economic aspect) is now directing strategies, politics and 
surely conflicts in this new period.  In the Cold War he ideological struggle led to 
‘peaceful co-existence’ as a means of ending conflict. (Girgin, 2003:111) Today 
globalization and the drive for economic hegemony make the decision-making 
process more complicated: as the number of actors is constantly on the rise with new 
means of responding to powerful state actors’ conflicts seem to arise more than 
before.  Economics has brought a range of actors into the arena of world politics: 
multi-international firms, NGOs, different types of lobbies and a huge media.    
                                                 
59  On contrary to the idea of globalization has replaced the ideological affinities in politics, many 
would argue that the people behind Bush are extraordinarily committed ideologues.  For example, new 
ideological politicians that has been dominant US politics with Bush administration, so-called “new 
conservatives” (See Chapter 3-3.4) 
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Naturally the new environment has intensified polarization between state actors and 
global institutions (the World Bank and the IMF) and their diverse anti-system critics 
(opponents of globalization). Other actors in the new environment include 
international terrorist groups and mafia organizations involved in a broad range of 
activities.60  The essential point here is to the influence of all these new actors in the 
evolution of foreign policy.  These actors are not part of the new environment but are 
forcing changes to the definition of ‘national’ interests.  
Not surprisingly, the new environment has changed the nature and balance of 
costs and benefits to many countries. The new, very aggressive policies of the US 
administration (centering on disregard of sovereign rights, multilateralism and the 
taking of ‘anticipatory action’ against governments regarding as threatening US 
interests) create new challenges for the friends and allies of the US.  They have to 
make the kind of choices that were imposed on various countries during the Cold 
War.  This boils down to standing with the United States or against it – as defined in 
the rhetoric of President Bush and senior American officials in his administration. 
This is not a choice many of America’s friends feel they should have to make. 
Turkey, for example, has tried to develop a broader base for its foreign policy.  While 
continuing its links with the US and Europe it has been seeking to consolidate its 
relations with the Central Asian republics and Russia, because the cost and benefits 
balances of the new stage of history seem to require a multi-dimensional political 
strategy. 61 How successful this approach can be in practice remains open to question 
because of Turkey’s dependence on external financial support (from the US in 
particular but also other western sources) has been carried over from the Cold War.   
Clearly the rising importance of economics (particularly in global context) will play a 
                                                 
60 See Section 4.3 for the analysis of globalization 
61  For example, nowadays, many (including some generals) are rather frequently underlined the 
importance of being a multi dimensional foreign policy for Turkey.  
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dominant role in US foreign policy and will accordingly shape the policies of lesser 
players. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union Turkey seems to have much of the 
strategic value it had in the Cold War but it may be only that the strategic importance 
of Turkey has changed, as the following examples would seem to indicate: 
 
 
3.2 Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia &Kosovo) and Somalia 
 
It is fact that the Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence marked 
the beginning of the end for Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav case had both regional and 
global dimensions. The conflict in Yugoslavia arose as an important challenge to 
international society and the United Nations. The role of the world organization in 
settling the conflict marked a change in approach to traditional means of keeping or 
restoring the peace in global trouble spots.  On this point P.F. Diehl  (Diehl, 1993:77) 
has remarked that  ‘peace keeping has been less problematic and has generally 
operated more smoothly when the danger has arisen from the threat to peace by 
external aggression’ rather than from problems within a sovereign if disintegrating 
state. Interestingly, when he wrote these words the Yugoslav crises had not ended but 
his view underscored general characteristics of what had been regarded as the limits 
of UN and western intervention in problem area. Until Yugoslavia the west had 
reached consensus on military intervention overseas relatively easily. (The Korean 
War was an extrinsic example-see chp.2-2.3). But Yugoslavia was almost in the 
middle of Europe and Western Europe countries could not agree or decide on a united 
course of action.  Every country had its own perspective on Serbian aggression:  some 
(Balkans countries like Greece) had a long history of cultural and religious 
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connections with Serbia.62 The inability of western European governments to agree 
on what to do about the disintegrating situation in Yugoslavia inevitably put pressure 
on the United States to override the Europeans and take actions itself.  Eventual US 
intervention marked a change in US foreign policy at the beginning of the 1990s. 
What I mean here is very well summarized in James G. Roshe and G. Pickett (Kanter, 
Brooks, 1994:199): 
 
For example, alliances may be seen as the useful tool in such crises (the NATO 
response to Bosnia). However alliances may be even less skilled than the US in 
understanding, controlling, and limiting commitments. They may have 
unwarranted optimism for the effectiveness of forces (e.g. air power)_, may 
lack the skills for providing civil affairs support in delicate situations, or may 
not realize that a peace keeping enterprise for them may be seen by one or 
more of the protagonists as inserting an additional aggressor to be fought and 
resisted. 
  
Therefore, it can be possible to argue that at the beginning of 1990s, US started 
to follow an interventionalist policy for seeking consensus and partnership to 
intervene to anywhere in the world. 63  
Slovenian independence was the first step in the development of the Yugoslav 
crises (June 1991).  Serbia, the dominant nation in the federation, accepted Slovenian 
independence but reacted hostility when Croatia followed suit brought the UN and 
peace-keeping on to the agenda.  In 1992, a UN peacekeeping force (UNPROFOR) 
was dispatched to Croatia in order to monitor the cease-fire between Croats and 
Serbs.  Meanwhile, as Haass has pointed out, (Haass.1999: 38) ‘the real Yugoslavian 
                                                 
62 Greece opposes NATO's approach for reasons based on history, culture, competing foreign policy 
goals, and public opinion. Its sympathies lie with the Serbs. Turkey is participating in the military 
operation; Greece is not. Greece is concerned about the refugee crisis destabilizing the region. It also 
is concerned about the implications that its position on Kosovo might have on relations with the 
United States and Europe. 
(http://: www.fas.org/man/crs/RS20149.pdf) 
 
63 Surely, with the US invasion of Iraq in2003, it is possible to argue that these US priorities to seek 
out allies (especially with NATO) have disappeared in the US intervention policies in 2000s. (See 
Chapter 3-3.3 and 3.4) 
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crises, and the one that stimulated a great debate in the US, began in March 1992 
with the formal declaration of independence by Bosnia-Herzegovina’. Both during 
the Bush (Snr.) and Clinton presidencies public opinion was divided over what role 
the US should play vis-à-vis Yugoslavia but there was general agreement that the US 
should do something. Differences being expressed tended to focus on type and the 
timing of intervention. 64 From other perspectives the Bosnia tragedy (in particular) 
demanded intervention solely on humanitarian grounds. Clearly neither Bosnia nor 
the Kosovo crisis that followed involved US strategic interests: Bosnia was a 1990s 
humanitarian tragedy, with the Bosnians being subjected to ‘ethnic cleansing’ by of 
Bosnians by Serbs even while the western Europeans and the Americans were trying 
to decide how they should respond.  Therefore, it is possible to assume that lack of 
strategic and economic interests and the US search for consensus with Europe helped 
to prolong the conflict between Serbs and Bosnians (or more properly put, the Serb 
assault on Bosnia). (Kanter, Brooks, 1994: 16-17)  On the other side, Coit D. Blacker 
has pointed out another essential and implicit reason for US intervention in the sense 
of US interests he says (Kanter, Brooks, 1994: 16-17) that: 
 
Part of the US reluctance to take a more active military role in the war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina has had to do with the issues of interests: how is the US’ 
interests materially affected if the Serbs and Croats succeed in their efforts to 
dismember the Muslim republic? Unless the fighting spreads to other areas 
beyond the borders of the former Yugoslavia, the answer….has been… not 
very substantially…this despite the fact that no one in the public domain in 
the US denies that the war in Bosnia has been and continues to be a human 
tragedy of significant proportions.  
 
The statement is a reminder of it was humanitarian motive behind US intervention, a 
notion supported by the American people: account to Gallup Organization/Dave 
                                                 
64 http://search.csmonitor.com/durable/1999/04/09/p2s1.htm)  
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Herring- staff prepared the question to measure American public opinion. The poll 
question was 65 
If the current NATO air and missile strikes are not effective in achieving the 
US’ objectives in Yugoslavian issue (and Kosovo), would you favor or 
oppose having President Clinton send US ground troops into the region along 
with troops with other NATO countries? In March poll resulted with 31% 
favor, in March 31 poll resulted with 39% and finally 7 April resulted with 
nearly 47 %  
 
Therefore, it is again possible to claim that the US, both at the public level and at the 
administration level was clarifying the issue earlier than the European countries. On 
that point, it is impossible to undertone Turkish foreign policy influence, especially 
on the US administration level. So, here, it should be noted that Turkey played an 
important role both at the beginning of air strikes and also after the NATO 
operation.66 Bosnia became a cornerstone in Turco-American relations and 
cooperation.  On this point, it is essential to understand American attitudes, policy 
options and decisions in order to clearly understand Turkey’s role in the development 
of US policy towards the Yugoslav crises (especially Bosnia and Kosovo). For 
example, as Ali Askerlioğlu has pointed out (Journal of Qafqaz University, 1999-
vol.2 no.2: 101-102) 
 
There were several peace initiatives made by Turkey or some international 
organizations, as Islamic Conference Organization or by the London 
Conference, which took place between 26-28 August 1992, in London. The 
first of them was the Resolution 749 adopted by the UN Security Council 
calling all the member states to cooperate with the efforts of EC to provide a 
cease-fire and political solution for the Bosnian problem. This resolution had 
been followed by the application of Turkey to the UN asking for necessary 
measures to protect territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the same 
                                                 
65 (SOURCE: GALLUP ORGANIZATION /DAVE HERRING - STAFF)-
(http://search.csmonitor.com/durable/1999/04/09/p2s1.htm)  
66 From 1992 to 1995, Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans has centered on the question of 
support for the position of Sarajevo on the Bosnian question. Throughout the war in Bosnia Turkey 
has pursued active foreign policy by seeking attempts to stimulate international organizations to act 
reasonably and in a credible way in order to deter the aggressor. (Journal of Qafqaz University, 1999-
vol.2 no.2: 101-102) 
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time Turkey sent letters to the USA, Islamic and European countries to draw 
attention to the worsening situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Turkish proposal 
about humanitarian aid for the people of Bosnia was approved in the June 
meeting of Foreign Ministers of Islamic Conference Organization which took 
place in Istanbul. 
  
Turkey was not only trying to get the US attention to Bosnian case. Turkish 
diplomacy also tried to get issue to European agenda. For example, as Askeroğlu 
(Journal of Qafqaz University, 1999-vol.2 no.2: 102) pointed out 
 
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has also been an 
organization where Turkish diplomacy has been carried out for Bosnia. 
Mostly as a result of Turkish intensive diplomacy Bosnia-Herzegovina has 
been accepted to CSCE in May 1992. In fact, CSCE had been unsuccessful in 
solving the conflict, despite its self-formulized proposals.  
 
 
As a result of Turkish efforts, on June 10, 1992, the Committee of Senior Officials of 
the CSCE called the UN to consider military intervention as a means to stop the 
bloodshed in Bosnia. In addition to this, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 
752, according which all forms of interference from outside Bosnia-Herzegovina 
should cease immediately. So, according to Askeroğlu: 
 
This Resolution was mainly directed against the units of Yugoslav National 
Army and Croatian Army. However, these attempts of the UN for cease-fire 
were fruitless, and being aware of this, on 17 June 1992, Turkey called 
international community for military intervention to stop the war, and clearly 
expressed its readiness to contribute to an international force in case the 
international community decides to intervene militarily. 
 
  
The end of the Cold War made it possible for the US to shift away from the 
multilateralism that had been such a strong feature of western actions in the 1950s 
and 1960s (with some notable exceptions like the Suez War of 1956).  When the 
Europeans could not agree on what they should do there was no longer the Soviet 
barrier to the US taking action of its own. The US had several options in the case of 
Serb aggression against Bosnia.   
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  One of the basic topics of debate was that the UN force (UNPROFOR 2) 
should be given more power and military means to stop Serb aggression. At this 
point, in American politics, there was an idea that in tandem with the arms embargo 
against Serbia, the Bosnians should be given arms to defend themselves.   It was a 
fact, however, that no matter what was going on in the major cities of Bosnia-
Herzegovina the lack of strategic interest was the main reason why the US and the 
European powers   were unable to arrive at a united policy position. (Haass, 
1999:114) Over almost two years they failed to reach consensus over what kind of 
intervention there should be.  They sought to avoid direct intervention by passing the 
responsibility to the UN.67 (Haass, 1999:114) 
 Although there were no visible strategic benefits for Turkish foreign 
policy in Bosnia, Turkey played an extensive role in shaping western attitudes over 
Bosnia and then Kosovo [Turkey sent a brigade-994 soldiers-to Kosovo and sent   
120 Turkish police to UN police force (UNMIK-CIVPOL)]68  
 The Turkish government’s position strongly reflected public sympathy 
and outrage over the plight of the Bosnian and Kosovan Muslims.  At the same time, 
it seems that the government utilized the public mood to develop a more active 
policy towards Balkans.69 Bosnia became an important stepping-stone for Turkey’s 
new Balkans policy.70 Turkey certainly wanted to end the humanitarian tragedy, but 
at least in the later stages of the crisis it wanted to use the situation to expand its 
influence in the Balkans. In this connection, the Turkish American ‘strategic 
partnership’ moved towards Balkans under the NATO umbrella and was given new 
                                                 
67 For example, UN Security Council Resolution 713 of September 25, 1991, was an extrinsic 
example in order to see how the US and some other powers to avoid their own role in Bosnian at the 
beginning of Bosnian tragedy canalize UN to Bosnian case. 
68 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkce/grupc/cb/03.htm 
69 http://haberanaliz.com/tsk_dunya_barisini_sagliyor.php 
70 http://haberanaliz.com/tsk_dunya_barisini_sagliyor.php 
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relevance, because the European and the US were finding it difficult to reach 
consensus. Turkey started to take on the role of a negotiator between them.71  
Turkey’s links with the region were certainly much stronger than those have the US 
and even most European powers. Turkish expectations and attitudes may be 
illustrated by reference to its NATO perspective and its regional perspective. As 
noted in the previous page, as a member of NATO, Turkey extrinsically wanted to 
put Bosnia on the organization’s agenda. Turkey also tried to use its’ special 
relationship with the US to activate both the US and NATO against Serbian 
aggression. Turkish involvement and influence was much more successful once the 
US began to move towards intervention. In addition to this, Turkey also opened 
NATO oriented military basses during attack against Serbian targets in Bosnia War. 
For example72, 
Turkey, a NATO member since 1953, agreed to give bases to NATO last 
month when the alliance decided to expand the air war against Yugoslavia 
which was launched on March 24. An unspecified number of US fighters 
have already arrived at Balıkesir base, which lies some 70 kilometers (45 
miles) to the south of Bandırma. Thirty-eight F-15 and F-16 jets are to be 
stationed at Balıkesir, where cargo planes have been bringing equipment, 
provisions and NATO personnel since the weekend.  
 
In the context of the ‘regional’ perspective, Turkish concerns were mostly a 
mixture of emotional identification with the plight of another Muslim people and 
anxiety to prevent new conflicts arising in the Balkans that would ultimately create 
new costs for Turkey. I prefer to use the phrase ‘new’ costs because in previous 
decades Turkey had done almost nothing in Balkans -- economically or politically -- 
because of the Cold War environment and Soviet domination of the region.  It is an 
                                                 
71 As noted in quotations in the previous page, the period with Turkish role so London Conference is 
the extrinsic example of Turkish negotiator role between the US and European countries 
72 http://fpeng.peopledaily.com.cn/features/Kosovo/txt/060301.html 
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extrinsic reality that Turkey had suffered from communist expansion in Eastern 
Europe during the Cold War period. In the 1990s Turkey wanted a ‘peaceful and 
democratic’ environment in the Balkans region, which might enable it to play a 
leading role that democracy, and freedom in the Balkans would somehow smooth 
Turkey’s entry into the EU.73 For example, Turkish Foreign ministry best 
summarizes74; 
In the Balkans, Turkey pursues a balanced, realistic and determined policy of 
conciliation, peace and stability. This is mainly due to the strong historical 
and cultural bondage between the Turks and the Balkan peoples as well as the 
geographical proximity, rendering Turkey sensitive to the developments of 
the region, both negative and positive. Also, the Balkans constitutes a natural 
gateway for Turkey in reaching to Western Europe.  
 
On the Yugoslav question the costs and benefits for Turkish and American 
sides may be summarized up in the following manner. First, Turkey played   an 
important role in stimulating American interest and persuading it to use its influence, 
as indicating above. Second, Turkey tried to develop its economic political and 
strategic linkage with the former communist countries of astern Europe after the 
collapse of the USSR (especially Turkish firms have easily come into Balkan 
countries market, today, the amount of trade of Turkish firms which invested into 
Balkan countries (including Bosnia) has risen to billions) In this sense, American 
involvement in the Balkans seemed to work in Turkey’s favor in the view of   
Turkish foreign policy makers, as underlined in the quotation  which is from Turkish 
foreign ministry documents. Through its support for American involvement in 
Yugoslavia, Turkey found a role for itself in the peacekeeping forces deployed both 
in Bosnia and Kosovo after the informal collapse of Yugoslavia.  Accordingly it can 
                                                 
73 http://www.mideasti.org/html/b-islam030503.htm 
74 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupe/em/03.htm 
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be concluded that the ‘strategic partnership’ between Turkey and the US created 
benefits for the Turkish side both during and after the Yugoslav crises. At the end, 
first, Bosnia and Kosovo become independent from Serbia, which has opened more 
influential and direct effect of Turkey. On the other hand, secondly, the NATO 
operations (with clearly led by the US) was a kind of stepping stone to stability in a 
region that in which Turkey had sought influence since the beginning of the1990s. 
As noted before, all these developments supported to Turkish perspective in Balkans.  
The Bosnian situation in particular highlighted weaknesses in the foreign 
policy making mechanism of the EU.  Turkey was reluctant to get involved as long 
as the western Europeans could not make up their mind, but the decision of the US to 
take action of its own gave Turkey the opportunity to do something on an issue of 
mounting humanitarian concern to the Turkish public. In this sense Europe’s failure 
became Turkey’s opportunity:  at the very least in terms of costs (the commitment of 
troops and equipment) Turkey benefited by yet again demonstrating its reliability as 
a US ally.  The Turkish-American partnership under UN and NATO during Bosnian 
and Kosovo crises played an essential role to developing confidence between two 
countries.  
  In the western and global context, UN intervention in Yugoslavia with 
NATO support could be taken as proof of NATO’s continuing validity in the post 
Cold War Era while the post Cold War Era was questioning NATO and the relevance 
of its mission after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  What the Yugoslav crises did to 
show that NATO did have a role: it could even be said involvement in Yugoslavia 
somehow prevented the collapse of the NATO alliance during the 1990s.75  It was 
certainly helpful for the US to stress the role of NATO.  NATO involvement expands 
                                                 
75 http://fto.int8.com/researchpapers/usandnato/ 
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the strategic means of the US. Turkey played an important bridging role in Bosnia 
and elsewhere between the Muslim majority and UN forces, thereby establishing the 
paradigm of secular, moderate Muslim states whose services could be useful in other 
situations involving the deployment of NATO or US forces in Muslim countries.  
 Somalia was one such country.  The situation that developed in Somalia   had 
very deep roots.  The ‘clan’ structure dominated the political system as it did in other 
African countries. After 1969 the Marehan clan (headed by Siad Barre76) adopted 
harsh state policies against other clans in the country.  
 
Although drought conditions were partially responsible for this situation, civil 
war had devastated this already threatened country. Since 1988, this civil war 
has centered on more than 14 clans and factions that make up Somali society, 
all of which fought for control of their own territory. Their culture stresses 
the idea of "me and my clan against all outsiders," with alliances between 
clans being only temporary conveniences. Guns and aggressiveness, 
including the willingness to accept casualties, are intrinsic parts of this 
culture, with women and children considered part of the clan's order of 
battle.77  
 
During this period of conflict more than 300,000 civilians died in the conflict 
between the state and other forces.  Moreover, more than one million people were 
displaced and became refugees in neighboring countries. (Akinrinade, 1998:182) In 
the capital city, Mogadishu, hundreds of thousands of people suffered from illness 
and starvation. By the end of 1980s, the crisis in Somalia seemed to have reached the 
point of violence. (Akinrinade, 1998:182) 
                                                 
76 After the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, the political situation deteriorated, with the clans in 
the northern part of the country trying to secede. With drought conditions worsening everywhere, clan 
warfare and banditry gradually spread throughout Somalia. By early l992, these conditions brought 
about a famine of Biblical proportions: more than one-half million Somalis had perished of starvation 
and at least a million more were threatened.( http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books) 
77 http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20-
%201990%20to%201995/Somalia%20Lessons%20Learned%20Jan%2095/allardch1.html 
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The lack of Somalia’s strategic and geographic importance was probably the 
main reason why the US and other UN members did not initially react to the events 
even though the Somali tragedy was beginning by the 1990s   to find a place in the 
western media and on the agenda of NGOs. As S. Akinrinade has pointed out 
(Akinrinade,1998:183) the US started to take an interest in Somalia during the 
George Bush Snr. Administration, which finally decided to send, troops there.  
Humanitarian concern appears to have been the primary motivation behind US. The 
operation was turned into a UN operation78 in April 199279but the rising number of 
peacekeepers arriving in the country was not enough to keep the peace even in 
Mogadishu. Chaos and violence were the order of the day. The US was the only 
county willing to intervene out of humanitarian concern: most western countries 
(especially EU members) failed to develop consensus on Somalia.            
Whereas the Bush administration had chosen a lower-risk monitoring mission 
for U.S. forces, the Clinton administration tended to ‘move to a policy of de facto 
peace-making and nation-building in spring, 1993, without putting in place the 
necessary forces or preparing the country [the US] for the inevitable costs’. (Haass, 
1999:113)  As a result the Clinton administration was not able to prevent US soldiers 
being killed80 along with other material and hidden costs.81 Turkish military 
                                                 
78 In April 1992, the U.N. Security Council approved Resolution 751, establishing the United Nations 
Operation in Somalia—UNOSOM— whose mission was to provide humanitarian aid and facilitate 
the end of hostilities in Somalia. 
79 http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-06/appc.htm 
80 The crisis came into full view on 5 June 1993, when Aideed supporters killed 24 Pakistani soldiers 
in an ambush. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 837, passed the next day, called for 
the immediate apprehension of those responsible—and quickly led to U.S. forces being used in a 
highly personalized manhunt for Aideed. After a series of clashes involving U.S. Rangers and other 
units, a major engagement occurred on 3 October in which 18 Americans were killed and 75 
wounded—the bloodiest battle of any U.N. peacekeeping operation. Shortly thereafter, President 
Clinton announced the phased withdrawal of American troops that would end by 31 March 1994. U.S. 
forces largely were confined to force protection missions from this change of mission until the 
withdrawal was completed. (http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books) 
81 They did not properly link US strategic objectives and concerns to the tactical plan. The TF Ranger 
mission was a direct operational attempt to obtain a strategic objective in a single tactical action. Yet, 
they failed to assess the lack of strategic groundwork, the threat’s intent and capabilities, and the 
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involvement in Somalia took place under the command of the United Nation Task 
Force (UNITAF). Under UNITAF Somalia’s situation slowly improved compared to 
the previous US-UN operation. At this time, Somalia was receiving financial 
assistance of up to $400 million (for Somalia’s short term needs) while a great 
variety of Muslim troops were arriving from Tunisia, Turkey82, Kuwait, along with 
contingents from other countries, in the effort to stabilize the country. Turkish 
military involvement was strongly influenced by the US desire to bring into Somalia 
more troops from the region or from nearby countries. Turkey accepted to send 
limited force of peacekeepers whose main aims centers on the provision of security 
for the distribution of food and relief supplies. In the following periods, a Turkish 
general started to command UN forces in Somalia (Turkish involvement in the 
Somalia operation between January 1993- 22 Feb. 1994, involved 300 troops83.)84   
)85.86Like the US Turkey has only limited interests in Somalia: the prime motivation 
for involvement was humanitarian concern. It is hard to talk about specific costs for 
Turkey but (like the Balkans) involvement in Somalia at the request of the US 
consolidated the relationship between the two countries. 
Through its involvement in Somalia Turkey tried to find place in the new 
peacekeeping operations of the 1990s. It is possible to summarize the Turkish 
attitude in the case of Somalia. First, Turkey regarded involvement in peacekeeping 
                                                                                                                                          
overall impact of the urban environment, to include the terrain and society, on the operation. Such an 
assessment may not have led to such a high-risk course of action and instead to one that de-
emphasized military operations and emphasized a political solution that adequately considered the 
clans’ influence (http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-06/appc.htm)(in fact this quotation 
is well summarizing the failure and its reasons of US in Somalia) 
82  Turkey sent 300 troops to UNOSOM 2 force between 2 January 1993 and 22 February 1994 and a 
Turkish general commanded the UN forces for a specific period of time. (http://www.tsk.mil.tr)  
 
83 This late UN forces included the 4,000 US troops have been placed under a U.N. command headed 
by a Turkish general 
84 http://www.tsk.mil.tr/genelkumay/uluslararasi/barisdesharekatkatki/bmmisyonlar.htm#%207 
85 http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/1993/o93/o93reports.html 
86 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkce/grupc/cb/03.htm 
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forces as a kind of tool that had to be paid in order to raise its regional power.87.   
Somalia did not count in the context of Turkey’s regional aims but still served to as a 
demonstration of Turkish influence in coordination with the US and the UN. Second, 
Turkey somehow saw involvement in Somalia as the natural result of its ‘strategic 
partnership’ with the US: Somalia was also tangible proof of the new role the US had 
in mind for Turkey following the end of the Cold War.  No longer a frontline partner 
in the struggle against communism and the USSR the Americans had begun to see 
Turkey as a country that could help implement the global operations of its strategic 
partner. Turkish involvement in the aftermath of such operations has in fact been 
essential to the success of most US interventions. Most of the regions in which the 
US have been close to Turkey, not just in terms of geography but culturally, 
religiously and historically.  In the sense of geography and religion and historical 
roots, it can be seen that Turkey’s involvement in multinational force generally led 
by the US has expanded American alternatives and decreased its risks.88  In sum the 
Somali case can be described as one, which has not resulted in a great variety of 
costs or benefits for Turkey or the US.  But Somalia was important in delineating the 
form of Turkish-American partnership likely to emerge in the post-Cold War period. 
 
  
3.3 The Gulf War 
The outbreak of the 1990-1 Gulf War was affected by the change in the 
global power balance brought about by the collapse of the USSR, which had had a 
close client-patron relationship with Iraq since the 1970s. The dramatic events, 
                                                 
87 http://www.byegm.gov.tr/REFERENCES/Foreignpolicy2001.htm 
88  Because, as Roshe and Pickett pointed out,  For the US involvement in local conflicts poses a 
number of risks, including subtle changes in commitments and objectives that embroil the US beyond 
its original intent and create threats to  US personnel more severe than anticipated. (Kanter, Brooks, 
1994:21) 
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taking place in Eastern Europe helped to free the hands of the US in the Middle East. 
However, already by the late 1980s the Soviet Union has been considering changes 
to its foreign policy approach. (‘New thinking’ approach). (Freedman, 1993, 74).  Its 
chief architect was Mikhail Gorbachev.  According to this, ‘new thinking’ the USSR 
would seek a “balance of interests that would take into account the legitimate 
interests of USSR, the US, and the regional states”.  (Freedman, 1993, 75).  The Gulf 
War arose as the first test of the new foreign policy approach in practice. 
89Simultaneously, the war gave the US the opportunity to demonstrate its own 
determination to create a ‘new world order’, as President Bush called it.   
The Middle East remained the focal point global and regional tensions. It has 
been argued (Bresheeth, Yuval-Davis, 1991:13) that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 
August 1990 was only the first step of territorial claims in the Middle East.  
According to Ken Matthews,90 one of the main reasons for present and probably 
future territorial disagreements was past foreign intervention in the region. 
(Matthews, 1993:2).  Whatever the real motives behind Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (a 
genuine belief that Kuwait should have been part of Iraq since the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire or the desire to take its oilfields and gulf coastline) it triggered off 
unexpected patterns of reaction. According to the neo-conservative American 
commentator Daniel Pipes (Pipes, 1993:2):  
Arab states proudly wore their American associations. Even so famous an 
anti-American as Hafiz al-Asad of Syria joined the U.S.-led coalition; more 
astonishing yet, Syrian and American troops stood together in Saudi Arabia. 
Old verities and structures appeared moribund; the Middle East had been 
                                                 
89   There were five major principles in the ‘new thinking’ policy.  First, to put humanity before 
nuclear weapons. In short, these are reduction of nuclear power with the claim of humanity. Secondly,   
to abandon such   concepts as ‘spheres of influence’ and   ‘vital interests’. , Third, to  seek a  balance 
of interests. Fourth, to accept the primary role of the UN in resolving   regional conflicts.  Fifth, seeks 
a joint action by the superpowers to reduce the likelihood of such   conflicts. (Freedman, 1993, 74-75)   
90  Matthews has argued that the events were   the product of “contingent factors, historical factors, 
and structural factors”. (Matthews, 1993:2-3)   
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altered in deep and irreversible ways; and the war’s decisive end confirmed 
expectations that a new world order in the region had dawned.  
 
It is impossible to explain Iraqi invasion of Kuwait by only the nature of Iraq-
Kuwait relations and the nature of Saddam Hussein’s political regime. Ken Matthews 
has argued that miscalculations were also among the origins of the war. (Matthews, 
1993:46). Both Matthews and Baudrillard   (Baudrillard, 1995:54; Matthews, 
1993:49-50) attribute sinister ulterior motives to the US.  According to Matthews  
(Matthews, 1993:49) the US consciously sent misleading signals to Saddam Hussein 
through the US embassy in Baghdad. If Iraq invaded Kuwait the US would not 
respond: this was allegedly the gist of the now famous conversation between Saddam 
Hussein and the US ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie:  the cynical reading of her 
remarks is that the US was trying to draw Saddam into a trap in Kuwait. This 
interpretation was quickly denied by the US administration. However, it can scarcely 
be denied that whether Saddam was trapped or whether he walked into a trap of his 
own making, his invasion of Kuwait gave the US a golden opportunity to strengthen 
its presence in a region vital to its interests. in an larger perspective, it seems clear 
that  all these political developments both in Iraq and Kuwait inescapably effected 
other regional powers like Turkey.  
As American policy for Iraq, in ten years time have become irrational identity 
and support to anti-Americanism in the radical portion of the Islamic world. 
.(Freedman, 1993:171-172)  It means that however U.S. added to new dimensions of 
its global power identity at the begging of the post-Cold War Era with mobilization 
capacity of its army during the Gulf War. The Gulf War and the American policy in 
the aftermath of the war added different types of costs on the region countries, for the 
U.S. and for Iraqi people in the long run. As Jean Baudrillard has pointed out in his 
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famous article- ‘The Gulf War did not take place”; “no accidents occurred in this 
war, everything unfolded according to pragmatic order, in the absence of passional 
disorder. Nothing occurred which would have metamorphosed events into a duel.” 
(Baudrillard, 1995:73) it seems to be adequately persuasive to see deep cost and 
benefit game under the Gulf War. As Baudrillard says the Gulf War was far away 
from being a real war, it mostly similar to programmed situation, which was 
supported by different sources including media, companies and politicians.  
 
  As Philip Robins has underlined (Dodd, 1992:71): 
 
The invasion and the take-over of Kuwait by Iraq was an event, which 
Turkey could not afford to ignore. Iraq’s control of Kuwait (either as a 
surrogate, or directly once annexation was announced) threatened the power 
configurations in the Middle East.  
  
  Not surprisingly, the war added new dimensions to Turkish-American 
relations as well creating new costs and benefits.  Turkey had its own view of what 
the war meant. There were civilian perspectives, government perspectives and 
military perspectives.  President Turgut Özal saw US intervention as an opportunity 
for Turkey to come advantageous to a position in the eastern part of Turkey. (Such as 
solving the Kurdish question and so on)  Moreover, Özal also expected economic 
benefits from the war such as increased Turkish access to Iraqi oil in the aftermath. 
As Dairo Navaro has pointed out in his article (Bresheeth, Yuval-Davis.1991: 81) 
even the Turkish military did not agree with Özal’s approach to the war: both the 
military and the government saw Özal’s position as kind of adventure which would 
end with a huge range of costs. As a result, the military chief of staff (the commander 
of Turkish Army) General Necmi Torumtay resigned because of the differences 
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between the military, the government and President Özal. By that point what were 
these differences between the president Özal and government? 
As Navaro has asserted that (Bresheeth, Yuval-Davis.1991: 81-82) 
 
Özal argued forcefully in favor of strong support for the US…as necessary 
measures to ensure Turkey an advantageous position in a post war peace 
conference and leading role in future regional security arrangements… Özal 
claim, “This is the most profitable business deal of my life. It is the first time 
that I am making such big profits with so little work.”. But there were also 
other more specific internal and regional concerns that have accentuated 
Turkey’s search for an active post war role in the Middle East. (Such as 
Kurdish question). 
 
This was the core point of the arguments, which directly influenced Turkish 
domestic politics. The president was in favor of total support for the US   including 
active involvement in the war.  A significant section of the Turkish public did not 
support such a level of involvement. (Dodd, 1992:81-85) This opposition and 
criticism stretched into the ranks of the party Ozal had led as Prime Minister, the 
Motherland Party, before moving into the presidency.   
 Apart from the question of troop support Turkey gave important assistance 
as a close US ally and as a member of the UN.  The Grand Assembly passed, by 250 
votes to 148, a government motion declaring that that   ‘the Turkish armed forces and 
foreign forces based in Turkey could participate in military actions against Iraq, 
effectively signaling the opening of a second front.” (Bresheeth, Yuval-Davis.1991: 
81). As result, Turkey did not send force to Northern side of Iraq during the ‘Desert 
Storm’ operation. However Turkey decided to out itself out of the hot conflict, 
Turkey decided to close the Kirkuk-Yumartalik pipeline91 in line with the embargo 
decision of the US and (accordingly UN). This was a crucial decision for Turkey 
                                                 
91 Kirkuk-Yumartalık oil pipeline opened 25 May 1977. Turkey was spending more than $1 billion 
(according to present rate of exchange) it was closed unilaterally by Turkey to support UN embargo 
decision on August 1990. The pipeline was opened to limited oil transporting on 16 December 1996. 
(http://haber.superonline.com/haber/arsiv/haberler/0,1106,81758_4_8969,00.html) 
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both politically and economically, because of the importance of the pipeline to the 
Turkish economy. Iraq was also an important market for Turkish products and 
services and had become even more so because of Iraq’s needs during its long war 
with Iran in the 1980s (1980-88).  (Approximate total of the trading level between 
Turkey and Iraq had been $ 2,5 billion per year before the Gulf War92)  important 
markets for Turkish economy during the Iran-Iraq war. Turkey increased its trade 
and investments in Iraq during 1980s and subsequently Iraq became its most 
important trading partner after Germany. (Bresheeth, Yuval-Davis.1991: 83)    
According to estimates, the cost to Turkey through the closure of the pipeline and the 
embargo on Iraq amounted to more than $10 billion (and according to some 
estimates as much as $40 billion93).  In this sense, the embargo on the Kirkuk-
Yumartalık pipeline cost Turkey approximately $ 1,252 billion. In addition to this, 
Turkey lost $ 63 million from port revenues94 during the 12 years period; these costs, 
from embargo on the pipeline, were not compensated by the US. More dramatically 
for Turkish benefits, as Philips Robins has pointed out (Dodd, 1992:75) 
 
Once Turkey had closed the pipeline and haltered all economic interaction 
with Iraq, the international spotlight turned away from Ankara. For, the anti-
Iraq coalition, with the US clearly in the lead, Turkey was now of much less 
importance. This devaluation of Turkey from primary to secondary 
significance was to continue until the practical details of waging war against 
Iraq emerged as important issues. 
 
In fact, Turkey’s the loss of pipeline revenue was part of total cost of the Gulf 
War to Turkey. On that point, for example, Nadire Mater is evaluating the cost to 
Turkey as95 
                                                 
92 http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/228704.asp#BODY 
93 http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/228704.asp 
94 http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/228704.asp 
95 http://www.atimes.com/c-asia/CJ13Ag01.html 
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Turkey joined the alliance against Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War, but 
lost one of its biggest foreign trade partners, Iraq, under UN sanctions. 
Turkey's losses from the Gulf War are estimated at US$40 billion, according 
to official reports, and it feels that it has not received the compensation it 
merits. Turkey is seeking billions of dollars in new loans from the 
International Monetary Fund to help finance debt due in 2002. 
 
Turkey faced other problems in the aftermath of the Gulf War. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, PKK96-Kurdish terrorism had almost been suppressed but at 
a huge economic, political and social cost.   In the chaotic environment created by 
the defeat of the Iraqi forces in Kuwait the PKK looked to regroup and consolidate in 
northern Iraq.  The US created a ‘save haven’ in northern Iraqi but was not able to 
exercise the same control over the region as had the Iraqi government, giving the 
PKK (which had been using northern Iraq as a sanctuary) a new lease of life. The 
conflict in Turkey’s southeast was renewed. Within several years the number of 
people killed there (soldiers, civilians and PKK militants/terrorists) had climbed to 
about 30,000.97Economically, according to some sources, as Ramazan Gözen has 
pointed out, Turkey spent more than half the total $100 billion98 on the struggle with 
the PKK between 1991 and 1996.  Moreover, the general feeling of instability among 
the population in the southeastern provinces dramatically in creased with the 
resurgence of PKK attacks. (Imset, 1992:191). As Ismet Imset pointed out (Imset, 
1992:191) 
 
The arrival of the US, French and British troops in turkey and the effort to set 
up five to six ‘safety zones’ inside Iraq for the Kurdish refugees are expected 
to seriously affect the operations of the PKK in that region. Although 
international relief efforts to have lifted some of the burden from Turkey’s 
back, local officials here are aware that the influx has had some serious side 
                                                 
96  the Terrorist organization, PKK  changed its name to KADEK and it has changed to KHK. 
97 http://www.yargitay.gov.tr/aihm/tcyaozgurgundem.html 
98 http://www.liberal-dt.org.tr/guncel/Gozen/rg_turkiye1.htm 
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effects which have served Turkey’s own separatists and may impose an long-
term security risk in the region. 
 
 
It can therefore be seen that the overall costs to Turkey of the war were huge.   
A supplementary issue was the flow of Kurdish refugees into Turkey from northern 
Iraq. Turkey had witnessed refugee experience at the end of 1980s before the Gulf 
War. (Dodd, 1992:82)(For example, more than 50.00 refugees crossed the Iraqi-
Turkey border to escape Iraqi repression and by the beginning of the Gulf war 27.000 
was still living in Turkey,) during and the aftermath of the Gulf War, more than a 
million Kurds. As P.Robins (Dodd, 1992:82) has pointed out, more than two million 
people were believed to be on the move in the border region. (Some 700.000 
refugees traveled to the Iraq- Turkish border in the aftermath of the War) (Many of 
them fled for fear of a possible chemical weapons   attack such as the one carried out 
by the Iraqi government against Halabja in 1988. (Dodd, 1992:82-85)  Turkey was 
not prepared for a refugee flow of such a size.  Most of the refugees were accepted as 
such by the Turkish government and allowed to stay in Turkish camps for more than 
a year. Different types of problems were created apart from the huge amount of 
money spent on maintaining them. In this sense, PKK militants also used the camps 
as cover for slipping into Turkey. As Tuncay Özkan, journalist who writes for Akşam 
newspaper, pointed out the American involvement in northern Iraq in the aftermath 
of the Gulf War supported PKK involvement over Turkish borders.99  
As an ally and partner it was natural for Turkey to help the US campaign 
against Iraq. Unlike the Cold War, the danger to Turkey was direct. Iraq was a 
neighbor and taking such a strong position in support of the US (and the UN) it was 
                                                 
99 Akşam, 1 March 2003 
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even thought possible that the Iraqi government could order missile attacks on 
Turkey.  In return for the help it gave and the risks it took Turkey benefited from 
favorable US mediation in the securing of large loans from the IMF and the World 
Bank just after the war. However, it remains an open question whether the loans 
granted even equaled the losses and costs incurred by Turkey as a result of the war 
on the other side, the US started to give economical and military aids to some Arab 
countries in the aftermath of the Gulf War. As Stephen J. Hedges and Catherine 
Collins have underlined the American perspectives in the sense of economic aid in 
the aftermath of the Gulf War,100 
 
In the Persian Gulf region alone over the past two years, the United States has 
sold, lent or given away an estimated $7.5 billion worth of weaponry, other 
military equipment and training assistance, according to State Department 
figures. Recipients have included such vital U.S. allies as Kuwait, Jordan, 
Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. The deals include 
advanced fighter jets, radar systems and missiles. Airfields are being 
expanded. Military bases are being renovated. In return, the United States has 
won the right to build bases, house troops and use sovereign airspace if it 
wages a war against Iraq. 
 
Turkish support for the US was not sufficient for it also to the given substantial 
military and economic aid. One clear gain, however, was unequivocal US support for 
Turkey on the question of PKK terrorism, as noted before, there is a question mark 
on the correlation between American involvement to Northern Iraq and PKK 
uprising in the aftermath of the Gulf War. But, However the formal announcement 
by the US of its opposition to PKK terrorism can be counted as somehow support to 
Turkish struggle with terrorism.  At the same time, the US began stronger support to 
Turkey’s EU accession. (See Chapter 3-3.5.3 for detail) 
                                                 
100 Chicago Tribune, 2 Feb-2003 
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 If the Turco-American relationship was strengthened by Turkey’s active role 
in the Gulf War it was badly damaged by the unfolding of the US attack on Iraq in 
2003. Turkey found itself unable to grant key US demands, especially relating to the 
use of bases in Turkey to launch a second front against Iraq. Clearly anticipating 
more help, the decision of the Turkish parliament to refuse base support surprised 
and angered the Bush government.  The strategic relationship – strengthened through 
the Cold War and through Turkish military and/or peace-keeping operations in 
Korea, Bosnia, Kosovo and Somalia – suddenly appeared to be close to collapse.  
The Gulf War and the second American operation against Iraq demonstrated the 
unpredictability of world affairs and the differences experienced by one country in 
harnessing its foreign policy interests to those of another even when that country 
happens to be a close ally.  
        
 3.4 The ‘War on Terrorism’ and Afghanistan 
  
The US interventions in Afghanistan were characterized by complex local, 
regional and global complexities.  There were first of all the regional tribal, religious 
and ethnic divisions between the Afghan people themselves. Moreover, Afghanistan 
had only recently experienced invasion and occupation by the USSR. This had 
destabilized the country, aggravated its internal divisions and set up the conditions of 
the struggle for power, which followed when Soviet forces were finally withdrawn. 
Globally, the decision to intervene in Afghanistan stemmed directly from the 
September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon and 
American determination to get at the sources of ‘international terrorism’ and wipe it 
out. A further striking characteristic of intervention in Afghanistan is that unlike 
Bosnia, Kosovo and Somalia there was no suggestion of intervention for 
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humanitarian purposes: the liberation of the Afghan people from the rule of the 
Taliban was entirely ancillary to the bluntly-stated US goal of removing the Islamic 
regime for the sake of its own strategic and national interests rather than any 
humanitarian assistance or ending of civil conflict.  This is not to say that US interest 
in Afghanistan began on September 11. The US had been involved (especially with 
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) in the organizing, funding and training of the radical 
Islamic guerillas sent into Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. As Sankaran Krishna has 
pointed out (Turkish Journal of International Relations, 2002,vol 1-2: 74) 
 
prospect of a collapse of the communist regime in that country, the Soviet 
Union invaded Afghanistan in December of 1979. As disaffected factions 
within the Afghan communists made common cause with various tribal 
warlords in their fight against Soviet occupation, the Americans sensed an 
opportunity to ensnare their longtime adversary in a Vietnam of their own. 
American money and weapons poured into the Afghan resistance via its 
conduit in neighboring Pakistan. By the mid-1980s nearly a fifth of 
Afghanistan’s twenty-odd millions were refugees – mostly in Pakistan – 
while thousands of others were either killed or seriously injured in the war. 
At its height, the Soviet occupation had involved over a 100,000troops and 
they would lose more than 15,000 of them during that decade. When the 
mujahideen succeeded in forcing a Soviet withdrawal in 1989 (soon followed 
by the political collapse of Gorbachev’s Soviet Union and the East bloc as a 
whole), the Americans turned their backs on both Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
 
So it is possible to think that once the Soviets withdrew this policy backfired as the 
Afghan guerillas returned to the Middle East and other countries and declared war on 
their previous backers. By the mid 1990s their terrorist attacks in East Africa and 
elsewhere were beginning to point the way to future developments. By this time, 
also, the Taliban regime was allowing Islamic radicals to organize and train on 
Afghan territory.  Paramilitary camps were established in the isolated mountain 
ranges alongside the border with Pakistan. In the first strikes against Islamic 
terrorism  (following the bombing of  the US embassies  in  Kenya and Tanzania)  in 
August 1998 the Clinton administration ordered  cruise missile attacks on  terrorist 
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camps in Afghanistan and  what was mistakenly thought to be a chemical weapons 
material producing factory in Sudan in August 1998. (Haass, 1999:169).   By this 
time this time al Qaida had been identified as the group most likely to have been 
responsible for the embassy bombings in East Africa:  the organization’s leader, 
Osama bin Laden, a billionaire Saudi, was among the radicalized Muslims who had 
gone to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets and had then declared jihad   against the US 
and Israel (Özkan, 2003:228-229)  
Turks and the Turkish government shared the common global outrage at the 
September 11 attacks in New York and Washington.  In Afghanistan, as had been the 
case in Bosnia and Somalia, Turkey as a moderate and modern Muslim country was 
in a good position to help the Americans in Afghanistan. There were deep historical 
relations between Turkey and Afghanistan (the first country to extend diplomatic 
recognition to the new Turkish republic in 1923) Turkey had given economic and 
military assistance to the Afghan government101 102 and throughout their modern 
history up to the Soviet invasion the two countries had developed a close 
relationship.  They had taken a similar position on many international issues and in 
the 1950s Turkey had insisted on Afghanistan being included in the Baghdad Pact: at 
that time Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan were regarded as being like-
minded ‘northern tier’ countries well suited to protecting western interests in an arc 
of territory close to or bordering the USSR.  
                                                 
101 http://www.avsam.org/turkce/yayinlar/kitaplar/kitap/kitap46.htm 
102 Turkey’s interest in Afghanistan is not a newfound one. Afghanistan was the first country 
to recognize the new Turkish Republic when it was proclaimed in 1923. Turkey has helped 
Afghanistan with its modernization efforts. Torn apart by decades of continuous warfare, the 
country is now entering a period of gradual recovery and reconstruction 
(http://www.byegm.gov.tr/REFERENCES/Foreignpolicy2001.htm)  
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All these characteristics of the long Turkish involvement with Afghanistan 
made it likely that Turkey would be an early choice when the US began looking for 
allies to help it in Afghanistan.  As a poor developing country, Afghanistan was not a 
military problem for the US but the maintenance of stability and security was a 
different matter. High costs were likely to follow because of Afghanistan’s 
complicated social structure and even – it could be said – because of its geography, 
and the difficulties involved in getting at Islamic radicals in the remote mountains in 
which al Qaida had set up its training camps. 
Although Afghanistan was important in the immediate aftermath of 
September 11 it soon became clear that the decision to destroy the Taliban regime 
there was only the first step in a global campaign against ‘international terrorism’.  
The degree to which the war on terrorism was a convenient cover for the 
strengthening of the US presence in areas vital to its national strategic interests 
(because of oil resources and the pending construction of pipelines) is still being 
debated. Certainly Afghanistan seemed to fit into a matrix of issues and interests 
facing the US as it began to put in effect a strategy that would cement its global 
power against all possible rivals (including Russia and China) into the coming 
century. In the view of US ‘neo conservatives’ the US should use its power 
(including ‘anticipatory action’ against actually or potentially hostile regimes) to 
protect and extend its interests around the world.  Given the extent of its power it 
could act alone:  one striking characteristic of the Bush government has been its 
rejection of multilateralism and even of the wishes of world organizations if the 
consensus view does not suit American national interests. This attitude has been 
manifested in debate across a broad range of global issues (including arms control 
and environmental safeguards). The triumphalist American nationalism which has 
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been a striking characteristic of the new regime in Washington is being stimulated by 
the pressures of a wide range of vested interests, including oil, the media, 
fundamentalist Christian organizations (George Bush Jnr. is himself a reborn 
Christian) and the Israeli lobby. The new unilateral global vision being expressed by 
the US has caused many problems even with countries traditionally regarded as 
being part of the ‘western alliance’. They are alarmed at what they see.  This is 
especially true of France and Germany. Since September 11 Britain is the only one of 
these traditional allies to give continuous support to US policy as it has been 
implemented. 
In this new environment what could or should be Turkey’s role?  Towards the 
success of the Afghan operation Turkey gave the US support on two levels. First, 
during the hot conflict phrase of ‘Enduring Freedom’ operation (Turkey opened its 
airspace to US planes.) In addition Turkey also sent military personnel to 
CENTCOM (US)-Central Command.  After the ‘Enduring Freedom’ operation 
Turkey took an active role in the multinational peacekeeping force assembled in 
Afghanistan. In addition to this, as by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, 
Ritz-Carlton Hotel, Washington, D.C. (March 18, 2002)103  
Turkish bases have served as key transit points for medical evacuations, and 
they have been hubs for humanitarian assistance airlift missions. Turkey has 
allowed the use of its national transportation and logistics infrastructure and 
its military manpower and equipment beyond its borders. Turkish crews are 
receiving training so they can use Turkish KC-135s to refuel U.S. cargo 
aircraft. 
Moreover, Turkey agreed to take command of the multinational force (the 
ISAF – International Security Assistance Force) for a two times period of six 
months.104 While it is natural to assess Turkey’s involvement according to the 
number of its soldiers send to Afghanistan, its   importance was greater that just   the 
                                                 
103 http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020318-depsecdef.html 
104  First Turkish commander period was  21 December 2001-21  July 2002 and Turkey got 
responsibility as an commander of  ISAF, 21 July 2002 to 10 February 2003  
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statistical size of its brigade.  The US   Britain shared the view 105that Turkey could 
play an important role in the fulfillment of their plans in Afghanistan.  Turkey’s 
historical links with Afghanistan were seen as an advantage. Naturally, Turkish 
soldiers were able to maintain security in Kabul more easily than any other foreign 
troops. The Muslim identity of Turkish soldiers opened the way to easier 
communications and greater mutual confidence between foreign the powers and the 
Afghan people, surely it is hard to find objective evidence to support this. For 
example, is that106 
It seems ridiculous sometimes when a diplomatic corp. in a reception states 
that Turkey is playing an important role in Afghanistan as a NATO member 
and a Muslim country. One may believe so after a short visit to Afghanistan 
not because some high rank officers tell so but I heard Afghani children 
saying "merhaba Turkiye" (hello Turkey) in Turkish. I had similar feelings 
when Turkish - Farsi translator Atikullah Seycan stated that people used to 
say in the beginning of ISAF "how are you?" and that they were replying 
"How are you nist" (not how are you in farsi English mixed language) but 
"merhaba Turkey". Seycan pointed out that Afghanis feel better since a 
Muslim country leads the command. These local interpretations show how 
fragile is situation in Kabul. Afghans may resist the ISAF but Turkish 
existence seems to prevent them doing so for the moment.  
 
In fact Afghanistan arose as one of the biggest example of Turkish-US 
cooperation after the Korean War. The Turkish-American ‘partnership’ there 
decreased American costs both politically and strategically. In this sense, Turkish 
support also helped to legitimize US policy on the behalf of western world. In fact 
we should lighten up the deep American strategic interests in the region in order to 
ferret out Turkish position in the operation. At that point, Paul Watson has 
                                                 
105 http://www.turkey.org/news97/t060298.htm 
106Turkish Daily News, 23 June  2002 (Turkish Probe issue 491) 
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underlined the economic and accordingly strategic interest of the US as follows 
that107 
While the easily led follow the morality play being acted out on television 
using scripted dialogue like "liberation" and "democracy," let's play a quick 
game of connect-the-dots and see if some kind of pattern emerges -- behind 
the scenes. Even with all of the media attention on Afghanistan as we 
prosecute the war on terrorism, still we have only a fuzzy focus on that part 
of the world, and even less of a sense of our more camouflaged connections 
to the region. The picture that emerges is a land teeming with wild-eyed 
warlords, malnourished children, abused women, mud huts and treacherous 
mountain terrain whose taverns and underground caves are home to minions 
of malevolence -- basically, a scene out of Lord of the Rings. The Bush 
administration insists the war on terrorism, with Iraq as the next target, is all 
about fighting evil and defending innocents, and that it doesn't have anything 
to do with commercial interests.  
 
 In this sense, indirect benefits to Turkey in Afghanistan operation started to 
flow through several channels. For example, the US supported Turkish accession to 
the EU even more vigorously. In addition, as retired US ambassador Marc Parris108 
underlined that Turkey’s image as a moderate and democratic Muslim country – an 
example to other Muslims -- was also enhanced in the context of the US struggle 
against terrorism and Islamic radicalism. Turkey’s ‘Muslim democracy’ was 
promoted for a Muslim world characterized by radicalism and authoritarian political 
structures.  Whether the model will be emulated remains to be seen but Afghanistan 
highlighted Turkey’s importance to the US both politically and structurally compared 
to it’s which strategic and geographic importance during the Cold War. On the 
Turkish side the new western preoccupation with ‘international terrorism’ allowed 
Turkey to justify its struggle with Kurdish terrorism before the western public and 
                                                 
107 LA Times , May 30, 2002 
108 Turkish Policy Quarterly, April 2003 
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media. As an evidence for this claim, we can explicitly show Turkish Foreign Policy 
Ministry’s formal declaration:109 
In order for the fight against terrorism to succeed, it has to be seen in the right 
perspective. Terrorism cannot be associated with any religion, culture, 
geography or ethnic group. The fight against terrorism is thus the common 
fight of the civilized world. The fight against terrorism should be a 
comprehensive effort. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 
provides a valuable basis for the broad efforts to counter terrorism. In the 
context of the required international solidarity in the fight against terrorism, 
the decision of the European Union, taken in May 2002, to include PKK- a 
separatist/terrorist organization which has been renamed as KADEK- and the 
extreme leftist DHKP-C terrorist organization in the list of terrorist 
organizations constitutes a positive development.  
 
 At the same time it is essential to distinguish between Turkish and American 
perspectives.  The US administration regarded ‘Enduring Freedom’ as the first stage 
in the implementation of a new foreign policy approach, aimed at preventing 
international terrorism in general meaning. Many observers, like Paul Pillar 
(2001:41-44) have defined this terrorism as new era in the post- Cold War Era. In 
this connection Afghanistan operation should be seen in this form. In this sense, 
Turkey supported US involvement in Afghanistan only because of its desires to 
demonstrate the value of its relationship with the US in the new global environment.  
Turkish support for the US was limited, and by its nature quite different from British 
support for the US. As differences between Turkey and the US over Iraq in 2003 
demonstrated there could be no question of a ‘permanent’ relationship founded on 
the basis of Turkey following the lead of the US in all situations. At that point, it is 
possible to see changing Turkish public attitudes to the Afghanistan involvement of 
the US in the aftermath of US invasion of Iraq. The atmosphere, which has been 
created by differences between Turkey and the US also extrinsically, has influenced 
                                                 
109 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupg/gb/default.htm 
 111 
on Turkish public perspectives on the Turkish involvement in Afghanistan. The polls 
also indicate this trend. According to this,110 
An opinion poll by the research firm Strateji-Mori shows that 80 percent of 
those interviewed oppose Turkey's troop deployment in Afghanistan.  
 
(Interestingly) A similar poll in September, conducted in the aftermath of the 
attacks in the United States on September 11, by A&G Research Company, 
showed that 74.3 percent of those interviewed considered that the US's 
declaration of war and Turkish involvement in it as wrong. 
 
 
Much of what Turkey might have gained over its involvement in Afghanistan 
(in American eyes) it lost over Iraq: the decision not to give the US land, sea and air 
base support for the war on Iraq caused anger and frustration in Washington.  
However, in the new global environment Turkey’s role vis-à-vis the US is still being 
moulded.    Turkey is still working on how it can adapt its policy needs to those of 
the US in Iraq and elsewhere.  However, given the fact that the US is now deeply and 
directly involved in the Muslim world Turkey is likely to be called on to play a more 
direct role in support of US policy than it during the Cold War.  If it accepts this role 
there will again be costs as well as benefits.   
  
3.5 Mixed blessings in Turco-American relations 
There are no clear division between costs and benefits in many situations in 
the Turco-American relations: some can be put in the category of “Mixed blessings” 
as illustrated follow: 
 
 
 
                                                 
110 http://www.atimes.com/c-asia/CJ13Ag01.html 
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3.5.1 Greece and Cyprus 
The relationship with Greece is one of the most ossified problems in Turkish 
foreign policy. The crux of the problem between the two countries has long historical 
roots.  The Ottoman Empire had ruled the Balkans for more than 400 years. (Ülger, 
Efegil, 2002:348). Taking advantage of the increasing weakness of the Ottoman 
Empire, and with the help of the European powers, Greece became independent in 
1830.111 From that time, as Ülger has pointed out, Greek foreign policy had 
irredentist aims against both the Ottoman Empire and then Turkey. During Turkey’s 
War of Independence the conflict between Greece and Turkey (1919-1922) resulted 
from Greece’s irredentist policies.  (Ülger, Efegil, 2002:349)  The borders between 
the two countries were fixed in the agreement signed at Lausanne (1923).  The 
political status has not changed until today with the exception of the Dodecanese 
case in the Aegean Sea.112The key point of the Turco-Greek relationship is the 
international than simply regional nature of the conflict between the two countries.   
The geographic and strategic positions of both Greece and Turkey have frequently 
given the problems between them an international dimension. After the First World 
War Britain openly supported the Greek invasion of Anatolia, providing some of the 
warships that ferried the Greek army across the Aegean to Izmir (Kartal: 1996:9-
555). After the Second World War, Britain intervened directly in Greece to prevent 
the communists taking over during the civil war. The perceived communist threat to 
Greece, Turkey and Iran rapidly became of critical concern to the governments of 
                                                 
111  Most of the countries that had been supported by the Western European countries (especially 
Great Britain that declared their independency from the Ottoman rule). In other words, both nationalist 
ideologies and the Western countries support had played important role in Serb or Greek revolts 
against the Ottoman rule. 
(Kutay, 1959:3924) 
112   The concept of the Dodecanese represents twelve islands, which are found in the Aegean Sea. 
These islands have always become a topic of dilemma between two countries. At the end, Paris 
agreement, in 1947 designates Greek domination in these islands. (Ülger, Efegil, 2002:348)  
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Western Europe and the US. Keeping the peace between Greece and Turkey was a 
continuing concern of these governments during the Cold War.  The two countries 
were admitted to NATO, which might have reduced the polarization between them 
but did not. The chronic problems between them can be summarized as the Aegean 
Sea, Cyprus, and the Turkish people who live in the Western Thrace. (Kongar, 
1999:472) Each problem area has specific dimensions.  For example, the Aegean Sea 
problem can be separated into differences relating to the extent of territorial waters, 
delimitation of the continental shelf, the militarization of the Eastern Aegean islands 
contrary to the provisions of international agreements and lastly air space related 
problems.113 The combination of all the problems has prevented a long-term 
improvement in Turkish-Greek relations. They have   frequently found a place on the 
agenda of international organizations.  According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, 
the main reason for the long history of these unresolved problems is the difference in 
perspective between Turkey and Greece.114 Domestic political dynamics has strongly 
affected Turco-Greek relations (Fırat, 1997: 4) For example, during the 1980 
PASOK (the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party) and its leader Andreas Papandreu won the 
elections (gaining 41.07 per cent of the popular vote)115. This shift in Greece’s 
domestic politics influenced Turco-Greek relations, because Papandreou’s116 foreign 
policy was strongly anti-Turkish (Sönmezoglu, 1996:487). The consequences were 
felt in the negative situations that frequently developed between the two countries. 
(For example, Greece politics which constituted the Aegean oriented problems 
mostly ossified the agenda during this period)  
                                                 
113  All these issues, which related with Aegean Sea, are quoted from the Turkish Foreign Ministry 
Web Page (http://www.mfa.gov.tr)  
114 (http://www.mfa.gov.tr)- Turkish Foreign Ministry Web Page 
115 http://www.ana.gr/hermes/1998/julaug/politic1.htm 
116  Andreas Papandreou, the Greek prime minister during 1980s, known with his anti Turkish 
policies, He was the leader of PASOK party. After he lost 1990 election, Kostantin Mitsotakis became 
prime minister. Papandreu became prime minister after the election in 1993, but he had to recede from 
the government because of his illness and he died in 1996. (Sonmezoglu, 1996:487)  
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Both Turkey and Greece have frequently tried to use their global influence 
with governments and international organizations to support their positions against 
each other.   For example, as Erol Manisalı has pointed out, Greece followed a policy 
that sought to bring its problems with Turkey to the agenda of international 
organizations and the super powers. (Ülger, Efegil, 2002: 99).117 As already 
indicated, the US made strenuous attempts during the Cold War to keep the peace 
between Greece and Turkey. It had powerful strategic interests both in the Aegean 
Sea and the Cyprus issue.  In the US view, a hot conflict between Greece and Turkey 
could well strengthen the position of the USSR in the Mediterranean and fragment 
the US’s frontline, as Kissinger (2000:577-79) and he has observed, the US 
considered the situation in Eastern Europe and Turkey. As being as important as the 
stand by the western alliance against the USSR, the US attitude was that if Greek-
Turkish problems (in the Aegean and elsewhere) could not be solved they had to be 
frozen in the general western interest during the Cold War. For example, as Henze  
has pointed out118 “U.S. policy has discouraged both Greece and Turkey from taking 
primary responsibility upon themselves for the management of their relations and has 
increased their governments’ vulnerability to domestic partisan pressures.” At the 
same time the US used its influence to prevent a hot conflict breaking out between 
Greece and Turkey in the Cold War and then the post-Cold War periods. (For 
example, during the Cold War, Johnson’s Letter. 
                                                 
117  According to Erol Manisalı, Greece adopted the policy which can be explained as “open crises 
policy” against Turkey up to 1999, which means Greece openly its hostility openly declared on the 
behalf of international originations like EU, European Council and so on. By this way, Greece 
expected to gain political advantages in its struggle with Turkey. (Ülger, Efegil, 2002: 99-100) 
118 http://web.deu.edu.tr/kibris/articles/aftermath.html 
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The 1996 crisis over the Kardak rocks119 was one example that from the post-
Cold War Era: in this case, the US put pressure both on Greece and Turkey to 
prevent conflict breaking out.120 However, the American involvement in the Turco-
Greek relations has also added new complexities to the problems between the two 
countries.  When the US has appeared as a negotiator in Turco-Greek problems, the 
problem has directly gained a third leg because benefits and costs to the US become 
part of the problem.  It would somehow be harder to strike a balance between three 
partners in practice. In sum, while US involvement has prevented conflicts between 
Turkey and Greece it has also added new complexities and specificities to their 
problems. Within this framework, Turco-Greek problems have started to play an 
important role in the Turco-American cost benefit analysis. 
On the Cyprus question the US was often actively involved whether during 
the Cold War or in later periods.  In the modern period the international significance 
of Cyprus goes back to June 4, 1878, when the Ottomans leased Cyprus to Great 
Britain on condition that it was eventually to be given back to the Ottoman Empire. 
(Akarcalı, Raif, 2001: 91)  However, Great Britain unilaterally annexed Cyprus when 
the First World War broke out in 1914.121  With British domination of the island, the 
number of Greek Cypriots began to rise.  Britain held the island until arrangements 
for independence were worked out in the 1950s, against the opposition of Greek 
Cypriots who favored Enosis with Greece.    April 1, 1955 was the date when the 
Greek Cypriots used force against the Turkish Cypriots under the directives of 
                                                 
119  1996 Kardak Rock crises stated that how the little rock piece would cause an huge conflict, 
According to Turkish Foreign ministry perspective, “The 1996 crisis over the Kardak rocks has 
erupted by coincidence in such an atmosphere when Greece was making announcements for 
recruitment of potential settlers from all over the world to some of these small islets and rocks” 
(http://www.mfa.gov.tr). Interestingly, Greece perspective also reflects as the opposite like the other 
cases between two countries. As a result, it would be possible to show Kardak Crises as a good 
example of problems, which originated from different perspectives on the same issues. 
120 (http://www.mfa.gov.tr). 
121    With Lausanne agreement in 1923, annexation of Cyprus was accepted by new Turkey republic. 
(Akarcalı, Raif, 2001: 91) 
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Archbishop Makarios and with the assistance of Greece. At this point, EOKA 
appeared as the core of terrorist attacks against Turkish Cypriots. (Akarcalı, Raif, 
2001: 91).  1950s passed with mostly Greece and Turkey struggle on the Cyprus in 
order to get political benefit on the behalf of the UN. For example, Cyprus question 
was brought to the UN by Greek side to carry out Enosis122 ideology Most of the 
time; the UN rejected these attempts. (Akarcalı, Raif, 2001: 92) The idea of enosis 
and the organization of EOKA arouses in the same manner. EOKA violence and 
reactions of Britain and Turkey against this formation in the island had been 
accelerated the developments at the end of 1950s.  B.Akarcalı (Akarcalı, Raif, 2001: 
92) summarized the case as: 
After four year of Greek Cypriot terrorism for Enosis against the 
British and the Turkish Cypriot people, a settlement was reached in 
1959 though the Zurich and London Agreements between the 
representatives of Turkey and Greece and the respective leaders of 
the Turkish and Greek Cypriot people in Cyprus. Thus, the 
foundation of the 1960 partnership Republic of Cyprus was laid 
down.  
 
This agreement creates a positive atmosphere in Turkey and accordingly among 
Turkish Cypriots. The agreement made Turkey, Greece, and the Great Britain   as 
guarantors of the independent republic On the other side, as Skjelsbaek (Skjelsbaek, 
1988: 9) points out, lots of Greek Cypriots, who initiated by ideological perspective 
of Enosis, found the creation of Cyprus Republic as a thwarting of their ‘Enosis’ 
ideology. On November 1963, President Makarios proposed new revision in the 
constitution. As Skjelsbaek has pointed out, (Skjelsbaek, 1988: 9) “the wide-range of 
veto power conceded to the Turkish Cypriots effectively immobilized legislation 
such key area as budget and taxes, and the proposed changes were not without a 
                                                 
122  According to Makides’ definition, “Enosis can be viewed primarily as the expression of a desire to 
reaffirm Greek Christian moral standards, which were being threatened by secularization and 
modernization. Enosis is not only a geopolitical goal, it is a catchword with Greek Cypriots 
understand to mean the preservation of their way of like” (Skjelsbaek, 1988: 8)  
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rationale.” This was somehow the starting point of the Cyprus dilemma that was 
going to open the way to chaos in the following years. Eoka and Greek Cypriots, 
standing for enosis or unification with Greece- started to use of force against Turkish 
Cypriots. On the other side, Turkish part also started to become armed against 
attacks. On the other side, the Turkish side also started to arm itself against 
threatened attacks.  
  The Greek Cypriot position was also affected by political maneuvers in 
Greece.   Kongar  (1999, 467) has underlined the fact that by the late 1960s, the 
Greek Cypriot leader and the republic’s president, Makarios, no longer supported the 
idea of Enosis because of the military coup d’etat in Greece. In consequence, 
Makarios lost the presidency through a coup d’etat on 15 July 1974, which was 
instigated by the Greek government. (Kongar, 1999, 467-68)  While the level of 
violence increased between the two publics on the island, political maneuvering in 
both Greece Turkey added new complexities on the island’s political atmosphere,123 
from the beginning of dilemma in Cyprus, the UN had become involved.  Necati 
Münir Ertekun (Skjelsbaek, 1988: 83) has underlined the role of the UN as follows: 
 
When  in 1954 Greece decided to make its first resource to the UN 
General assembly in an effort to obtain, under the guise, and with 
the assistance of, a one-sided application of the principle of the 
Self determination  only to the Greek Community, a resolution to 
support its policy of Enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece). The 
more direct involvement, however, of the UN itself with the 
physical presence in Cyprus of a peacekeeping force (UNFICYP). 
Goes back to nearly a quarter of a century when, towards the end 
of March 1954, the first contingent of UNFICYP arrived in Cyprus 
pursuant to Resolution 186 (S/5575) of 4 March 1964 of the UN 
Security Council. 
   
                                                 
123 http://web.deu.edu.tr/kibris/articles/hist.html 
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I do not want to embark upon a critical analysis of how the UN became party to the 
issue, but, in my view – as also highlighted by Ertekun (Skjelsbaek, 1988: 83) – the 
fact that Cyprus had become an important strategic question for the global powers 
during the Cold War years limited the possibilities of the UN finding a solution. 
In the context of the Turco-American relationship Cyprus   became a strategic 
tool during the Cold War years. The development of the Cyprus problem during this 
period came at a difficult time for the Turco-American relationship, as Kongar and 
Fırat have pointed out. (Kongar, 1999: 46, Fırat, 1997:129-130).  Four years after 
military intervention in Turkey (27 May 1960) the ‘Johnson Letter’124 highlighted the 
importance of Cyprus as a strategic issue in international relations in Cold War 
circumstances. The American administration had come to the conclusion that a 
Turkish operation on the island was unacceptable (Kongar 1999, 466) As Kongar has 
pointed out the US became directly involved and decided to put pressure on the 
Turkish side to prevent its intervention in Cyprus.  The letter written by US President 
Johnson to Prime Minister Inonu became famous as the “Johnson Letter” in the 
history of Turkish Foreign policy.  The letter strongly influenced Turco American 
relations in 1960s.   
The main points of the letter, according to one observer, were as 
follows: 125 
 
1) Turkey decided to intervene in the island in contravention 
of the Guarantee Treaty. Turkey cannot use its right to 
                                                 
124  US president Johnson sent a letter which was explicitly threatening Turkey without using 
diplomatic language and tradition, to Turkish Prime minister Ismet Inonu on 5 July, 1964. 
(Kongar1999, 466)  
125  This summary of the Letter is quoted from http://www.turk-
yunan.gen.tr/english/answers/question16.html and from (Kongar1999, 467). For accessing to full text 
and analyses, please apply to these sources. 
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intervene for the time being. 2) Any military intervention 
made by Turkey in the island may result in Turkey pitting 
itself against the Soviet Union. 3) Turkey took action without 
consulting its NATO allies and obtaining their "consent and 
approval." I (President Johnson himself) wonder if NATO is 
liable to defend Turkey in such a circumstance. Turkey did 
not take this point into consideration. 4) According to article 
4 of the assistance agreement dated 12 July 1947 between 
Turkey and America, Turkey does not have the right to use 
the arms it acquired from America in the intervention in 
Cyprus. Because, these arms were given to Turkey for 
defense purposes (3). 5) President Johnson would like to 
meet with the Turkish Prime Minister for detailed talks.  
       
In every respect, as Melek Fırat has pointed out (Fırat, 1997:129-133), the 
letter strongly affected Turkish thinking.  Intervention did not go ahead, and Turco-
American relations were severely strained as a consequence.  Kongar (1999, 466) has 
shown how the letter became a focal point for the Turkish anti-Americanism that 
increased during the 1960s.  Summing up the issue,   it can be said that the Johnson 
letter strengthened newly emerging leftist tendencies in Turkey. (Kongar, 1999, 466)  
The letter tended to undermine Turkey’s position as a guarantor of the rights of the 
Turkish Cypriots, as established in the 1960 London Conference agreement. (Fırat, 
1997:130) However, while the letter prevented a possible Turkish operation on the 
Island in the 1960s, it did not prevent Turkish intervention in the long run.  What it 
did, in fact, was to weaken the Turco-American relationship  
The Cyprus issue moved into the 1970s without being satisfactorily resolved.   
Eventual Turkish action in 1974 126 was triggered off by the fact that the inter-
communal violence in Cyprus was reaching the level of ethnic cleansing, forcing the 
Turkish Cypriots into ghetto-like conditions in enclaves constituting only three per 
                                                 
126  Turkey intervened as a result of rising violence against Turkish Cypriots on 20 July, 1974. This 
operation named the “Cyprus Peace Operation”. 
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cent of the island.127 One of the immediate causes of intervention was that the Greek 
colonels had conspired with the Greek Cypriots to bring about enosis.128 
On 20 July 1974, Turkey launched its unilateral Cyprus peace operation in 
accordance with Article 4 of the Guaranty Agreement. (Skjelsbaek, 1988: 13).  By 
the evening of 22 July Turkey had accepted the armistice resolution of the UN 
Security Council.  As a result of Turkish intervention, the military junta in Greece 
and the Cypriot government headed by Nikos Sampson collapsed. (Kongar1999, 468, 
Akarcalı, Raif, 2001: 16). 
Intervention had a strong effect on Turco-American relations. In its 
aftermath, the US decided to impose an arms embargo on Turkey. As Füsun Çoban 
Doskaya has pointed out129,   
American’s justification for the embargo was that Turkey had used American 
supplied arms during the peace operation in Cyprus. Under need that decision 
was the effect of Greek lobbying which argued that such an action was 
against the rules of U.S. Foreign Assistance Act. However the supporters of 
this argument ignored the fact that the Greek Cypriots had been using U.S-
supplied NATO arms against Turkish Cypriots for over eleven years and that 
the Greek and Greek Cypriot forces were still using them against the Turks. 
 
This embargo increased pressure on Turkish politics and the economy.   In 
the context of the relationship with the US, Kongar’s analysis shows that Turkey did 
not manage to turn its military success in Cyprus into a success in the international 
                                                 
127 http://www.turk-yunan.gen.tr/ 
128 Peace prevailed between the two communities until the coming back of Grivas to the island in 
1971. During that period Greek Junta began to see Makarios as an obstacle to Enosis. Papadopoulos 
and others “reached the conclusion that Makarios would never settle the Cyprus problem, whether by 
Enosis, double Enosis, or essential compromises with Turkish Cypriots” (Hart 130). Furthermore, 
when in 1973, a new junta came to power, matters became worse. Even the sudden death of Grivas 
did not better the events. On 15 July 1974 a coup led by Nicos Sampson destroyed the Presidential 
Palace and overthrew Makarios. However they failed to kill Makarios, who has fled with British help. 
Sampson immediately told that the negotiations would continue but this was not convincing. He was 
planning to unite Cyprus with Greece if Turkey had not intervened. 
(http://web.deu.edu.tr/kibris/articles/hist.html) 
129 http://web.deu.edu.tr/kibris/articles/mathesis.html 
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arena.  (However it domestically supports the prime-minister Ecevit’s position and 
influences his popularity).(Kongar 1999, 467) While the embargo was lifted, 
politically the US has never agreed to end the international social, cultural, and 
economic embargoes applied against the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus. 
(Akarcalı, Raif, 2001: 60). The failure of the US to understand Turkey’s position on 
Cyprus was extremely disappointing to the Turks, and led to questioning of the value 
of the US relationship: in addition, as had been the case in the 1960s after the 
‘Johnson letter’, public anti-American feeling began to mount as a result. More 
importantly in the sense of Turco-American Relations, Johnson Letter became a 
pivotal point that Turkey began to reconsider its foreign policy to the US (Surely in 
the limitations of the Cold War Period). For example, Turkish Foreign Minister 
Feridun Cemal Erkin visited to Moscow, “Turkey adopted a “multi-faceted” foreign 
policy and Soviets tried to better Soviet-Turkish relations.”130 However, this claimed 
perhaps be seen as Turkey using a trump card against the US: The overturn to the 
USSR did not lead to radical change in aims of Turkish foreign policy in general. 
Cyprus also became a dynamic element in the Turkish-EU relationship.  The 
‘Heinze Report’131 indicated the impossibility of Cyprus being made a EU member 
in the political and physical circumstances created by Turkish intervention; the EU 
then moved (in the 1990s) towards the plan to accept the membership of Greek 
Cypriots in the name of a unified Cyprus.  (Ahmetbeyoglu, Afyoncu 1997: 212)  
Greece‘s EU membership created further costs and complications for Turkey.  
Clearly Turkey’s   relationship with the EU has been greatly affected by the Cyprus 
issue. (Ahmetbeyoglu, Afyoncu.1997: 244).  On this point, while continuing to 
                                                 
130 http://web.deu.edu.tr/kibris/articles/hist.html 
131 Christian Heinze prepares the UN document, which is known as “Heinze Report”, in 1997. This 
document mainly indicates that Southern Cyprus administration could not apply to full membership of 
EU because of Cyprus problem’s historical roots that creates impossibilities in the sense of 
international law and science.   
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support Turkey’s EU membership, the US remained impartial on Cyprus oriented 
problems between Turkey and the EU.(See chapter4-4.3 for more detail) On the 
other side, the US’s nowadays attitudes to Cyprus problem is best summarized by 
McCaskill. He pointed out that132  
Cyprus does not have a very high priority in Washington these years. In 
contrast to former years when they spent considerable time looking for a 
solution, Cyprus has come to be regarded as a problem to be solved rather 
than as a situation to be managed. (43) Today America’s policy of Cyprus is 
to support the UN Secretary General’s proposals since they feel that that 
offers the greatest chance of success. However in the beginning United States 
preferred the de-internalization of the Cyprus question, and finding solutions 
away from the United Nations, that is, through NATO and bilateral 
negotiations between Greece and Turkey. “The United States did utilize the 
U.N. in Cyprus in order to legitimize solutions that served its broader 
politico-strategic interests, or when there were no other alternatives 
available” (Coufoudakis 65).  
As a result, it can be concluding that American attitudes and involvement had 
neither benefited U.S. nor helped Greeks or Turks on Cyprus.  
  
3.5.2 Armenia 
The word ‘Armenia’   has generally negative connotations in the language of 
Turkish foreign policy-making. As a political question Armenia brings many 
complexities both to Turco-Armenian and Turco-American relations.  There is more 
than one reason, which lies under the almost frozen diplomatic relations between 
Turkey and Armenia. It is therefore better to delineate the specific dilemmas between 
Turkey and Armenia before discussing the correlation between Turco-Armenian and 
Turco-American relations. 
  First of all, there is the longstanding Armenian claim of for “genocide”. The 
Armenians argue that there mass killings of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 
                                                 
132 http://web.deu.edu.tr/kibris/articles/aftermath.html  
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between 1915 and 1923. On the other side, Turkey argues that both Turkish and 
Armenians suffered from partisan fighting during the First World War and later as 
the Ottoman Empire collapsed.  During the years when Armenia was under Soviet 
domination, the Armenian claims of “genocide” claims were limited.  However, 
when Armenia declared its independence from the USSR on August 1, 1991, the 
accusation “genocide” was again voiced and started to find place in western public 
opinion and on foreign policy agendas.133 
However, even during the Cold War Armenian terrorists had carried out 
numerous attacks on Turks and Turkish diplomats all over the world.   Many of these 
attacks were carried out by the ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of 
Armenia) terrorist group.  Unfortunately, lots of innocent people were injured or 
died: they included 28 Turkish diplomatic and military personnel serving their 
country were assassinated in the western countries during the Cold War Era.134 On 
that point, for example Sedat Laciner (T.C Merkez Bankası, 2002: 81) claims that 
US did not primarily focus on Armenian oriented terrorist attacks against Turkey and 
intended to prevent these attacks to weakening of Turco-American relations during 
the 1970s (because of opium crises and Cyprus crises and following the US arm 
embargo to Turkey).  As Hyland has pointed out (Hyland, F.P, 1991: 32)  
 
ASALA employed diverse tactics, receiving support from Armenians (mostly 
lived in the US), non-Armenians, groups, and states (such countries Syria and 
Iran gave explicit support to ASALA). The support was sometimes given 
freely, sometimes grudgingly, sometimes fearfully. The support was both 
financial and ‘in kind’- weapons, explosives, training facilities.   
        
                                                 
133 http://www.turks.us/article.php?story=20030812091248752  
134  http://www.turks.us/article.php?story=20030812091248752  
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 For example, PKK appears as a group, which supported ASALA against 
Turkey, in that sense even in 2000s135: 
The terrorist organizations, the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK)(later 
renamed Kadek and nowadays it has changed to KHK) and ASALA, have 
reportedly signed an agreement concerning the training of terrorists in 
northern Iraq. (21.11.2001) Simon Zakarian a leader of the Armenian terrorist 
ASALA group has agreed with the PKK to train 110 of its militants on 
suicide and close combat techniques. The terrorist organizations, the 
Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) and ASALA, have reportedly signed an 
agreement concerning the training of terrorists in northern Iraq. Simon 
Zakarian a leader of the Armenian terrorist ASALA group has agreed with 
the PKK to train 110 of its militants on suicide and close combat techniques. 
 
 
These first two problems – the claim of genocide and terrors -- dominated 
Turco-Armenian relations for a long time, but these are not the only issues that have 
created tension between Turkey and Armenia.  When Armenia became an 
independent country   it also laid clam – at least informally – to territory in eastern 
Turkey.  Tansu Okandan, a former senior Turkish Foreign Ministry official, has 
defined the Armenian claims in the following words (as reported by the Turkish 
Daily News 3 December 2000): 
 
Armenia was continuing its territorial claims on Turkey, adding that 
Armenian authorities have identified six Northern provinces of Turkey as 
“western Armenia.” Okandan called on US authorities to urge Armenia to 
give up its current policy towards Turkey in order for Armenia ties with 
Turkey to develop. 
 
Moreover, Armenian territorial claims activated one of the first important 
conflicts in the region -- with Azerbaijan -- in the aftermath of the collapse of the 
USSR when Armenia occupied the Azerbaijan territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.  
Karabakh, especially, was the core point of the Armenian-Azeri dispute.  Azerbaijan 
                                                 
135 http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/CHR/ING2001/11/01x11x21.HTM# 12 
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and Armenia fought over Nagorno-Karabakh for three years. 136 Some parts of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh, mostly populated by Armenians, proclaimed their independence 
from Azerbaijan in 1991 with Armenia’s backing.  This can be shown as another 
important factor that should be highlighted as one of the reasons for the frozen 
diplomatic and economic relations between Turkey and Armenia during 1990s. 
Ironically, Turkey was one of the countries that recognized Armenia’s independence 
on August 1991.  Ongoing fighting and the inconclusive cease-fire settlement in the 
region of Nagorno-Karabakh inevitably constituted a significant obstacle to the 
improvement of Turco-Armenian relations. Turkey started to use its dominant 
position in 1993 by closing its borders with Armenia. The air border remained open 
but land routes -- including the railway --- were closed. Armenia was blockaded   
both in economic and political senses.137  The US paid close attention to the Turkish 
embargo on Armenia.  According to the US perspective, Turkey should form a kind 
of economic bridge between Asia and Europe and as a result of US pressure.  The 
border the land and rail routes were reopened. 138 It is clear that the US strategy was 
dırected towards maintaining the openness between economies in the region.  
Turkey, however, was mostly interested in the political side of the issue. Obviously, 
this border issue turned Armenia into an important factor in Turco-American 
relations:  it seemed to illustrate the separation of Turkish and American perspectives 
in the region.  Turkey might block the oil pipelines crossing Armenian territory.  
                                                 
136 The latest flare-up of this long-standing conflict occurred toward the end of the Soviet period, 
when the autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh petitioned to become part of Armenia. Serious 
fighting erupted in 1991, and in the following two years Armenian forces not only gained control of 
Nagorno-Karabakh but also occupied almost 20 percent of Azerbaijani territory. The leaders of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh region have declared independence, though this status has not been recognized by 
any state. The fighting between Azeris and Armenians left more than 15,000 dead.  
(http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks25/keypts25.html) 
 
137 It has been estimated that Armenia would gain between USD 600 million and 1 billion a year if the 
railway to was to open again. (http://www.rosbaltnews.com/print/print?cn=63363) 
138 http://www.rosbaltnews.com/print/print?cn=63363 
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Thus energy 139in the Turco-Armenian context would add tensions to relations 
between the US and Turkey.  
To sum up, the border issue between Turkey and Armenia opened ambiguous 
developments in Turco-American relation. At the same tıme Armenia began to 
escalate the genocide allegations and bring the so-called “genocide” issue on to the 
international agenda: ıt wanted judgment to be made before an international court.140 
In particular, the Armenians wanted to use lobby mechanisms in the US political 
system. In fact here, we should somehow separate the Armenians who live in the US 
and the formal attitudes of Armenian governments, because lobby facilities in the US 
have generally been independent of the countries. Şükrü Elektağ141, former Turkish 
ambassador to Washington, has summarized Armenian efforts in the US as follows: 
 
 
The activities of the Armenian lobby to have a bill passed by the US 
Congress accusing Turkey of Armenian Genocide continued incessantly. As a 
result of these efforts and with the strong support of the Greek lobby, the 
Armenians were able to bring a bill to the floor of the General Council of the 
House of Representatives. 
 
 
The Armenian lobby is one of the most influential groups in the US, after the 
Jewish lobby. Its anti-Turkish propaganda in the US is largely based on the genocide 
claim. As Elektağ has142 pointed out  
 
In both cases [each attends of Armenian lobbies in order to be accepted] 
where heated discussions took place the bills were rejected. The rejection of 
these claims that are seen as undisputed facts by the Armenian lobby; their 
supporters and a majority of the Americans angered the Armenian circles. 
Not knowing what to do, they wanted to declare the Turkish Ambassador as 
'persona non grata'. Deputy Speaker Tony Coelho presented a draft law to the 
                                                 
 
140 Milliyet, 18 October 2000 
141 Milliyet, 18-10-2000 
142 Milliyet, 18-10-2000 
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House of Representatives with the signature of 60 deputies with that purpose. 
This attempt failed. 
 
Even this case is adequate to see how Armenian lobby activities are influential in 
Turco-American relations.  
One of the most serious periods of tension between Turkey and the US 
involving the Armenian lobby arose in October 2000, when the House of 
Representatives decided to put the Armenian claim of genocide on its agenda.   This 
was the closest point that the resolution came to being discussed in the House of 
Representatives. President Clinton immediately warned the House not to pass the 
resolutions because it could damage the US partnership with NATO ally Turkey and 
seriously harm other US interests.143  It was thought likely that such a vote could 
result in the Incirlik airbase being closed: thus US planes could not use the base for 
patrols in the no-fly zone in Iraq. Consequently the House of Representatives 
cancelled a vote on a resolution. Former Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem 
underlined how this resolution would have Turco-American relations:144 
 
Turkey’s relations with the United States have been “saved from a grave 
threat” by the US House of Representative’s withdrawal of the resolution 
accusing the Ottoman Empire of the genocidal killing of Armenians early last 
century. 
 
             Several attempts by the Armenian lobby to have the House of 
Representatives pass a genocide resolution have failed in the last decade through the 
intervention of the American administration: these failures represent Turkish foreign 
policy successes. The Armenian issue between Turkey has remained inconclusive but 
when the time is right the claim of genocide will again be brought to the agenda of 
                                                 
143 http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2000/10/20102000061240.asp  
144 http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2000/10/20102000061240.asp  
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American politics.  This issue has created further costs for both sides in relation to 
Turco-American relations. Indeed, when Turco-American relations seem to be 
weakening over other issues, the Armenian genocide claim often reappears on the US 
political agenda. For example, however it  seems to be speculative news that the  
genocide  resolution  has  come up for discussion  in the aftermath of the US 
occupation of Iraq on the strength of  Turkey’s  to  give  support to the  US military 
during the American operation against Iraq. There is a probability of readapting of 
Armenian genocide in to the US political agenda. Thus it can be seen that the 
Armenian issue can cause very serious problems between the US and Turkey.  
So, however Turkey has always found means to cope with the Armenian’s 
lobby activities to have the so-called Armenian genocide recognized in some western 
European countries like Italy and France. There are some other problems that may 
bring further regional costs or benefits to Turkey ın connection with the Armenian 
issue. Global developments will play a crucial role in determining the direction of 
Turco-Armenian relations and accordingly Turco-American relation. In this sense 
sociologist Şule Kılıçarslan who is chairperson of the Eurasia Cultural and Social 
Development Association (ECASDA) has summarized Turco-Armenian relations by 
saying 145  
 
Especially after September 11 and the recent war in Iraq,  
one of these is the need to benefit from the current situation especially after 
the tension in the Turkish-US relations in the northern front (in Iraq) )and 
recognize that the Armenian genocide allegations will not bring any benefit 
for regional peace. On the contrary, two neighboring countries Armenia and 
Turkey should adopt liberal and mild rapprochement policies in the 
awareness of the destruction and economic depression brought by the war and 
should be able to see that there are more interests to be considered. The oil 
and gas energy transportation line projects may be the first part of this 
potential and communication and transportation technologies may become 
the new keys in Eurasia. This may be defined as one of the common 
                                                 
145 http://www.turks.us/article.php?story=20030812091248752  
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denominators where in accordance with the future enlargement policies of 
NATO both countries may cooperate in the security field. The second lesson 
to be drawn is that the determined foreign and security policies pursued by 
the US in the struggle against terrorism may lead to a new opportunity (for 
new phase of Turco-Armenian relations) 
 
 
Now, one question remains unanswered:  even if Armenia and Turkey 
develop a sort of common vision in the region, will it really affect Armenian 
lobbying activities in the US?  It is hard to answer this question because Armenian 
lobby is activated generally as a result of weakness or crises moments in Turco-
American relations rather than directly related to Turco-Armenian relations. 
Therefore, in my opinion the Armenian claim of genocide is used as a tool ın the 
relationship between Turkey and the US, rather than being directly related to 
improvements in Turco-Armenian relation.  In other words, the Armenian issue has 
been used as a kind of a variable in the cost and benefits balance both by different 
US administrations and also by the Armenian lobby. Therefore, it is possible to think 
that the US will use the “Armenian genocide” question at times of crisis with Turkey.  
 
 
3.5.3 Turkey between the EU and the US 
 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, when the western European 
countries were taking the first steps towards becoming a united Europe, involvement 
into the European Union146 took its place as key Turkish foreign policy objectives. 
Turkish enthusiasm to become an EU member has a long and complicated history. 
Most of the time, Turkey’s striving for EU membership has ended in disappointment.   
                                                 
146  “The European Union came into being when the Maastricht Treaty was ratified in November 
1993. ‘Europe’ (the politics and institutions of European integration) was called the EEC (European 
Economic Community or, colloquially, the Common Market until the 1980s, when it became the EC 
(European Community).” (Kesselman,Christophers,Ost, Krieger,Hellman, Ross.1997:571) 
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Obviously, it is possible to see difficulties in Turkish membership from several 
different variables. As of June 1993, the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ became the most 
critical obstacle to be overcome by Turkey.147 
On the other side, there are various different arguments which focus on 
Turkish displacement from the EU. On the other hand, however Turkey has been 
stepping decisive steps for the EU membership, especially political problems also 
played an important role as an obstacle against Turkey.  It can possible to be divided 
into two different segments such as the problems which depend on internal structural 
problems of the EU and secondly the political problems which directly depend on 
Turkish standing in the global world. For example, however as many pretend not to 
see, the period, which started with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, opened also a 
period of difficulties. The integration process has come into new process with 
expanding deeper problems.(Kesselman, Christophers, Ost, Krieger. Ross.1997: 631) 
For example, as Kesselman underlines the fact that the EU has internal problems like 
unemployment, which have hardened further involvement of countries like Turkey. 
So Kesselman (1997:631) points out the problematic period of the EU in the 
aftermath of the Maastricht as follows: 
 
The new Europe had been promoted for its ability to create jobs. By the time 
of Maastricht, it had begun to be perceived as a job destroyer. Moreover, 
                                                 
147 In June 1993, the Copenhagen European Council recognized the right of the countries of central 
and eastern Europe to join the European Union when they have fulfilled three criteria: political: stable 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for minorities; 
economic: a functioning market economy; incorporation of the Community acquis: adherence to the 
various political, economic and monetary aims of the European Union. These accession criteria were 
confirmed in December 1995 by the Madrid European Council, which also stressed the importance of 
adapting the applicant countries' administrative structures to create the conditions for a gradual, 
harmonious integration. 
(http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cig/g4000a.htm)  
 
 131 
analyses showed that EC unemployment was substantially greater than in 
comparable economies elsewhere, such as in the United States. For some 
deep reasons, Europe had less able to create jobs than other regions. As 
recession spread, observers also remarked that the Maastricht EMU 
proposals, with their stringent convergence criteria, would make it even more 
difficult for member state governments to stimulate economic activity. 
 
 
 
So that it should be accepted the fact that the EU and its mechanism has also had 
difficulties in balancing its economic and structural integration, which means Turkish 
membership have faces problems other than Turkish oriented economic and social 
problems. (Kesselman, Christophers, Ost, Krieger. Ross.1997: 631-34) Naturally 
Turkish membership makes some EU member countries worried. In this sense, 
France is already concerned about a new wave of Muslim migration and the Germans 
are already dealing with thousands of illegal Turkish immigrants. Beyond these 
realties and difficulties of the EU project, differences in the political perspective 
seem to be as the main obstacle for Turkish involvement. More importantly, the US 
appears as the core point of the political oriented issues between Turkey and the EU. 
At that point, Hasan E. Şener has summarized the uncertainty of Turkey on the 
behalf of the EU. He says, “It also seems to an observer that there are unwritten 
political criteria, in addition to the Copenhagen criteria, that Turkey needs to fulfill in 
order to reach the point so often trumpeted in Europe "Turkey is destined to join the 
EU".” 148 
  On that point, the Cyprus issue is a core political obstacle against Turkish 
involvement.  Especially with the Greece’s EU membership has been primarily role 
in changing EU perspective against Turkish occurrence in the Cyprus. The general 
tendency of the EU has reflected the idea that “Cyprus belongs to the Greek Cypriots 
                                                 
148 http://www.thesprout.net  (the Sprout, number 8,2003) 
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and they are prepared to impose minority status on the Turks living in Northern 
Cyprus” (Akarcalı, Raif, 2001: 27) Actually the decision which is taken by the EU at 
the Luxemburg Summit in 1998 is adequate to explore the EU perspective on the 
Cyprus issue. At this summit, the Cyprus issue was underlined with an attention 
being paid the idea of “Turkey should recognize the Greek Cypriot government in 
the south as the state for the entire island. This recognition, of course, would relegate 
the Turkish Cypriots to the status of a community” (Akarcalı, Raif, 2001: 92) In fact, 
the EU‘s perspective on Cyprus and its possible results is another point but, more 
importantly, this issues explicitly show the reluctance of the EU regarding Turkish 
membership and support for he indefinite position of Turkey on the road to EU 
membership. (Akarcalı, Raif, 2001: 29). Cyprus issue also symbolizes one of the 
difficult periods in Turco-American relations such as “Johnson’s Letter” and arm 
embargo wagged Turk-American relations (1974). (See Chapter3.5.1 for detail) these 
cases have shown that the fact the US did not want a Cyprus oriented conflict in the 
region during the Cold War. So, it would be hard to argue that the US role in Cyprus 
negotiations did not support Turkish benefits in Cyprus for most of the time during 
the Cold War Era. 
In general, the US gave its support to the establishment of a united Europe in 
the aftermath of the Second World War. (Kissinger, 2000:768) According to the 
American perspective, a united Europe was essential to maintain security and welfare 
on the continent.  Throughout the Cold War the US gave arms support to most EU 
countries.  However, as Kissinger (Kissinger, 2000:781) has pointed out, the collapse 
of the USSR opened a new era in the US-EU relationship. Kissinger has underlined 
the fact that the European has not need to get American support against the USSR 
that explicitly means that the security and indefiniteness problem in the European 
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continent has gone away. On the other side, as he pointed out, the US also is not 
going to desirously bear the consequences of sacrifices for the sake of European 
security as much as the Cold war period and continue its solitude policy in most of 
the case (Kissinger, 2000:781-82)  
The end of the Cold War was a pivotal point in determining in mutual 
relations the US and the EU. As a result, the EU has developed mostly as an 
economic organization, which is still far away from being a dissuasive military 
power. This reality ties the EU to US military power. However, there are serious 
differences of perspective and opinion of which Iraq is only the most recent. 
Inevitably, changing US perspectives on the EU have influenced the EU-Turkey and 
Turco-American relations. During the Cold War years the US saw Turkey as 
standing in the front line against the USSR and therefore supported Turkish 
involvement into the EU. It can be said that Turkish EU membership was not a 
primary foreign policy topic of US during the Cold War.  However, US policy 
shifted with regard to Turkey’s EU membership shifted enormously especially in the 
aftermath of the September 11 attacks. The US revised its foreign policy with the 
September 11 terrorist attacks. This had a direct impact on the Turkish position both 
in the region and in its relations with the EU.  The previous US Ambassador to 
Turkey, Robert Pearson, best expressed the US position on Turkish-EU relations in a 
speech on May 28, 2002: 
Referring to relations between Turkey and the European Union (EU), Robert 
Pearson described the inclusion of PKK and the Revolutionary People's 
Liberation Party Front (DHKP-C) in the EU's list of terrorist organizations as 
an important step. He stressed that the United States had been supporting 
Turkey's full membership to the EU. 149 
 
                                                 
149http://www.turkishpress.com/turkishpress/news.asp?ID=5987  
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             Recent developments indicate that the US is increasing its pressure on a 
reluctant EU to admit Turkey and to promote it’s (the US) greater foreign policy 
goals in the Muslim and Arab world. US Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz 
urged the EU   ‘to welcome Turkey into its fold’ during its December 12-13 summit 
in Copenhagen.150  He described Turkey as the only Muslim and secular country that 
is “striving to develop a free and democratic and tolerant society that could be a 
useful model for others in the Muslim world”.  151 Thus Turkey has appeared as a 
useful model for the US in its struggle against Islamist terrorism.  
In addition, the US has also increased its pressure on the EU, Greece and 
Turkey to solve the Cyprus issue. As the US Undersecretary of State for Political 
Affairs, Marc Grossman pointed out152 “The US reiterated the support of the US 
government to the UN Secretary General's efforts to solve the Cyprus problem and 
expressed his country's support for Cyprus' accession to the EU.”  It means that the 
latest UN plan to Cyprus, so-called “Annan Plan”, is supported by the US. The 
American supported Annan plan has opened new debates in Turkish domestic policy.  
Some portion including, Northern Cyprus Turk Republic President R.Denktas also 
oppose to the plan in some degree, on the other hand, in Turkey some are underlying 
the importance of gains that the plan offer to Turkish Cypriots and evaluate as an 
historical changes both for Cyprus and both for Turkish membership to the EU. As, 
Mehmed Ali Birand, an influential journalist in Turkey, sees “Annan Plan” as an 
historical chance. He says, “Turkey is faced with one final historic chance. Though it 
does not fully satisfy the Turkish side, the Cyprus package does offer extremely 
important gains. Casting aside the 'We will not give away even a pebble,' litany, we 
                                                 
150 http://www.arabia.com/I87/pina 
151 http://www.arabia.com/I87/pina 
 
152 http://www.pio.gov.cy/news/dailynews/news2002_6_20.htm 
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must take the most we can and close this file.” Whatever the different perspectives 
are, the important point here is the US support symbolizes increasing directly and 
indirectly pressures of the EU on Turkey in order to accept that Plan. As a result, 
however there is both the US and the EU pressures on Turkey and accordingly 
Greece, Annan Plan has carried out by two sides, but it does not fairly means that the 
EU pressures on Turkey will ended. More importantly, the US future attitudes will be 
envisaged the process.    
The positive US position on Turkish membership of the EU has also helped 
Turkey during the arguments over the EU’s efforts to build its own defense arm 
force.  For example, Doug Bereuter, an153 influential Republican Congressman who 
is close to the Bush Administration, has said  (according to the Turkish Daily News 3 
December, 2000) that  
Turkey should not be excluded from the decision-making mechanism of the 
proposed force .The EU cannot exclude NATO members from the decision-
making process while using NATO assets. … (He continued)… The EU is 
not autonomous and probably never will be. It would continue to need NATO 
facilities. Therefore, it cannot exclude NATO members, especially a strategic 
country like Turkey. 
 
American support also was also shown in the aftermath of NATO Summit in 
Washington in April 1999.154 The major decision taken at this meeting was that it 
was   
clear that the work done on establishing WEU-NATO cooperation will have 
to be revised and reworked to provide for NATO-EU cooperation on a more 
equal footing. Thus it reflects a re-launch of the idea that the future of 
transatlantic relations should be based on two pillars - the EU and the United 
States.155  
  
                                                 
153 Turkish Daily News, 13 Nov, 2002 
154   The meeting is held for  celebrating the 50th anniversary of NATO 
155 http://www.basicint.org/europe/NATO/99summit/nato_at_odds.htm 
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This decision strengthened Turkey’s bargaining position as an NATO member.   In 
addition, following US pressure on individual member states, the EU decided in 
December 2001 at its Helsinki  Summit  that the  EU‘s Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) 
would  not intervene in the region close to Turkey without common partnership with 
NATO.156 157 This decision gave an indirect veto power to Turkey without it being 
actively in European security structure.  However, all these examples do not allow us 
to determine exactly what direction US- Turkey and the EU relations will take in the 
near future, and accordingly, what role the EU will play in the cost-benefit balance 
between Turkey and the US. 
 
3.6. Concluding remarks   
 Although it seems clear that Turkey has tried to develop a broader 
base/perspective for its foreign policy in the post Cold War, as indicated in this 
chapter, the obvious fact is the continuation of Turco-American linkage as much as 
the Cold War years. The important point is one difference or transformation in 
Turkey’s quality on the behalf of the US perspective. That is, as it has been indicated 
in this chapter, (as Müftüoglu and Yüksel has pointed out) “In the first years after 
Second World War, as the only Islamic country with a secular democratic 
government, Turkey was viewed as a bulwark against Soviet designs in the Middle 
East.” (Müftüoğlu and Yüksel, 1997:188).Then, in the post Cold War Era, these 
specifies of Turkish structure has been started to view as a kind of model for the 
Middle Eastern despotic and religion oriented powers by the Western countries (and 
specifically by the US). This seems to be main difference of Turkey from the Cold 
                                                 
156 http://europa.eu.int/ 
 
157 http://www.c3ed.uvsq.fr/c3ed/Axe6/Serfati-AEA-2002.pdf 
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War to the Post Cold War for the Western and the US perspective. Especially, in the 
aftermath of September 11 attacks and with the rise of “Islamic” terrorism, Turkish 
secular and democratic structure has started to view as an important element for 
modeling the “new” Middle East rather than “bulwark” against one enemy. Actually, 
the US approach that is viewing Turkey as a model for the Middle East, which also 
means that US and the Western perspective is still seeing Turkey in the Middle 
Eastern context rather than European context. More exactly, all the costs and benefits 
which has mentioned in this chapter indicates that Turkish political and geographical 
position have been generally perceived and evaluated by the US according to US 
strategies in the Middle East rather than in Europe. So this reality should be highlight 
as a main characteristic of Turco-American relations.    
 After highlighting Turkish position in the post Cold War Era as one of the 
main remarks of this chapter, we can easily extract two main reasons from the Turco-
American relations in the post Cold War in order to clarify Turkish position in 
nowadays political environment; 
First, however, this thesis is somehow questioning “strategic partnership” 
between Turkey and the US in most of the sections; it is fact that Turkey has become 
one of the close partnerships of the US in its world wide operations, rather than 
becoming front line of the US like in the Cold War years. Turkish role and 
involvement in Yugoslavian and Afghanistan operations in the post Cold War are the 
most extrinsic examples of this partnership. In addition to this, however US invasion 
of Iraq is disputatious operation in terms of its legitimacy and efficiency; it has 
openly paved the way of new alternatives for Turco-American partnership, which 
may be beneficial or detrimental for Turkish position in the new global environment. 
As a result, transformation of Turkish position in its relations with the US from 
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“front line of the Cold War” to “partner in US operations” has inevitably caused new 
type of costs and benefits for Turkey in the post Cold War. Therefore, it is possible 
to remark that Turkish costs and benefits has been changing form with changing US 
global politics and becoming abundant in the post Cold War environment.   
Second, in the post Cold War Era, it can be easily observing that there are 
still ongoing process of some issues between Turkey and the US which has started in 
the Cold War. In fact, these topics, which have been mentioned in the section--called 
“Mixed Blessings” section in this chapter, constitutes important place in determining 
the real nature of Turco-American relations in the post Cold War era. In other words, 
on one side, Turkey and Turkish foreign policy in the post Cold War have showed 
cooperation and parallelism with the US global policy for most of the time; on the 
other side; Turkey and the US have still unclear issues in bilateral relations. For 
example, as has pointed out in this chapter, Cyprus, Armenia, and EU. All these 
issues are long time pasts in Turco-American relations. It can be easily observing 
that all these issues have common similarities in terms of Turco-American relations. 
First and the main similarity is Turkey have not changed its attitudes and policies so 
much to these three issues both during the Cold War and aftermath. On the other 
hand, as indicated in this chapter- the US approaches and accordingly policies to 
these issues has always been in alteration according to the US global interests. 
Therefore, these three issues (Cyprus and accordingly Greece, Armenian, and 
Turkish relations with Europe.) have gained ossified characteristics in Turco-
American relations. For this reason, these issues become more important and 
diagnostic in Turco-American relations when Turco-American relations come into 
crises or in cooperation. For example, American support to Turkish membership to 
the EU has been uprising just after rise of global terrorism in 2000s, while it was 
 139 
indistinct for most of the Cold War Period. Armenian issues indicate another 
example- Armenian claims of genocide and lobby activities has rapidly increases in 
the US Congress during the crises times in Turco-American relations. It also means 
that these three issues also plays important role to designate the level of costs and 
benefits in Turco-American relations, because these ossified issues can be suddenly 
activated as result of another problem or changing policy.  So, it is possible to remark 
that these issues, which have been underlined in the “Mixed Blessings” section in 
this chapter, are staying a sort of question mark in the relations and also in the cost-
benefit analysis in the post Cold War. 
 Another important concluding remark from this chapter is changing roles of 
the concepts like dependency, super power and so on in the Turco–American 
relations in the post Cold War. On this point, it is sure that Turco-American 
partnership and cooperation have continued in the post Cold War. On the other hand, 
Turkish side-both in the administration and public levels- has started to question the 
super power and dependency concepts much more than the Cold War Era. However 
the post Cold War environment has changed the dependency concept between 
Turkey and the US. Turkey  proved its enthusiasm to increase relations with the US 
in the new global arena. In short, we can easily show two main reasons for Turkish 
desires to continue and expand its relations with the US. First one is the sensitive 
interrelation between Turco-American and Turco-EU relations. Second one is the 
increasing role of the US in both in the Middle East and Eurasia. (All these two 
reasons have been analyzed in this chapter). 
On the other hand, what kinds of differences can be observed on the concepts 
of super power and dependency in Turco-American relations? The main difference is 
the US not only dependent to Turkey in terms of strategic anxieties, but also has 
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started to be dependent in terms of philosophy and ideology (Democrat and secular 
Muslim country). Therefore, it can be claiming that interdependency concept has 
replaced the dependency concept specifically in the aftermath of the September 11 
attacks at one degree. As J.S. Nye’s book-called “The Paradox of American Power” 
has pointed out, the US needs to other actor countries as much as the Cold War days 
in order to continue its “super power” statisko in the global environment. (Nye, 
2003:5-6) On this point, as he has pointed out, the US is trying to find out balance 
between increasing dependency to other actors and its global strategies. For example, 
Clinton administration appropriated “multi-sided” foreign policy and tried to increase 
the number of its allies. (Nye, 2003:6). Then the Republican/Bush administration has 
totally changed that policy to “obstinately” American foreign policy on other actors 
in the aftermath of September 11 attacks. In both cases, Turkey developed different 
policies towards changing nature of the US foreign policy in order to secure its good 
relations with the US. It means that the US has remained diagnostic factor of Turco-
American relations in the post Cold War. Therefore, however interdependency 
concept seems to be somehow replaced dependency concept. It is hard to argue that 
there has been total interdependency between Turkey and the US in the new global 
environment, which means that the dominancy of dependency concept for Turkey 
and similar other actors in their relations with the US is still on political agenda. As a 
result, the main finding of this chapter is; the post Cold War has witnessed inevitable 
and huge issues (like September 11 terrorist attacks) that changed foreign policies 
and cost-benefit balance between Turkey and the US.    
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CHAPTER 4: 
CONCLUSION: COST-BENEFIT ANAYLSIS 
 
As can be seen from the analysis of previous chapters, Turkey has been 
strongly affected by the global balance of power both during and after the Cold War.  
What makes Turkey unique – in the context of its relations with the US -- is its 
strategic and geographic position.   In the contemporary situation Turkey has become 
important to the US because of its structural uniqueness in the Muslim world.  
However much Turkey’s geographic and strategic importance seems to be decreasing 
by the end of the Cold War, its secularized Muslim identity appeared as an important 
dynamic factor which pulled Turkey again into a global struggle. (See Chapter 4, 
4.3) it may lead to create new reciprocal costs and benefits between Turkey and the 
US in economic, political and even in social structures. This means that Turkey, both 
politically and geographically and now structurally, is still in an important position 
during a new period of global struggle.  
As a result, it is important to analyze the Turkish position   both during the 
Cold War and also after the Cold War.  Towards this end it is important to separate 
the outlook for Turkey into three areas:  constraints in foreign policy, economic 
dependency and lastly in the sense of Turkey’s costs and internal divisions arising 
from globalization. Therefore, this chapter will examine some of the general 
concepts that create differences in the Turco-American relations cost-benefit balance. 
 
 
 
 142 
 
4.1. Constraints in foreign policy 
  
The foreign policy of any country is influenced by both domestic and 
international politics and Turkey is no exception. A global power exerts its own 
pressures on the foreign policy decisions of any state, and perhaps especially so in 
the case of actors such as Turkey. Turkey is not well placed to develop an 
independent foreign policy.  From the Middle East to the Caucasus the region is 
driven by conflict. In this kind of environment many important issues have to take 
second place to high-level security, military and diplomatic needs. In this context, 
foreign politics with its all subtopics become an airly essential area for Turkey’s 
position in the region. (Kut, 2001: 5)  In the past four decades, Turkish foreign policy 
has been influenced first by the global rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union 
and then by new developments in the post Cold War period just after the collapse of 
the USSR. For instance, as Şule Kut (Kut, 2001: 5) has pointed out, “in just two 
years, the number of states neighboring Turkey increased by 50 per cent”.  Therefore 
the development of Turkish foreign policy has been conditioned by global power 
both during the Cold War years and also in the post Cold War period. 
       It is essential to understand Turkish foreign policy in order to highlight 
the  constraints under which it is developed.   What makes Turkey distınctive is that 
its traditions are entirely different from Europe’s. Turkey has a strong state tradition 
dependıng  on the heritage of Ottoman Empire,  which means that centralization  has 
remained  a dominant character of Turkish politics.   Accordingly, when we look at 
the  first decades of the  republican period,  the Republican Party government created 
a huge bureaucratic elite to carry out its  political decisions.  Thıs has remained the 
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situation up till now.  (Kongar, 1999:20)  On the other hand, this kind of bureaucratic 
tradition sometimes is not enough to prevent the influence of populist politics on 
foreign politics. The important point here is the grey area between domestic and 
foreign policy making, which is connected with the role of the high state 
bureaucracy.  (Kongar, 1999:20)  The high state bureaucracy has mostly been able to 
run domestic politics and foreign policy in tandem. The interesting and unique point 
here is that the state structure canalizes both its foreign policy and domestic foreign 
policy towards the Westernization project as an ideology.  However, this 
westernization as an ideology has led to more dependency on Europe and US 
especially in foreign policy decisions.  This means that both the foreign policy and 
domestic policies of Turkey are somehow affected from outside. This is sure a sort of 
dilemma in Turkish foreign policy and somehow one of the reasons for foreign-
origin constraints in Turkish foreign policy so that the US appears as the most 
influential actor in this sense. 
  What constraints have arisen as a result of the reality of American global 
power? As we have seen Turkey has been   an important actor in all the global 
challenges that arose after the end of the Second World War. (Derengil, 1992:3).   
Between the 1950s and 1980s, most countries both in Balkans and also in Eurasia 
remained under the political domination of the Soviet Union. This highlighted 
Turkey’s position as a bastion of western influence in the southeastern Europe and 
Middle Eastern regions. In this sense, Turkish foreign policy options were 
constrained because of the alignment with the US and the ‘West’. For example, 
relations with countries in the Middle East region languished because of Turkish 
linkages with the US even though the Middle East region remained very important 
for Turkey both in the sense of economic and political relations. (Derengil, 1992: 4)   
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Turkish foreign policy never found a way to develop warmer relations, mostly 
because of the limitations arising from US policy interests during the Cold War 
which allowed Arab opinion to see Turkey as a servant of the west in the region.  
In the sense of security, Turkey was also affected by the Cold War period. 
For example, during the Cuban missile crises at the beginning of the 1960s Turkish 
foreign policy became a ‘trump card’ between the US and the USSR.  (Allison and 
Zelikow, P.1999: 356) During this  period,  President Kennedy offered  to withdraw 
American missiles from  Izmir as the  price  of securing the withdrawal of Soviet 
missiles  from Cuba.(see chapter 2, 2.4)  Turkish foreign policy concerns  had no 
effect on that decision of the US. (Allison and Zelikow, P.1999: 356)   There are lots 
of different examples showing the constraints on Turkish foreign policy arising from 
the relationship with the US: one was when Turkey made a foreign policy decision 
separately from the US during the Cyprus operation, resulting in a long term arms 
embargo being imposed against Turkey. (See chapter 4, 4.1).   
There were of course the advantages that have already been pointed out, i.e 
US support for Turkey’ entrance into NATO.  In the post Cold War period İlhan 
Üzgel has pointed out (Uzgel, 2001: 65) that Turkey started to establish strong 
economic and political ties with Balkan countries with the support of the US.   For 
example, Turkey participated in peacekeeping operations both in Bosnia, Albania, 
and Kosovo with strong backing by the US (see chapter3, 3.2) Turkey also gained 
advantages with the support of US on the issue of the Baku-Ceyhan158 pipeline 
project. (Sasley, 2001:228).  
                                                 
158 The Baku-Ceyhan scheme that has been reeling since 1992. If everything goes according to plan, 
oil will start flowing through the pipelines by 2005. The cost of the project was among the most 
contentious subjects up to now. Botaş (Petroleum Pipeline Corporation) assumed the responsibility of 
completing the Turkey part of the project. Pledging to complete the 1070 kilometer part of the 
pipeline passing across Turkey for $1.4 billion including nationalization. The income to be drawn 
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Overall, it is possible   to argue that the post cold-war has brought more 
complicated and surprising costs to the Turco-American relationship compared to the 
Cold War period.  Kaner and Brooks have described how the costs of the cold War 
have moved into less obvious and less quantifiable categories than during the Cold 
War: (Kanter, Brooks, 116-17): 
Every minor problem during overt intervention, especially military 
intervention, may have great political impact in the age of global televised 
news, when vivid images can bring about rapid changes in the national mood. 
The pictures of the October 1993 desecration of dead Americans in Somalia, 
for example, led directly to the American decision to withdraw its forces from 
the United Nations effort in that ravaged nation. 
 
The September 11 violence and attacks have brought about a revolutionary 
transformation both in the expression of US power and in the position of other actors.  
The different way in which global power will be expressed is already clear: the US 
has expressed its determination to exercise a range of options including ‘anticipatory 
action’ against regimes it believes are threatening or may threaten its interests. Iraq is 
an example of the new policy in action: the US has made it clear’, in a manner 
strikingly familiar to the ‘ether with us or against us’ rhetoric of the Cold War, that it 
expects other countries to fall into line with the new approach. What is clear is 
Turkey will be in the part of the US in the sense of “either with or against with us”, 
but the essential point in this sense that Turkey again will be one of the most affected 
country from new American foreign policy perspective and accordingly its practices 
because of its geographic position. In fact, that is why both economic and political 
relations of Turkey should be revised according to this new conjecture  
                                                                                                                                          
from the transit fees of the incoming oil is projected at $100-200 million annually. 
(http://www.turkishtime.org/ekim/42_1_en.htm) 
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4.2 Economic dependency 
Secondly, economic phase of the global power occurrence is an important 
part of the relationships between the US and others. By nature, a global power 
depends on not only on militarily and physical power but also economic power, 
because the combination of economic and physical power is somehow the sine qua 
non element of becoming and remaining a global power. Turkey’s economic 
dependency on the US started after the Second World War.   The ‘Marshall Plan’ 
was the first step in Turkey’s economic dependency on the US.  In the following 
years, and generally with US support, Turkey applied for all kinds of credits   from 
the World Bank and the IMF. By the end of 1974, Turkey had acquired debts of 
more than 63 billion TL. (According to 1974 exchange rate) of which 71.3 per cent 
was provided by the US. (Kongar, 1999: 488)  In addition, by 1974 Turkey had 
acquired militarily aids and credits from the US of more than three billion dollars: by 
the 1990s Turkey’s foreign debt had increased to hundreds of billion of dollars.  
                        From the “cost-benefit” analysis perspective, Turkey benefited from 
this economic dependency on the US in the form of military and political support in 
the region and in the long road of the European Union Membership. (Cumhuriyet, 
25-1997: 4) (See chapter 4, 4.3)  On the other hand,   the Turkish economy lost 
billions of dollars as the result of Turkey’s strong support for the US during the Gulf 
War. The US invasion of Iraq will cause deeper economic dilemmas in Turkish 
economy.  What is clear is that economic dependency is not a significant source of 
political dependency (For example, Turkey would not support the attack on Iraq in 
2003). Therefore, Turkish economic dependency without political dependency will 
be open new dilemma in Turco-American relations. In this sense, Turkey will be 
constrained economically as a result of its political behaving against the US. It is 
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possible to argue that there has been very delicate linkage between economy and 
foreign policy in Turco-American relations’ nature. It is clearly that Turkey has 
managed to successes in separating its foreign policy from its economic dependency 
in some cases (for example in Cyprus operation-1974 and US invasion of Iraq-2003). 
On the other side of the fact, Turkey has always been in the position to select 
economic costs or political one. 
 On that point, it would better to look at some values that highlight the gravity 
of the economic dimension in Turco-American relations. By the end of 2000, 
Turkey’s foreign loans had reached $ 114,324 billion. More importantly, the IMF 
and the World Bank constituted more than % 10 percent of these loans.159  The US 
had played essential role to take these loans to Turkey. (As pointed out before, both 
IMF and the World Bank are the organization which can be count in American 
navigation.).160 As C. Erhan has pointed out, (Bal, 2001:128) we should also look at 
capital transformation between Turkey and the US.  The sum of the foreign capital 
that has entered into Turkish economy is approximately $ 28,610 billion in the period 
between 1980 and 2000.161 More importantly, American companies’ share was $ 
3,306 billion. Therefore, the US has become the fourth biggest country (after France, 
Germany, and Netherlands), which invested in Turkey. At this point, we should also 
underline the importance of Turkish attitudes to the US. Turkey, especially at the end 
of 1980s, started to struggle with strict American quote policy with the mentality of 
“trade instead of aid”. (Bal, 2001:128). This new approach has given positive results 
and Turkish products have come into the US more easily than before. On the other 
hand, there is a still huge gap in Turco-American foreign trade balance for American 
                                                 
159 http://www.hazine.gov.tr 
160 http://www.die.gov.tr/TURKISH/SONIST/DISTICIST/06112001.htm 
161  Statistics are selected up to 2000 year, because Turkey lived series of economic crises which had 
an effect on both foreign and domestic economy  in the aftermath of 2000, which probably mislead the 
real level of capital transformation between the US and Turkey. 
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benefits. For example, by the year 2000, the US was in the second place (After 
Germany) in Turkish exportation. ($ 3.074 billion and % 9.2 percent)162. In the realm 
of imports, US were in the fourth position with $ 3,887 billion and % 7.6 percent.        
Here the important point that should be highlighted is examining the real 
effect of economic dependency of Turkey to the US and going forward to the 
question: Has this economic dependency really helped to create a sort of “patron-
client structure” in Turco-American relations? It can be argued that the Turco-
American relation has embraced some of the patron-client (Clientalism)163 type of 
relationship in economic sense. In other words, unequal economic status of two 
countries somehow opens up to the question of the relationship as being a “patron-
client” relationship, because economic dependency on the US inevitably creates 
constraints at some levels of the Turkish policy mechanism.  Accordingly, all these 
debts have created some type of constraints in Turkey’ macro-economic decisions 
which can be shown as a one form of patron client relationship, because constraints 
in macro-economic decisions also impact on the country’s political and social 
structure.  On the other side, ironically, the nature of the patron-client relationship 
involves total hegemony of the hegemonic state both on the other state’s economic 
and political decisions, especially in foreign policy. Turco-American relations do not 
fit into this type of Clientalism to the fact that Turkey (with some exceptions) have 
never included into American navigation of foreign policy in related to its economic 
dependency. American navigation in Turkish politics has been limited with some 
                                                 
162 http://www.hazine.gov.tr 
163  “The concept of Clientalism was taken up by the students of comparative politics in the 1960s to 
account for the patterns of political association and organization at the national level, in the 
“developing” societies of Latin America and Asia…” (Sargin, 2001: 2) but, on the other hand, macro 
level dependencies between countries can also be show the Clientalism specialties to some extent. But 
it needs to involve almost full dependency that open an extrinsic navigation way to  one state on other 
which has not been the case in Turco-American relation for most of the time,. Therefore it is 
impossible to argue a full type of Clientalism structure in Turco-American relations whether in 
economic sense. 
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exceptions such as it can be arguing that Turkish Middle Eastern policy was under 
the direction of the US during the Cold War Era. (See Chapter 2) But, we should not 
forget the fact that it is hard to find any examples that illustrates economic 
dependency’s transformation to the foreign policy decisions as a kind of constraint in 
Turco-American relations. As a matter o fact, almost all crises in Turco-American 
relations has been occurred because of different perspectives of the countries like in 
Cyprus peace operation, the Gulf War, the latest us invasion of Iraq and so on. So, 
we only mention a sort of patron-client structure in Turco-American relations limited 
with economic sense, rather than a full type of Clientalism. 
 
4.3. Final evaluation 
It is very hard to determine costs and benefits for a country involved in a 
relationship with another because the balance can be manipulated according to 
different perspectives.  Some of the issues, which can be shown as a ‘cost’ according 
to one perspective, could be regarded as a benefit according to another. The 
important point here is to set out both the international interests and the foreign 
policy practices of each country.  US foreign policy interests have largely determined 
the relationship with Turkey for most of the time since 1945:  Turkey has been 
affected – politically and economically -- both by specific US policies and more 
general global foreign policy maneuvers. For this reason I have sought to illustrate 
US general policy along with its position in specific cases (such as NATO, the 
Korean War, the Gulf War and so on) before focusing on Turkey’s position in these 
same cases.  
As can be seen from previous chapters, one of the specific difficulties in 
analyzing Turco-American relations arises from the wide range of variables that 
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affect this relationship given Turkey’ sensitive geo-strategic position between 
Europe, the Middle East and the Caucasus (with the ethnic, cultural and linguistic 
ties between Turkey and Central Asia adding another dimension to this mixture). All 
of these interests have shaped the American attitude towards Turkey over the years. 
In this sense, more deep American interest in the region of Turkey means that more 
put dependency issue in Turco-American relations agenda. In this sense, dependency 
on the US appears as one characteristic of the US-Turkish relations. Following the 
observations made in the introduction and in chapter 5, does dependency theory fully 
describe the Turkish position in the Turco-American relationship? The answer is no:  
Turkey is not fully dependent on  US foreign policy interests and economics  in 
accordance with classical dependency theory  as described in  chapter one.   Firstly, 
the Turkish position vis-vis the US can perhaps best described as ‘undulating’:  as 
noted before, the relationship has not been static but has been repeatedly buffeted by 
all types of difficulties, as described in this study. There is an unchallenged 
consensus on the ‘undulating’ structure of Turco-American relations (as Prof. Emre 
Kongar).  The two countries have lived through periods of strain   (during the Gulf 
War, Cyprus and the latest US invasion of Iraq) as well as full cooperation (Bosnia, 
Somalia and the Korean War).  As a result it is hard to conclude that dependency 
theory fully describes the Turco-American relationship.  It fits some aspects of the 
relationship (i.e. Turkish dependency on US arms during the Cold War, which was a 
constraint on Turkey’s foreign policy towards Greece and Cyprus (see chapter 4- 
4.1).  Dependency can also clearly be seen in the economic aspect of the relationship.   
According to a  US source: “As part of the cooperative effort to further Turkish 
economic and military self-reliance, the United States has loaned and granted Turkey 
more than $4 billion in economic aid and more than $14 billion in military 
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assistance.”164  By the end of the year 2000, Turkey had been given approximately 
$18 billion in economic and military aid (some of it a loan) by the US.  In addition, 
Turkey was to receive another $8.5 billion loan from the US in the aftermath of the 
US invasion of Iraq. (We should also add the loans which have been provided by 
IMF and the World Bank, because the US also played an essential role in the 
decision to give these loans to Turkey). As a result, the Turkish economy has been 
strongly support with mostly American-oriented loans.  
 Here it must be said -- as observed in the beginning of this chapter – which 
Turkey has not allowed economic dependency to be transformed into total political 
dependency. Secondly, the relationship was symbiotic from the end of the Second 
World War: in pursuit of global and regional geo-strategic imperatives the US 
needed Turkey while Turkey needed American loans to develop its economy. In 
short, dependency theory only explains one part of the Turco-American relationship.  
  As I have pointed out, (See Chapter 1) realpolitik is another element 
explaining the nature of the Turco-American relationship.  Turco-American relations 
have been constructed on the basis of the national strategic and geographic interests 
of both sides.  This has remained true from the Cold War to the present US interest in 
Turkey’s Muslim and democratic secular structure in the aftermath of September 11 
(see Chapter 3-3.4 and chap. 4-4.3). On the other hand, similar to dependency theory, 
realpolitik is also somehow not adequate to explain the whole nature of Turco-
American relations.  In the post-Cold War Era, as Sellahattin Bakan (Bal, 2001:17) 
has pointed out, realism theory suffers from being restricted to such concepts as the 
struggle between nation states when new issues are now involved.: (e.g. international 
terrorism). Even neo-realist tendencies do not seem adequate to explain today’s 
                                                 
164 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm 
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complicated international relations. The conceptualization of theories may not be 
reflect all costs and benefits of a specific bilateral relations (like Turco-American 
relations): the post-Cold War Era  has illustrated  different complexities that 
strengthen the notion of  fitting  bilateral relations into general explanations of 
theories. In this sense, however realism has been referred to as one of the best and 
closest explanation to Turco-American relations. In other words, while realism is 
useful and even important a theoretical tool, the complex and opportunistic nature of 
Turco-American relations lead access to alternative description and explanations, 
that may be specific to Turco-American relations. 
The insufficiency of general theories has caused me also to look for an 
adequate description of the Turco-American relationship.  ‘Strategic partnership’ is 
the concept which has been frequently used. As retired US ambassador Marc 
Parris165 indicates that 
Formal recognition that the relationship had reached a new level of maturity 
came with Bill Clinton's November 1999 visit to Turkey. To prolonged, 
repeated applause from Turkey's Parliament, President Clinton declared the 
U.S. and Turkey to be "strategic partners," a term applied at the time to a very 
few close allies of the U.S., notably Israel.  
 Ironically, as I have shown in earlier chapters (Chp.1 and Chp.2 and also in 
Chp. 3), it is hard to see continuous total cooperation in the history of the Turco-
American relationship. The evidence indicates that the concept of ‘strategic 
partnership’ has been used arbitrarily in defining Turco-American relations.  The 
essential point here is how we define the concept of ‘strategic partnership’ between 
Turkey and the US. Almost all the cases that have been analyzed in this thesis 
somehow reflect the fact that the Turco-American relationship has been 
characterized by episodes of full cooperation (such as the Korean War, Bosnia, 
                                                 
165 Turkish Policy Quarterly, April 2003 
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Somalia and Afghanistan) and also friction (over Cyprus, Armenia, and the US 
invasion of Iraq in 2003).  Therefore, in my opinion, the ‘strategic partnership’ is 
also inadequate as a convincing description of the relationship between the two 
countries. This seems particularly true of the developments in the aftermath of 
September 11; differences over the invasion of Iraq have again called into question 
the validity of the ‘strategic partnership’ in the long-run. (We can easily evaluate the 
relations between the US and the Great Britain as full meaning of “Strategic 
Partnership” concept. Then we may be questioning the strategic partnership concept 
between the US and Turkey.)   
In summary, analyzing cost-benefits on the basis of particular issues makes 
more sense than trying to sum up the total costs and benefits involved in the Turco-
American relationship. So this tendency also explains why I have preferred to add a 
chapter called “Mixed Blessings” (Chapter 4) in addition to its classical separation of 
Turco-American relations like (the Cold War, the post-Cold War), because Turco-
American relations have been shaped by not only conjectural and global changes 
(like the end of the Cold War) but also it has been manipulated by very specific 
issues (Like Cyprus operation in 1974 and the following US arm embargo). More 
interestingly, as kind of unique side of Turco-American relations, even a specific 
issue may be influential in the direction of global politics. In other words, the 
strategic and geographic position of Turkey and global power identity of the US have 
made almost all issues in Turco-American relations as a key issue for other actors. 
Therefore, it is essential to look at particular cases in Turco-American relations 
rather than determining the relations in general terms. In this sense, Turkey had to 
pay lots of costs not only because of the global identity of the US, but also Turkey’s 
own failures have played a crucial role to determine the level of its’ costs (such as 
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Turkey specifically paid costs in the Middle East policies (sec.2.6) and in IRBMs 
issue (sec.2.4) and US Military Bases in Turkey (sec.2.5)). On the other hand, 
Turkey had to face with costs which originated directly to the US and its global 
hegemony (such as the Gulf War and the latest US invasion of Iraq (sec.3.3) and the 
‘War on Terrorism’ and Afghanistan operation (3.4)). 
In the realm of benefits, it is possible to claim that there have been two types 
of benefits which have been characterized by different cases in the contemporary 
history of Turco-American relations in the aftermath of the Second World War. First, 
as I pointed out before, Turkey has generally taken advantages of surprise 
opportunities in the aftermath of any global or regional initiative of the US (Such as 
the correlation between shifting the US foreign policy against radical Islamism and 
Turkey’s EU membership as a Muslim and secular country (sec.3.5.3)). The crucial 
point here is that most of these opportunities which can be labeled as “benefit” are 
mostly short-term, because they are also directly influenced by other developments 
which may not be directly related to Turkey. Therefore, again, as has been mentioned 
several times in the previous chapters, the ‘undulating’ nature of Turco-American 
relations somehow has constrained Turkish benefits and opportunities. 
The second type of benefit which is deliberate outcome of Turkish Foreign 
policy. For example, Turkish influence on US policy in order to involve and lead 
NATO operations to prevent aggression of Serbia in accordance with its’ long-term 
plans for the Balkan region. Surely, it would be too optimistic to expect fulfillment 
of Turkish interests to in the regional and global policies of the US, because it is 
impossible to see both Turkish and the US interests in a complementary form. As 
noted before, Turkey’s costs have generally increased when its policies have been 
closely aligned with those of the US (i.e. its pro-western Middle Eastern policy 
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during the Cold War) or when they have run counter to US positions (i.e. over 
Cyprus or the invasion of Iraq in 2003).  The conclusion arising from this study is 
that Turkey must develop a multi-directional and well-planned policy in order to 
minimize the possible costs that seem likely to emerge from the relationship with the 
US in the new global environment.  
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